Hutchins v. Hutchins .

• Decision Date: 05 March 1945
• Citation: 41 A.2d 612
• Court: Maine Supreme Court
• Parties: HUTCHINS v. HUTCHINS (two cases).

41 A.2d 612

HUTCHINS

v.HUTCHINS (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 5, 1945.

Exceptions and Appeal from Superior Court, Androscoggin County.

Action at law by Bradford H. Hutchins against Edith Hyde Hutchins, executrix of the estate of Guy H. Hutchins, deceased, for money had and received, consolidated with suit in equity by Bradford H. Hutchins, executor of the estate of Nellie M. Hutchins, deceased, against Edith Hyde Hutchins, executrix of the estate of Guy H. Hutchins, deceased, to have it decreed that the defendant, in her official capacity, held in trust for the benefit and use of the plaintiff a certain fund. Exceptions were filed by defendant to the decision for the plaintiff in the action at law, and, from the decree in equity, the defendant appeals.

Exceptions sustained in action at law, and appeal sustained as to bill in equity, and case remanded for dismissal of bill.

Berman & Berman, of Lewiston, for plaintiff.

George C. & Donald W. Webber, of Auburn, for defendant.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, MURCHIE, and CHAPMAN, JJ.

CHAPMAN, Justice.

The court is presented with the rather novel situation of two actions, one at law and the other in equity, seeking the same end and brought by the same person in different capacities, with judgment ordered for the plaintiff in each case. The two actions were heard together, a Justice of the Superior Court acting as Referee in the suit at law and as sitting Justice in the equity suit. By agreement, the evidence presented applied to both cases. In the suit at law, the decision was that the plaintiff, in his personal capacity, was entitled to $4,564.38. In the equity suit, it was decreed that the defendant, in her said capacity, holds in trust for the benefit and use of the plaintiff a fund of $4,564.38 which she was ordered to pay over to the plaintiff and also to make accounting and pay to the plaintiff any increase of the fund that had accumulated while in her hands. The finding of the Referee was sustained in the Superior Court and exceptions were filed by the defendant. From the decree in equity, appeal was taken.

The litigation arises from the following facts: Albert A. Hutchins died intestate. He left a widow, Nellie M. Hutchins, and a son Guy H. Hutchins as his only heir. The son was appointed administrator of his father's estate. He filed an inventory showing both real estate and personal property. Nellie M. Hutchins filed a petition in the Probate Court for widow's allowance. No objection was made thereto and decree was entered granting an allowance of all the personal estate after the payment of debts, expenses of last sickness and expenses of administration. Subsequently a petition was filed by the widow asking that the decree be amended to the effect that the allowance should be one-half of the personal property after the payment of debts, expenses of last sickness and expenses of administration. This petition remained upon the files of the Probate Court without action thereon. The administrator, Guy H. Hutchins, filed his ‘First and Final Account’ in which he accounted for the personal property scheduled in the inventory and increment while in his hands, and credited himself with sundry expenses and with the payment to himself and Nellie M. Hutchins of the balance in the proportion of two-thirds and one-third respectively. The account was allowed by the Judge of Probate. Voucher acknowledging receipt by Nellie M. Hutchins of one-third of the personal property of the estate was filed in support of the account. No order of distribution was made nor petition for the same filed.

Subsequently to the allowance of the account Nellie M. Hutchins died testate and, in accordance with her will, Bradford H. Hutchins, son of Guy H. Hutchins, qualified as executor. It is in this capacity that he appears as plaintiff in the bill in equity. He was also named in the will as residuary legatee and, as such, he brings the suit at law.

Subsequently to the death of Nellie M. Hutchins, Guy H. Hutchins died and Edith Hyde Hutchins qualified as executrix under his will and, in that capacity, is named as defendant in the two actions.

It is the contention of the plaintiff in both cases that an agreement was made between Nellie M. Hutchins and Guy H. Hutchins, subsequently to the entry of decree of widow's allowance and previous to the filing of the account of Guy H. Hutchins an administrator, that they would divide equally the personal property of the estate after the payment of debts, expenses of last sickness and expenses of administration, and that the agreement was not kept by Guy H. Hutchins in that he paid her one-third only of the balance of the personal property. This agreement and the breach thereof is the foundation for the claim in both actions.

In the action at law the declaration is for money had and received with specifications setting forth the Probate proceedings hereinbefore referred to, and the claimed agreement between Guy H. Hutchins and Nellie M. Hutchins and breach thereof by Guy H. Hutchins, by reason of which it is claimed that the plaintiff is entitled as residuary legatee of the estate of Nellie M. Hutchins to recover from the executrix of the estate of Guy H. Hutchins that part of the money of the estate that Guy H. Hutchins failed to pay to Nellie M. Hutchins, namely,-the difference between one-third and one-half thereof and alleged to be the sum of $4,564.38. There is further specification of claim to recover the value of certain articles of personal property which it is claimed had belonged to Nellie M. Hutchins and retained by Guy H. Hutchins in his lifetime and, after his death, by the defendant. It will be noted that this claimed right to recover by the residuary legatee is not against the estate of which he is a beneficiary but upon an obligation in favor of that estate by the defendant's deceased.

It appears from the evidence that within the period provided by statute for a proof of claim against the estate of a deceased person ‘Proof of claim of Bradford H. Hutchins' was filed in the Probate Court. The claim as presented was not, in its terms, set forth in the record and it does not appear whether the claim was filed in behalf of Bradford H. Hutchins personally or by him in his capacity as executor of the estate of Nellie M. Hutchins.

The Probate Court is a tribunal entrusted with the administration of estates of deceased persons within channels provided by legislative enactment. Its jurisdiction in this respect is exclusive and is limited to the authority so given. Graffam v. Ray, 91 Me. 234, 39 A. 569; Appeal of Thompson, 116 Me. 473, 102 A. 303. It can distribute personal property only in accordance with the provisions of the legislative grant of authority, and this is so even though the beneficiaries agree otherwise. Knowlton v. Johnson, 46 Me. 489; Grant v. Bodwell, 78 Me. 460, 7 A. 12.

It follows that while the parties, Guy H. Hutchins and Nellie M. Hutchins, could enter upon an agreement to divide monies which should come to them through distribution by the court, in such manner as they saw fit, they could not make an agreement that would affect the distribution of the estate by the court. They could make an agreement personally binding upon the parties but of no effect upon them in any other than their personal capacities.

If a valid agreement existed between Guy H. Hutchins and Nellie M. Hutchins, and Guy H. Hutchins breached the same, an action accrued to Nellie M. Hutchins; but, upon the death of the parties, the action survived to the executor of the estate of Nellie M. Hutchins and he alone could maintain the action against the estate of Guy H. Hutchins. Palmer v. Palmer, 112 Me. 156, 91 A. 284; Lee v. Chase, 58 Me. 432. In that case, Chief Justice Appleton said:

‘The legal representative of the estate is the proper party to any litigation, when the assets of the estate are to be recovered for its benefit. * * * The administrator represents all those rights and unites in himself all those interests. Upon him alone the law devolves the duty of their protection and enforcement. He only can give a valid discharge. His bond to the judge of probate is the security afforded by law to all interested in the estate, and if he fails in his duty, those aggrieved must seek their remedy upon it.’

To the same effect is Wright v. Holmes, 100 Me. 508, 510, 62 A. 507, 3 L.R.A., N.S., 769, 4 Ann.Cas. 583. This is recognized as the settled law of this jurisdiction. Wilson's Probate Law, page 146.

[5] Irrespective of the fact that the amount claimed may eventually come to him, the residuary legatee is not entitled to the same until it has been administered upon as the property of the...