Hussman v. Leavell & Sherman
| Decision Date | 26 November 1930 |
| Docket Number | No. 1399-5581.,1399-5581. |
| Citation | 32 S.W.2d 643 |
| Parties | HUSSMAN v. LEAVELL & SHERMAN. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Turney, Burges, Culwell & Pollard, of El Paso, for plaintiff in error.
Whitaker & Peticolas, of El Paso, for defendants in error.
This suit was begun in the Forty-First district court of El Paso county, Tex., by Charles H. Leavell and Ray E. Sherman, composing the firm of Leavell & Sherman, hereafter referred to as plaintiffs, against Harry L. Hussman, hereafter referred to as defendant, to recover certain commissions claimed by plaintiffs against the defendant. The case was submitted to a jury on special issues in the district court, and based on the court's construction of the law as applied to the verdict, judgment was entered for the plaintiffs for $5,000. On appeal this judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 20 S. W.(2d) 829. The case is in the Supreme Court on writ of error granted on application of defendant.
We find it necessary to make a rather extended statement of the plaintiffs' pleadings. It is alleged by them, in substance, that prior to May 1, 1927, the Dieter estate owned a certain tract of land in the city of El Paso, El Paso county, Tex.; that during the year 1926, and prior to May 1, 1927, the plaintiffs were real estate agents in El Paso, Tex., and were authorized by the owners of said property to sell, or dispose of the same on a longterm lease; that, in connection therewith, and in their efforts to dispose of the property for such owners, the plaintiffs corresponded with divers business organizations, particularly with chain store organizations, with reference to such property; that among these organizations was the J. C. Penny Company; that, through the correspondence of the plaintiffs and by reason of the efforts of the plaintiffs, the J. C. Penny Company became thoroughly familiar with the property and its desirability for a long-term lease, but at that time no lease was effected; that about May 1, 1927, the Dieter estate sold and conveyed the property to the defendant; that thereafter the defendant, by and through his authorized agent, J. M. Pollard, authorized the plaintiffs to sell or lease the property for the usual and customary commission, and at that time learned that these plaintiffs had been in correspondence, and negotiations with many and divers chain store organizations with a view of making a long-term lease of the property.
Plaintiffs further allege that about July 31, 1927, the defendant, through his said authorized agent, requested the assistance of the plaintiffs in effecting a sale of the property to one Joe Kline of Los Angeles, Cal., and in the resulting conference between Hussman and his representative, and Kline and these plaintiffs it developed that Kline was considering purchasing the property, but would only do so in the event he could probably lease it on a long-term lease to some solvent lessee, preferably a chain store organization; that, knowing that the plaintiffs had had extensive correspondence and negotiations with different chain store organizations, and were in position to facilitate such a lease, and so induce the sale to Kline, to purchase said property, the defendant agreed with the plaintiffs that for their assistance in convincing Kline that the property could probably be leased, and their efforts to convince Kline that he could probably lease the property, that, if Kline was able to negotiate a lease with any of the parties with whom the plaintiffs had been negotiating or corresponding, and if Kline should purchase the property and lease to any of said parties, the defendant would pay the plaintiffs a commission of $5,000.
It is further alleged by plaintiffs that, acting in accordance with this agreement, the plaintiffs advised Kline of the names and addresses, information and offers, correspondence had, and negotiations pending, names and addresses of district managers, etc., together with the information as to the desires and policies of the concerns with whom plaintiffs had been corresponding. It is then alleged who these parties were, among them being the J. C. Penny Company.
It is further alleged by the plaintiffs that,...
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John Deere Co. v. May
...evidence cannot be excluded just because it may prejudice the opposing party before the fact-finder. Hussmann v. Leavell & Sherman, 20 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1929), aff'd, 32 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Comm'n App.1930, judgmt adopted). This is because Rule 403 recognizes that evidence c......
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Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Alvarez
...allowed when it would tend either directly or by inference to establish or negate a principal fact in issue"); Hussmann v. Leavell & Sherman, 20 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tex.Civ.App.1929) (court stated "a party cannot be deprived of the benefit of evidence which is relevant and material because it ......
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Minchen v. Rogers, 17459
...finally took lumber from the construction site, which would certainly interfere with the construction of these houses. In Hussman v. Leavell & Sherman, 20 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso, judgment affirmed, 32 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Com.App.1930), the court discussed the relevancy of evidence ver......
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Kendall Co. v. Plastic Engineering & Sales Corp.
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