Hunt v. Mazaharirvesh, No. A06-2134 (Minn. App. 12/24/2007)

• Decision Date: 24 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. A06-2134.,A06-2134.
• Parties: Pamela D. Hunt, Appellant, v. Nosratollah Mazaharirvesh, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

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Unpublished Opinion

Pamela D. Hunt, Appellant, v. Nosratollah Mazaharirvesh, Respondent.

No. A06-2134.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Filed December 24, 2007

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2006).

Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 27-CV-03-000584.

Nicholas P. Slade, Barry & Slade, LLC, (for appellant).

Robert A. O'Malley, (for respondent).

Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge; Dietzen, Judge; and Ross, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINON

DIETZEN, Judge.

Appellant challenges a district court order and resulting judgment denying her claims arising out of the purchase of a motor vehicle from respondent, arguing that the district court erred in its application of the law. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Respondent Nosratollah Mazaharirvesh owns and operates P & N Auto Service, which is a car dealership and mechanic shop. In December 2001, respondent, acting on behalf of P & N, purchased a 1994 Dodge Caravan (Caravan) from Insurance Auto Auction. Prior to purchasing the Caravan, respondent received a list of the vehicles for sale, which categorized some vehicles as "salvage title." The certificate of title to the Caravan was not stamped "salvage" but the front of the certificate of title indicated that the vehicle had sustained damage in excess of 70% of its actual cash value. But the back of the title, reflecting the assignment to P & N, was left blank. Respondent observed some damage to the rear tailgate and bumper. The Caravan was displayed on P & N's lot for sale to the public, and in April 2002, appellant Pamela Hunt purchased the Caravan from P & N and signed a document entitled "Car Sales Agreement" (the agreement).

The agreement states that the purchase price is $3,500, that "car sold as is-she paid $1,000 down and pay $300 every month until payment down," and that respondent would "replace rear door and rear bumper of '94 Dodge because was damage[d]." In extra-large print in the middle of the page, it states "The car is sold as is!"

Appellant took possession of the Caravan and P & N retained possession of the title. Several weeks later, the transmission of the Caravan failed, but it was not related to the earlier damage to the vehicle. P & N arranged for the transmission repair, which cost $1,300; appellant made partial payment of the repair bill to respondent and the balance was added to the amount that appellant owed to respondent.

In June 2002, the Caravan's registration tabs expired and appellant was unable to renew the registration because the certificate of title had not been transferred. Respondent then obtained the registration tabs, and appellant exchanged a check for the tabs. But appellant stopped payment on the check and made no further payments because respondent had not transferred the title.

In October 2002, appellant discovered that the Caravan had sustained significant damage in an accident, and appellant commenced this action. About a month later, respondent repossessed the Caravan without appellant's knowledge or permission. Appellant then obtained a court order directing the Minnesota Department of Driver and Vehicle Services to transfer title of the vehicle to appellant. Several months later, appellant's husband observed the Caravan being driven on the road and, with the assistance of law enforcement, had the vehicle stopped and returned to appellant. Appellant continues to store the vehicle.

At trial, appellant, her husband, and respondent testified. Following trial, the district court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered a judgment denying appellant's claims and awarding respondent damages on his counterclaim for the unpaid balance under the car-sale agreement. Appellant moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. This appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellant argues that the district court erred in its application of the law in denying her nine causes of action. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 1998). When interpreting a statute, we give words their plain and ordinary meaning. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2006); All Metro Supply, Inc. v. Warner, 707 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. App. 2005). Appellant does not challenge the district court's findings of fact and adopts those findings as the facts of the case. Therefore, our review is limited to whether the conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact, which is a question of law we review de novo. Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Minn. App. 2002).

I.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that respondent did not violate the federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act when he failed to disclose the mileage of the vehicle on the title and that the violation was made with the intent to defraud appellant.

The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (the act), 49 U.S.C. §32701-32711 (2000), was enacted to prohibit tampering with motor vehicle odometers and to protect purchasers in the sale of motor vehicles with altered or reset odometers. 49 U.S.C. § 32701(b). The act requires, among other things, that a vehicle's mileage be disclosed to the purchasing party in writing on the title. 49 U.S.C. § 32705(a)(2); 49 C.F.R. § 580.5 (2000). The act provides that a private party may bring a cause of action against a person who violates the act with intent to defraud and that the violator is liable for three times the actual damages or $1,500, whichever is greater. 49 U.S.C. § 32710(a).

The district court denied appellant's claim, concluding that "[t]here was no proof that [respondent] failed to comply with The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act with the intent to defraud [appellant]. The mileage is listed as 110,060 as of April 2002, on the sales agreement signed by both [respondent] and [appellant]." The district court also concluded, in denying appellant's claim of common law fraud, that there was no proof that respondent "falsely represented the condition of the Caravan to [appellant]."

Appellant argues that the statute imposes liability for any violation of the act with intent to defraud regarding the general condition of a vehicle. Respondent contends that the act requires a finding of intent to defraud regarding the vehicle's mileage. We agree with respondent. See Ioffe v. Skokie Motor Sales, Inc., 414 F.3d 708, 709 (7th Cir. 2005) (the act requires a showing that the defendant intended to defraud the purchaser regarding the vehicle's mileage). The purposes of the act are focused on odometer readings and protecting consumers in the purchase of vehicles with altered or incorrect odometer readings. See 32 U.S.C. § 32701(b); Nabors v. Auto Sports Unlimited, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (rejecting more expansive intent requirement because of the "express and limited purpose of the statute"). We see nothing in the act that expands liability beyond intent to defraud a purchaser regarding a vehicle's mileage. Thus, the district court did not err in dismissing the claim.

II.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying her claim for relief under the Minnesota Odometer Act (the Minnesota act), Minn. Stat. §§ 325E.13-.16 (2000). Specifically, appellant argues that respondent violated the Minnesota act by failing to transfer title in violation of Minn. Stat. § 168A.11, failing to disclose the mileage on the certificate of title, and failing to obtain appellant's signature on the title.

The Minnesota act provides that "[n]o person shall transfer a motor vehicle without disclosing in writing to the transferee the true mileage registered on the odometer reading," and that the regulations contained in 49 C.F.R. §§ 580.1-.17 "prescribe the manner in which written disclosure must be made in this state and are adopted by reference." Minn. Stat. § 325E.15. The federal regulations adopted by reference require, among other things, that the seller disclose the true mileage of the vehicle to the purchaser in writing on the certificate of title and that the seller obtain the purchaser's signature on the title. 49 C.F.R. § 580.5 (1998). The Minnesota act provides that a private party may bring a cause of action against a violator, and that "[a]ny person injured by a violation of sections 325E.13 to 325E.16 shall recover the actual damages sustained together with costs and disbursements." Minn. Stat. § 325E.16 (2000).

But liability under Minn. Stat. § 325E.15, requires a showing that the person has been "injured" and has "actual damages." Bachovchin v. Stingley, 504 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Minn. App. 1993) (concluding that plaintiff was not "injured" and not entitled to costs and attorney's fees because the jury found that he suffered no damages from defendant's violation of the Minnesota act). Here, appellant has failed to show actual damages. Thus, the district court did not err in denying the claim.

III.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying her claim under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2000), and Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z., 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.36 (2000).

TILA was enacted "to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices." 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a). TILA and its regulations create a comprehensive scheme governing consumer credit transactions and impose a system of strict liability in favor of consumers. Wise Furniture v. Dehning, 343 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Minn. 1984) (citing Thomka v. A.Z. Chevrolet, Inc., 619 F.2d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 1980)). TILA provides that a person may bring a private cause...