Hutchinson, Matter of

Decision Date23 May 1989
Docket NumberNo. C0-88-2493,C0-88-2493
Citation440 N.W.2d 171
PartiesIn the Matter of the Occupational License of Kathy HUTCHINSON.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

The Minnesota Racing Commission's decision that appellant violated Minnesota Rules regulating the medication of a horse prior to its participation in a race was made upon lawful procedure, and is supported by substantial evidence.

Robert J. Hennessey, Andrew J. Mitchell, Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren Ltd., Bloomington, for Kathy Hutchinson.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Mary B. Magnuson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for Minnesota Racing Com'n.

Heard, considered and decided by SHORT, P.J., and RANDALL and KALITOWSKI, JJ.

OPINION

SHORT, Judge.

Kathy Hutchinson initially appealed a decision of the Minnesota Racing Commission. At appellant's request, the case was transferred to the district court for the taking of additional evidence on alleged procedural irregularities. See Minn.Stat. § 14.68 (1988). The case is now before us following the district court's decision against appellant. Pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03(g), appellant alleges that the Commission's decision: (1) was made upon unlawful procedure, and (2) was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm the Commission's decision.

FACTS

Appellant Kathy Hutchinson is a horse trainer who received her license from the Minnesota Racing Commission in 1985. She raced a number of horses at the Minnesota race track, Canterbury Downs, in 1985 and 1986. During the summer of 1986, appellant was administering a drug called propranolol to several of her horses. The drug is legal, and was prescribed by a veterinarian. However, Minnesota law prohibits the administration of propranolol and other medications to a horse within 48 hours of a race. See Minn.Stat. § 240.24, subd. 1 (1988); Minn.R. 7890.0110. Trainers use propranolol to control and reduce rapid heart rates and cardiac output induced by intense training. The drug is metabolized quickly by horses and is transformed into various water soluble products eliminated by the kidneys.

On August 7, 1986, appellant raced three horses, named Blopo's Nite, Dr. Francis, and Grey Writer, at Canterbury Downs. On August 7, 1986, Grey Writer placed second at the Canterbury race track. Immediately after the races, urine samples were taken from the three horses.

On August 21, the urine samples were analyzed at the Minnesota Racing Analytical Laboratory of the University of Minnesota, College of Veterinary Medicine. The tests showed that all three horses had received propranolol. The urine samples of Blopo's Nite and Dr. Francis showed traces only of a derivative drug, 4-hydroxy propranolol. Grey Writer's urine sample, however, tested positive for 4-hydroxy propranolol and its parent drug, propranolol. After determining that the test for the parent drug was positive, the Canterbury officials asked and received permission to conduct a search of appellant's stables. That search produced five bottles of Inderal L.A., a trade name for a long-acting form of propranolol.

On August 27, appellant was served with a notice of hearing before the Board of Stewards at Canterbury Downs. Following that hearing, appellant was suspended for 30 days and fined $500.00. The Board also referred the matter to the Minnesota Racing Commission for additional action. During the term of her suspension, appellant was ordered off all race track grounds under the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all horses owned or trained by her were declared ineligible to enter races. The purse that Grey Writer had won on August 7 was ordered forfeited and redistributed. Appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Commission, together with a request for a stay of the suspension.

A panel of the Racing Commission stayed all action of the Board of Stewards pending its resolution of the appeal following a contested case hearing. The case was then heard before an administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Office of Administrative Hearings. Appellant submitted into evidence various medication log books maintained by her. The entries in those books indicated that no propranolol had been administered to any of the horses within 48 hours before the August 7 race. Appellant also testified that she had not medicated the horses in question within 48 hours of the race.

The Commission offered the testimony of the Director of the Ohio State Racing Commission Laboratory. Based upon his knowledge and upon tests he had conducted on other horses, this expert concluded that Grey Writer had been medicated less than 48 hours before the race began. This testimony was corroborated by testimony of the Director of the Minnesota Racing Laboratory. 1

The ALJ found that the Commission had failed to submit substantial evidence proving that appellant administered propranolol to any of the three horses within 48 hours of the August 7 race. The ALJ based his recommendation on appellant's testimony and her medication logs. He also found that the scientific research about the metabolism rate of propranolol was inconclusive. 2

After the ALJ had issued his recommendation, the matter was heard by the Minnesota Racing Commission pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 14.61 (1988). The Commission heard arguments from the counsel for both parties, and then deliberated on the case in a closed session. The Commission announced its decision publicly, before the parties and their attorneys.

The Commission adopted findings and conclusions, in part contrary to those the ALJ had recommended. The Commission reasoned that the test results were reliable, that the Commission's expert testimony was supportive, and that appellant's history of past violations adversely affected her credibility. 3 The Commission therefore reimposed the suspension and fine.

Alleging various procedural irregularities in the Commission's proceedings, appellant sought a writ of certiorari to have the Commission's decision reviewed by this court. This court issued an order transferring the matter to the Hennepin County district court for the taking of testimony relevant to the alleged procedural irregularities. The trial court then ruled against appellant on all of her procedural arguments.

ISSUES

I. Was the Commission's decision made upon unlawful procedure?

II. Was the Commission's decision supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record?

ANALYSIS
I.

Where the trial court reviewing an agency decision makes independent factual determinations and otherwise acts as a court of first impression, this court applies the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 823 (Minn.1977); see also Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 872 (1st Cir.1985). Where, on the other hand, the trial court is itself acting as an appellate tribunal with respect to the agency decision, this court will independently review the agency's record. Reserve Mining, 256 N.W.2d at 824; see also Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 342 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Minn.1983). In the present case, the trial court based its conclusions as to the procedural issues raised by appellant on legal rather than factual considerations. This court conducts a de novo review of such issues, and is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court or of the agency itself. See No Power Line, Inc. v. Minnesota Envornmental Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 320 (Minn.1977).

A. The Commission's failure to file exceptions is not fatal.

Appellant argues that because the Commission staff failed to file exceptions to the ALJ's report, the Commission was required to adopt the report in its entirety. This argument is contrary to law. Surf & Sand Nursing Home v. Department of Human Services, 422 N.W.2d 513, 519-20 (Minn.Ct.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. June 23, 1988). An ALJ's report to the Commission is only a recommendation, and neither binds the parties nor limits the independent factfinding power of the Commission. There is thus no basis to conclude that the Commission is obligated to adopt the ALJ's recommendations when a party fails to submit written exceptions.

B. The Commission did not violate the Open Meeting Law.

Appellant next contends that the Commission's decision to close the deliberative portion of the proceedings violates the Minnesota Open Meeting Law. That law states in relevant part:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all meetings * * * of any state agency, board, commission or department when required or permitted by law to transact public business in a meeting * * * shall be open to the public. * * * This section shall not apply to any state agency, board, or commission when exercising quasi-judicial functions involving disciplinary proceedings.

Minn.Stat. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1988) (emphasis added). Appellant does not dispute that the Commission is a state agency, or that it was exercising a quasi-judicial function. She argues, however, that the "disciplinary proceedings" contemplated by the act pertain only to employee discipline matters, and not to proceedings involving licensees.

The Open Meeting Law requires that all meetings of state agencies be open to the public, subject only to a few explicitly-stated exceptions. St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc. v. District 742 Community Schools, 332 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn.1983). Disciplinary proceedings are among the "rare and carefully restrained exception[s]" specified by the legislature. Id. Minnesota courts have not distinguished between disciplinary proceedings involving employees and those involving licensees. See Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24, 29-30 (Minn.1989); St. Cloud Newspapers, Inc., 332 N.W.2d at 5. Appellant argues, however, that the legislative history of the open meeting law requires that such a distinction be recognized by the courts.

A statute whose meaning is plain must...

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