Huntley v. Huntley (In re Huntley)
Decision Date | 17 April 2017 |
Docket Number | C080534 |
Citation | 10 Cal.App.5th 1053,216 Cal.Rptr.3d 904 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Frank and Deanna HUNTLEY. Frank Huntley, Respondent, v. Deanna Huntley, Appellant. |
Matthew B. Smith, Davis, for Appellant.
BAIR & BAIR and Pamela A. Bair, Sacramento, for Respondent.
Deanna Huntley challenges the trial court's denial of her motion to divide unadjudicated community property under Family Code section 2556.1 Deanna filed her motion more than two years after entry of a default judgment that dissolved her marriage to Frank Huntley.2 The trial court denied the motion on grounds Deanna had not first moved to set aside the default judgment.
On appeal, Deanna contends (1) section 2556 confers the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate omitted community property without having to first move to set aside the judgment, (2) the dissolution judgment's silence as to the division of any property means all of the community property remains to be divided, and (3) the trial court's error requires reversal for proper division of the parties' community property.
We conclude section 2556 provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to divide omitted or unadjudicated community property. The default judgment's silence as to any division of property requires reversal and remand for further proceedings under sections 2550 and 2556.
The facts of this case are undisputed. Frank and Deanna married in 2000 and separated in June 2011. As the trial court found,
The trial court further found that
In December 2011, Frank served Deanna with a petition for dissolution of marriage, an income and expense declaration, and a community and quasi-community property declaration. Frank's petition stated all community and quasi-community property was listed in his accompanying declaration. However, the declaration did not list any property other than a house with a negative value of $89,000.
Deanna was served with the petition and attached declarations, but did not respond. In July 2012, Frank filed a request for default and served Deanna with a copy of the request. In October 2012, the trial court entered a default judgment. The default judgment dissolved the marriage but did not mention any community property.
At some point after Deanna received the request to enter a default judgment, she signed a grant deed conveying all title and interest in the house to Frank.
In November 2014, Deanna filed a motion to adjudicate omitted community property. After conducting several hearings, the trial court denied the motion. In denying the motion, the trial court reasoned that The trial court acknowledged, "the Judgment does not award assets to either party," but found The trial court further found Deanna's signing of the grant deed to the house "seems to support [Frank's] contention that the parties had an oral agreement as to how to divide their assets and debts." There is no indication the oral agreement was stated on the record in open court. Ultimately, the trial court determined "this case is concluded."
Deanna timely filed a notice of appeal.
Deanna contends a motion to vacate the default judgment was not necessary because section 2556 provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to hear her "motion for adjudication of omitted assets." The contention has merit.
We review questions of statutory interpretation under the independent standard of review. (Connerly v. State Personnel Bd . (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 788, 129 P.3d 1.) (Coker v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A . (2016) 62 Cal.4th 667, 674, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 364 P.3d 176, quoting Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 841, 292 P.3d 883.)
"Generally, once a marital dissolution judgment has become final, the court loses jurisdiction to modify or alter it." (In re Marriage of Thorne and Raccina (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 492, 499, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 887 (Thorne ).) However, as the California Supreme Court has explained, a dissolution judgment does not affect the disposition of community property as to which the judgment is silent. ( Henn v. Henn (1980) 26 Cal.3d 323, 330, 161 Cal.Rptr. 502, 605 P.2d 10 (Henn ).)
At the time the California Supreme Court decided Henn , a former spouse was required to file a new case in order to seek division of community property assets that were omitted from a dissolution judgment. (Henn, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 330, 161 Cal.Rptr. 502, 605 P.2d 10.) To alleviate the burden of filing an entirely new action to divide community property previously omitted in a dissolution judgment, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 4353 that was later recodified without substantive change at Family Code section 2556. (Lakkees v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 531, 540, fn. 5, 271 Cal.Rptr. 845 (Lakkees ); see also West's Fam. Code, § 2556, Law Revision Commission Comment [" Section 2556 continues former Civil Code Section 4353 without substantive change"].)
Section 2556 provides: (Italics added.)
In providing courts with continuing jurisdiction, section 2556 imposes no time limit on former spouses to seek to adjudicate omitted or unadjudicated community property after a dissolution judgment was entered. In Lakkees, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d 531, 271 Cal.Rptr. 845, the Court of Appeal noted arguments "that a dilatory party who suffers an involuntary dismissal should be barred from the postjudgment relief available under Civil Code section 4353 are not supported by any statutory language." (Id. at p. 540, fn. 5, 271 Cal.Rptr. 845.) The same observation holds true for Civil Code section 4353's successor: there is no statute of limitations imposed by section 2556 on a former spouse who seeks adjudication of omitted or unadjudicated community property. Section 2556 also imposes no limitation for default judgments such as that entered in this case. Accordingly, section 2556 applies to require adjudication of the omitted assets.
Section 2556 applies even when former spouses were aware of the community property at the time the dissolution judgment was entered. In Huddleson v....
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