Hutchins v. Candler
| Decision Date | 12 November 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 17999,17999 |
| Citation | 209 Ga. 415,73 S.E.2d 191 |
| Parties | HUTCHINS et al. v. CANDLER et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The Constitution, art. 6, sec. 17, par. 1, Code Ann. § 2-5201, provides that the General Assembly may create county commissioners and define their duties. The exception of county commissioners from the unformity requirement of art. 11, sec. 1, par. 6, Code Ann. § 2-7806, when construed with the power to create them, makes it clear that art. 1, sec. 4, par. 1, Code Ann. § 2-401, imposes no constitutional limitation on the power of the Assembly to create them and define their duties. The rights and powers of county commissioners are not defined by general laws, but by the special acts creating them.
2. In this case the authority granted by the General Assembly to tax assessors to use information based upon a cadastral survey in equalizing values for taxation, is not a substitution of the survey for the discretion of the assessors.
3. The complainants show no injury to themselves by the imposition of the fee to be collected to cover the expenses of the survey.
The equitable petition of W. H. Hutchins and others, as citizens and taxpayers, against Scott Candler, as Commissioner of Roads and Revenues of DeKalb County, attacked as illegal and void a certain contract entered into by the commissioner, providing for a cadastral survey. The petition attacked as unconstitutional and void the act of 1941, Ga.L.1941, p. 382, and the act of 1951, Ga.L.1951, p. 85, providing for a cadastral survey in certain counties. It was alleged that these Acts were unconstitutional and void, because such acts were special laws in violation of the constitutional provision, that 'Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law.' Constitution, art. 1, sec. 4, par. 1, Code Ann. § 2-401. The tax assessors of the county, the tax commissioner, and the clerk of the superior court were also named as parties defendant. It was alleged that the contract for the cadastral survey, and use of the information contained therein by the tax assessors, amounted to an illegal and unauthorized attempt to deprive the tax assessors of the duty imposed on them by law to assess valuations, and substitute, for the powers and duties imposed by law upon the tax assessors, the information contained in the survey. The provisions of the acts for the collection of an additional fee of 25cents by the clerk of the superior court, for the recording of instruments affecting the title to real estate, amounted to an illegal and unauthorized tax.
The peitioners sought to enjoin the tax assessors from using the information contained in the survey, and to enjoin the clerk of the superior court from collecting the additional recording fee provided by the acts, and other equitable relief. Their prayers for interlocutory injunctin were, upon hearing thereof, denied. The exception is to that judgment.
J. Hugh Rogers, J. E. B. Stewart, Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.
J. A. McCurdy, Decatur, Thomas B. Branch, Jr., Atlanta, for defendants in error.
1. Generally this court will not decide constitutional questions unless a decision on the constitutional question is essential to a proper determination of the cause. Oglesby v. State, 123 Ga. 506, 51 S.E. 505; Harper v. Davis, 197 Ga. 762, 765, 30 S.E.2d 481; Richmond County v. Harper, 206 Ga. 517, 57 S.E.2d 595. In the present case, the petitioners base their action upon the alleged invalidiy of the acts of 1941, Ga.L.1941, p. 382, and 1951, Ga.L.1951, p. 85, providing for a cadastral survey in certain counties. It is contended that these acts are special laws having application only to the County of DeKalb, and are in conflict with the constitutional provision that laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State; and that no special law shall be enacted where provision has been made by an existing general law. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 4, par. 1, Code Ann. § 2-401.
In this case it is unnecessary to determine whether the acts attacked by the petitioners may be general or special laws. If the acts attacked are general laws, the petitioners have no cause for complaint. If their contention can not be sustained that these laws are special acts, in conflict with a general law, the very foundation upon which they rest their complaint would fall.
The acts of 1941 and 1951 confer upon the governing authority of those counties falling within the classification set forth in the acts the power and authority to establish, through a cadastral survey, a field book system for real property identification and evaluation. In this case the Commissioner of Roads and Revenues is conceded to be the governing authority of DeKalb County. The acts attacked by the petitioners relate primarily to the duties and powers of the Commissioner of Roads and Revenues. If the acts of 1941 and 1951 are special laws limited in their application to the County of DeKalb only, such acts are not unconstitutional for any reason assigned by the petitioners.
The Constitution of 1945, art. 6, sec. 17, par. 1, Code Ann. § 2-5201, provides: 'The General Assembly shall have power to provide for the creation of county commissioners in such counties as may require them, and to define their duties.' This provision of the Constitution of 1945 was contained in the Constitution of 1877 and the Constitution of 1868.
This court, in Churchill v. Walker, 68 Ga. 681, 686, with reference to the power of the General Assembly under this provision of the Constitution of 1868, stated: 'There is no limit on the power of the legislature to create commissioners and define their duties.' In County of Pulaski v. Thompson & Co., 83 Ga. 270, 9 S.E. 1065, based on the constitutional provision of 1877, this court held: 'The legislature has the power to pass separate and distinct acts for any counties which require county commissioners; and it is not necessary that these acts...
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...made so by the special laws creating them.' Bowen v. Lewis, 201 Ga. 487, 489, 40 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1946). See also Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952), and Rhodes v. Jernigan, 155 Ga. 523, 117 S.E. 432 (1923). There is no requirement of uniformity with regard to the powers a......
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...189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394; Bowen v. Lewis, 201 Ga. 487, 489, 40 S.E.2d 80; Robert v. Steed, 207 Ga. 41, 60 S.E.2d 134; Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 418, 73 S.E.2d 191. 4. It is further contended that the act of 1937, Ga.L.1937-38, Ex.Sess., p. 790, and all zoning thereunder is unconsti......
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