Hutson v. Rent-a-Center, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 December 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.4:00-CV-198(HL).,CIV.A.4:00-CV-198(HL).
• Parties: R. Scott HUTSON, Plaintiff, v. RENT-A-CENTER, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

209 F.Supp.2d 1353

R. Scott HUTSON, Plaintiff, v. RENT-A-CENTER, INC., Defendant.

No. CIV.A.4:00-CV-198(HL).

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Columbus Division.

December 11, 2001.

Ronald S. Iddins, Columbus, GA, for R. Scott Hutson.

Marcus Benton Calhoun, Jr., George Golden Boyd, Jr., Columbus, GA, Robert F. Friedman, Franklin E. Wright, Dallas, TX, for Rent-A-Center, Inc. LAWSON, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Tab # 10) and Plaintiff's Motion to Allow Amendment (Tab # 15).

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

Rent-A-Center operates stores throughout the United States, including stores in Georgia and Alabama. (Church Decl. ¶ 3.) Rent-A-Center rents merchandise, which it owns, to customers on a rent-to-own basis. Id. at ¶ 4. The merchandise comes from existing stock or through its merchandise catalog. (Hutson Dep. at 40.) When merchandise is ordered from the catalog, it is shipped directly to the store from a vendor, almost all of which are located almost exclusively outside the state of Georgia. (Church Decl. ¶ 8.) The merchandise is delivered by Rent-A-Center employees in Rent-A-Center trucks to customers in Georgia and Alabama. Id. at ¶ 6.

Plaintiff, Scott Hutson, was employed by Rent-A-Center in Columbus, Georgia from March 1998 until February 2001. (Hutson Dep. at 17.) The stores at which Plaintiff worked had customers in Georgia and Alabama. Id. at 52, 56. Plaintiff was hired as an Account Manager. As an Account Manager, Plaintiff "spent a substantial portion of his time transporting furniture and appliances to the homes of customers of the Defendant's `rent to own' business." (Pl.'s Br. in Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) Plaintiff received a promotion and became an "Inside Outside Manager" from October 16, 1999 until February 3, 2000. Plaintiff testified that as an Inside Outside Manager, he still made deliveries "on average about twice ... a week." (Hutson Dep. at 72-73.) Plaintiff resumed his "Account Manager" position on February 3, 2000. Id. at 76.

On November 13, 2000, Plaintiff sued Rent-A-Center alleging violations of the overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Summary Judgment Standard

"[T]he plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time and discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party must put forth more than a "mere `scintilla'" of evidence; "there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir.1990).

A district court "can only grant summary judgment `if everything in the record ... demonstrates that no genuine issue of material fact exists.'" Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 952 (11th Cir.1986)(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Genuine disputes are those where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In deciding whether a genuine factual issues exist, the court must accept the truth of Plaintiff's evidence and must draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1486 n. 3 (11th Cir.1996). The court may not weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations. Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir.1993).

B. Fair Labor Standards Act

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") established minimum labor standards in order to eradicate "labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers." 29 U.S.C.A. § 202(a) (1998). Under Section 7 of the FLSA, covered employees, which include those engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, must be paid the minimum wage for each hour worked and must be paid at one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 206, 207. In Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he is entitled to receive overtime pay for each week in which he worked more than forty hours. (Compl. ¶ 3.)

1. Overtime Exemption — Section 13(b)(1)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is exempt from the overtime provisions, pursuant to Section 13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which provides an exemption from the maximum hours and overtime pay requirements of Section 7 of the Act. An employee is exempt if he is an "employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49." 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(b)(1).

The three elements to the Section 13(b)(1) exemption are (1) the employee must be employed by a motor carrier, (2) the employee must affect highway safety, and (3) the employee's activities must involve the interstate transportation of goods. 29 C.F.R. § 782.2 (2001); Baez v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 938 F.2d 180, 181-82 (11th Cir.1991).

a. Rent-A-Center is a Motor Carrier

Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 213(b)(1) refers to the Secretary of Transportation's power pursuant to 49 U.S.C.A. § 31502. Section 31502 states:

(a) Application. — This section applies to transportation —

(1) described in sections 13501¹ and 13502 of this title..

(b) Motor carrier and private motor carrier requirements. — The Secretary of Transportation may prescribe requirements for —

(1) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of, and safety of operation and equipment of, a motor carrier; and

(2) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of, and standards of equipment of, a motor private carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation.

Thus, the Secretary of Transportation has the power to regulate employees of motor carriers whose duties affect safety on the highways when interstate shipments of property are involved. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 31501, 31502. Title 49 U.S.C.A. § 13102(13) defines "motor private carrier:"

The term "motor private carrier" means a person, other than a motor carrier, transporting property by motor vehicle when —

(A) the transportation is as provided in section 13501 of this title (B) the person is the owner, lessee, or bailee of the property being transported; and

(C) the property is being transported for sale, lease, rent, or bailment or to further a commercial enterprise.

Rent-A-Center rents merchandise, which it owns, to customers on a rent-to-own basis. Rent-A-Center delivers merchandise from its store in Columbus, Georgia to its customers. These deliveries include deliveries in Phenix City, Alabama. (Hutson Dep. at 73-74.) Since Rent-A-Center transports property which it owns across state lines in furtherance of its commercial enterprise, the Court finds that Rent-A-Center is a motor carrier.

b. Plaintiff's Duties Affect Highway Safety

At all times during his employment, Plaintiff's job duties included making deliveries as a driver, in Rent-A-Center trucks, to customers in Georgia and Alabama. (Hutson Dep. at 55, 56, 73, 74.) As an Account Manager, he spent a "substantial" portion of his time making deliveries. When he became an Inside Outside Manager, the number of deliveries he made decreased; however, he still made deliveries, though not as frequently as when he was an Account Manager. Plaintiff testified that as an Inside Outside Manager, he made deliveries "on average about twice ... a week." (Hutson Dep. at 72-73.)

The Supreme Court has specifically ruled that drivers affect highway safety. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 931, 91 L.Ed. 1158 (1947); Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 68 S.Ct. 131, 137, 92 L.Ed. 44 (1947); 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(2) (2001). Thus, since Plaintiff was a driver, he was engaged in safety affecting activities.

Plaintiff argues that, as an Inside Outside Manager, the exemption does not apply to him. (Pl.'s Br. in Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) Plaintiff refers to Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 67 S.Ct. 954, 960, 91 L.Ed. 1184 (1947), where the Court found a de minimis exception to the application of the Motor Carrier Act. In Pyramid, the Court held that persons who only handle freight before or after loading perform tasks that may be too "trivial, casual, or occasional" to affect safety and bring them under the Motor Carrier Act's authority. Id. The workers in Pyramid are distinguishable from Plaintiff. In Pyramid, the workers were loaders who did not drive in interstate commerce. Here, the Plaintiff was a driver, even during the time he worked as an Inside Outside Manager. The former Fifth Circuit affirmed a decision that held that the Pyramid de minimis exception does not apply to drivers: "the de minimis rule should seldom, if ever, be applied to one who drives a motor vehicle carrying property of a private carrier in interstate commerce." Sinclair v. Beacon Gasoline Co., 447 F.Supp. 5, 11 (W.D.La.1976), aff'd, 571 F.2d 978 (5th Cir.1978).

The Court recognizes that the Plaintiff did not make as many deliveries during the time he was employed as an Inside Outside Manager. However, he still made deliveries approximately twice a week, and therefore still falls within the exemption:

As a general rule, if the bona fide duties of the job performed by the employee are in fact such that he is (or, in the case of a member of a group of drivers, driver's helpers, loaders, or mechanics employed by a common carrier and engaged in safety-affecting occupations, that he is likely to be) called upon in the...