Huntsman v. Huntsman
| Decision Date | 04 October 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. C1-00-1923.,C1-00-1923. |
| Citation | 633 N.W.2d 852 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of James Richard HUNTSMAN, petitioner, Appellant, v. Zenith Annette HUNTSMAN, f/k/a Zenith Annette Morgan, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
James Richard Huntsman, pro se.
Law Offices of Brad C. Eggen, Brad C. Eggen, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.
This appeal arises from the marital dissolution of appellant James Richard Huntsman and respondent Zenith Annette Huntsman. Review of the underlying claims is not before this court. We granted review to decide the narrow question of whether the provision in Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 104.01, subd. 2, for the commencement of the appeal period applies where judgment has been entered on the order disposing of a proper and timely post-decision motion. The court of appeals held that it does not and dismissed the appeal as untimely. We reverse.
On April 23, 1998, appellant served his wife, the respondent, with a summons and a petition for dissolution of their marriage. The parties were able to reach a settlement on child custody, child support, marital property, debt, and attorney fees, but went to trial on spousal maintenance and related issues. On January 12, 2000, the district court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and Judgment and Decree. A copy of the order was entered as the judgment on January 14. Both sides moved to amend that judgment, and respondent moved for a new trial. The court heard arguments from the parties, and issued an Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment, and Judgment and Decree on August 30, 2000. On September 1, the district court administrator entered a copy of that order as an amendment to the original judgment. On September 7, appellant was served by facsimile with notice of the August 30 order; a copy was mailed the same day.
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on November 6, 2000—60 days after receiving notice of the order,1 but 66 days after the amended judgment was entered. His notice of appeal stated it was from the January 12 and August 30 orders. Respondent moved the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that appellant had not appealed from a final judgment or an appealable order.
The court of appeals noted that even though appellant's notice of appeal had referred only to the January 12 and August 30 orders, he had included copies of both the January 14 judgment and the September 1 amended judgment. Huntsman v. Huntsman, No. C1-00-1923 at 2 (Minn.App. Dec. 27, 2000) (unpublished interim order). Citing our opinion in Kelly v. Kelly, 371 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Minn.1985), the court of appeals held that the appeal should be liberally construed as an appeal from the judgments. Huntsman at 2. The court of appeals construed the appeal as from the amended judgment and concluded that even though the time to appeal the January 14 judgment was tolled by post-decision motion, the period to appeal the September 1 amended judgment was unaffected and expired 60 days after its entry. Id. at 2-3. Because appellant had filed his notice of appeal more than 60 days after entry of the September 1 judgment, the court of appeals dismissed it as untimely. Id. at 3.
Resolution of the jurisdictional issue before us requires interpretation of Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01. Because the interpretation of court rules presents a question of law, our review is de novo. Madson v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 612 N.W.2d 168, 170 (Minn.2000). Rules "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," Minn. R. Civ. P. 1, and should be given liberal construction so as to effectuate that purpose. Kornberg v. Kornberg, 542 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1996). This court also liberally construes the contents of notices of appeal in favor of their sufficiency. Kelly, 371 N.W.2d at 195.
An amendment to Rule 104.01, effective on January 1, 1999, and therefore applicable to this case, provided:
Unless otherwise provided by law, if any party serves and files a proper and timely motion of a type specified immediately below, the time for appeal of the order or judgment that is the subject of such motion runs for all parties from the service by any party of notice of filing of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding. This provision applies to a proper and timely motion: (c) to alter or amend the judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02; [or] (d) for a new trial under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59 * * *.
Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 104.01, subd. 2. Notices of appeal filed before the disposition of post-decision motions are considered premature: not only do they not divest the district court of jurisdiction, they are given no effect and must be filed anew "within the time prescribed to appeal the underlying order or judgment, measured from the service of notice of filing of the order disposing of the outstanding motion." Id., subd. 3. The amendment also created a 60-day period to appeal from both judgments and appealable orders unless otherwise provided by statute. Id., subd. 1.
The policy underlying these rule changes was to clarify when parties can file appeals, and to provide consistent means for district courts to consider all pending motions without losing jurisdiction by a premature appeal. As we discussed in Madson, the amendments to rule 104.01 were intended to solve the problem we confronted in Marzitelli v. City of Little Canada, 582 N.W.2d 904 (Minn.1998). See generally Madson, 612 N.W.2d at 171 (citing Marzitelli, 582 N.W.2d at 904). Under the unamended version of rule 104.01, the district court's jurisdiction to decide post-decision motions terminated when the time for appeal ran or when an appeal was filed. Id. (citing Marzitelli, 582 N.W.2d at 907). Parties had to file timely appeals and then apply to the appellate court for a stay of appeal to allow time for the district court to decide post-decision motions. Id. (citing Marzitelli, 582 N.W.2d at 907). Rule 104.01 was changed to "simplify practice" in the hopes of creating "less confusion" about the timing of appeals. Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 104.01 advisory committee's cmt. (1998 amendment).
Once the time to appeal has been tolled by a proper and timely post-decision motion, it commences upon service of notice of filing of the order disposing of the last post-decision motion outstanding, not the prior entry of an amended judgment. The rule clearly states that "the time for appeal of the order or judgment that is the subject of [a proper and timely] motion runs for all parties from the service by any party of notice of filing of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding." Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 104.01, subd. 2. The text of the amended rule does...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
City of Waco v. Dock
...procedure. Specifically, we seek to "preserv[e] the right to appeal" and avoid setting a "trap for the unwary." Huntsman v. Huntsman , 633 N.W.2d 852, 855–56 (Minn. 2001). We also encourage unified appeals. Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc. , 418 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn. 1988) ("[T]he thrust of the rule......
-
Lennartson v. ANOKA-HENNEPIN SCHOOL DIST.
...Ass'n v. Buckentin, 410 N.W.2d 820, 823 (Minn.1987). The interpretation of court rules presents a question of law. Huntsman v. Huntsman, 633 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Minn.2001). Accordingly, our standard of review is de Before addressing the interpretation of Rule 1.10(b), a brief history of Jenson......
-
In re R.K., A17-0497.
... ... This practice gave L.A. little reason to rely on the service made on his appointed trial attorney. 7 In Huntsman v. Huntsman , the appellant was served with notice of the filing of an order by facsimile and on the same day was also served with notice by mail ... ...
-
In re Marriage of Huntsman v. Huntsman, No. A04-286 (MN 11/30/2004)
...dismissed as untimely, but it was reinstated by the Minnesota Supreme Court to be decided on the merits. See Huntsman v. Huntsman, 633 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Minn. 2001). 3. Due to appellant's second pending appeal, the originally scheduled hearing date had to be rescheduled because the district ......