Hussey v. City of Muskegon Heights
Decision Date | 01 October 1971 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 9785,No. 3,3 |
Citation | 193 N.W.2d 421,36 Mich.App. 264 |
Parties | Eddie HUSSEY and Agnes Hussey, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF MUSKEGON HEIGHTS, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellee |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Edward C. Wilson, Muskegon, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Charles H. Rawlings, Muskegon, for defendant-appellee.
Before R. B. BURNS, P.J., and HOLBROOK and LEVIN, JJ.
The plaintiffs, Eddie and Agnes Hussey, commenced this action against the defendant, City of Muskegon Heights, claiming that they were damaged when Agnes Hussey tripped after stepping into a hole approximately 10 1/2 inches by 7 1/2 inches in the sidewalk in front of a store in that city located at 2042 Peck Street, and that the city is liable under the 1964 governmental tort immunity act to compensate them for their damages because it had failed to maintain the sidewalk 'in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel'. 1
The circuit judge granted the city a summary judgment, dismissing the Husseys' action on the ground that the notice of injury and defect which they gave the city following the accident was not sufficiently specific and, therefore, did not comply with the statutory requirement, viz.:
M.C.L.A. § 691.1404 (Stat.Ann.1969 Rev. § 3.996(104)). 2
Agnes Hussey tripped and fell on September 23, 1966. Twenty-five days later, on October 18, 1966, the Husseys' attorney sent the following letter:
'Clerk of City Commission
City of Muskegon Heights
City Hall
Muskegon Heights, Michigan
'Re: Agnes Hussey
'Dear Sir:
'Mrs. Agnes Hussey has contacted me in regard to a fall with resulting injuries she sustained on September 23, 1966, on Peck Street at Johnson Drugstore and Vi & Herm's Cafe, 2042 Peck Street.
'It is merely my intention to notify you of a possible claim at this time; my information is that there appeared to be a defect in the sidewalk at this location.'
The following day, October 19, 1966, the city manager sent the letter received from the Husseys to the city's liability insurer. One of the insurer's adjusters conducted an investigation, and submitted a report on April 27, 1967.
The principal purpose sought to be served by requiring notice is to provide the governmental agency with an opportunity to investigate the claim while the evidentiary trail is still fresh and, additionally, to remedy the defect before other persons are injured. 3
In this case the defendant City of Muskegon Heights learned within 26 days of the accident that Agnes Hussey claimed she was caused to trip and fall by reason of a defect in the sidewalk in front of 2042 Peck Street.
The Husseys' description of the defect as a 'defect in the sidewalk' in front of 2042 Peck Street is adequate. In Jones v. City of Ypsilanti (1970), 26 Mich.App. 574, 583, 584, 182 N.W.2d 795, 800, we held that a notice based on a 'defective sidewalk immediately east of 5 West Michigan Avenue which is located on the south side of Michigan Avenue' was sufficient. 4 While in Jones the defendant city admitted it had experienced no difficulty in locating the defect and there is no such concession on the record in this case, neither has it been shown that defendant city of Muskegon Heights experienced any difficulty in locating the defect. It affirmatively appears from the report dated April 27, 1967, prepared by the insurance adjuster, that the claimed defect was located without difficulty.
In Meredith v. City of Melvindale (1969), 381 Mich. 572, 165 N.W.2d 7, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the notices of injury and defect given in that case substantially complied with Melvindale's charter requiring that the 'notice shall specify the location and the nature of the defect, the injury sustained, the names of the witnesses and the facts concerning the happening of the accident complained of'. 5
In Meredith, the first (and only timely) notice stated the date, place, and the nature of the injured person's Activity and injury. It did not state the names of any witnesses. 6 The Supreme Court ruled that the first notice (Emphasis supplied.) Meredith, supra, 381 Mich. 580, 581, 165 N.W.2d 11, 12.
Meredith and subsequent decisions of our Court make clear that a notice of injury and defect will not be regarded as insufficient because of a failure to comply literally with all the stated criteria. Substantial compliance will suffice.
In Republic Franklin Insurance Company v. City of Walker (1969), 17 Mich.App. 92, 169 N.W.2d 175, we held that there had been substantial compliance with a notice requirement where the notice stated the date of an automobile collision between the plaintiff and one of the defendant's police cruisers even though the notice did not state the place where the collision occurred. 7
In Kustasz v. City of Detroit (1970), 28 Mich.App. 312, 184 N.W.2d 328, we held that the failure to verify a notice of claim was not a fatal defect in a case where the notice was specific as to the time, place, nature, and result of the accident. Similarly see Reynolds v. Clare County Road Commissioners (1971), 34 Mich.App. 460, 191 N.W.2d 503.
We are satisfied that, as the law now stands, deficiencies in a notice of injury and defect are not of jurisdictional import, and an injured person may not be denied his day in court on that account absent a showing by the governmental agency that it has been thereby prejudiced.' 8
While names of witnesses were not stated in the notice given by the Husseys to the City of Muskegon Heights, their notice would not be defective on that account if they were unaware of any witnesses. 9 And even if they failed to mention the name of a witness of whom they were aware, that failure would not necessarily justify dismissal of their complaint. See Meredith v. City of Melvindale, Supra, and discussion in fn. 6.
Likewise, although the notice given by the Husseys did not state the nature of Agnes Hussey's injuries, we doubt whether the city would have been substantially aided in its investigation or defense if the notice had stated, as does the complaint, that she suffered 'serious and permanent injuries to her right ankle and both knees'. 10 This deficiency in the notice has not been shown to be prejudicial.
The statute further provides that 'the notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with civil process directed against the governmental agency'. 11 The failure to serve the notice personally or by certified mail is inconsequential where, as here, the notice was timely received. See Meredith v. City of Melvindale, Supra.
Pertinent to our disposition is the following recent statement by the Michigan Supreme Court:
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