Hyde v. Anania

• Decision Date: 28 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-2273,96-2273
• Citation: 578 N.W.2d 647
• Parties: Joleen HYDE, Appellee, v. Alan ANANIA, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 647

578 N.W.2d 647

Joleen HYDE, Appellee, v. Alan ANANIA, Appellant.

No. 96-2273.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 28, 1998.

Kimberly Pieters Knoshaug of Lewis, Webster, Johnson, Van Winkle & DeVolder, Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard E.H. Phelps II, Mingo, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, LAVORATO, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

LAVORATO, Justice.

Alan Anania did not appeal an adverse small claims judgment against him in a timely manner because the district court clerk did not notify him of the judgment entry. He moved to vacate the judgment, but the small claims court--and later the district court on appeal--refused to entertain the motion. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 252(a). Both courts decided they lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. We granted Anania discretionary review. He contends the district court erred in ruling that the small claims court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. He also contends the district court's refusal to vacate denied him due process of law because the clerk did not notify him of the judgment entry. We affirm.

On April 30, 1996, Joleen Hyde filed a small claims action against Anania. Hyde alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and sought both compensatory and punitive damages in connection with her purchase of a motor vehicle from Anania.

Anania appeared pro se and filed an answer denying the allegation. District Associate Judge Thomas W. Mott heard the case and took the matter under advisement.

On June 26 Judge Mott entered judgment against Anania, awarding Hyde $2400 in compensatory damages and $1600 in punitive damages.

The clerk of court did not notify Anania of the judgment until August 8. This was beyond the time for appeal. See Iowa Code § 631.13 (1995).

On August 13 Anania, through counsel, filed a motion to vacate or modify pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 252(a). Rule 252(a) allows a court to correct, vacate, or modify a final judgment because of mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk.

Although a hearing was scheduled on the motion, no hearing was held. On September 10 Judge Mott issued a memorandum ruling. Judge Mott held that the small claims court had no jurisdiction to hear Anania's motion to vacate or modify.

On September 17 Anania appealed to the district court. Hyde moved to dismiss the appeal, and Anania resisted.

On December 6 District Judge Joel D. Novak ruled that the small claims court lacked jurisdiction to hear Anania's rule 252(a) motion and affirmed the small claims court decision. The district court also rejected Anania's procedural due process claim.

We granted Anania's application for discretionary review of Judge Novak's ruling. See id. § 631.16; Iowa R.App. P. 201.

Anania contends the small claims court had jurisdiction to hear his rule 252(a) motion. Failing this, he contends the district court's refusal to vacate denied him due process because the clerk did not notify him of the judgment entry.

On discretionary review of a small claims action, our standard of review depends on the nature of the case. Roeder v. Nolan, 321 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 1982). If the action is a law case, we review the district judge's ruling on error. Id. A proceeding to vacate a judgment under rule 252 is an action at law. Mishler v. Stouwie, 301 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1981). Our review is therefore on assigned errors. Id.

I. The Jurisdictional Issue.

With one exception not pertinent here, a small claims court may only hear motions at trial. Iowa Code § 631.7(2) ("Motions, except a motion under rule 34 of the rules of civil procedure, shall be heard only at the time set for a hearing on the merits."). By definition, a "posttrial motion" can only be heard after trial. Schrock v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 541 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1995); Barnes Beauty College v. McCoy, 279 N.W.2d 258, 260 (Iowa 1979). For this reason, we have held that section 631.7(2) prohibits the small claims court from hearing posttrial motions. See Schrock, 541 N.W.2d at 258 (holding that small claims court has no jurisdiction to consider motion to set aside judgment pursuant to Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 256 and 257); Midwest Recovery Servs. v. Cooper, 465 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Iowa 1991) (same regarding motion to amend findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 179(b)); Severson v. Peterson, 364 N.W.2d 212, 214 (Iowa 1985) (same regarding motion to set aside a judgment pursuant to Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 252 and 253); Barnes, 279 N.W.2d at 260 (same regarding motion for new trial pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 244).

In Barnes we noted that for small claims suits "the legislature thought it was in the public interest to provide a simpler, easier, and less expensive procedure than was afforded in district court under the Rules of Civil Procedure." 279 N.W.2d at 259. To prove our point, we noted the simplified procedures in Iowa Code chapter 631 for the trial of small claims cases. Id. Based on these simplified procedures, we concluded the legislature's omission of any provision for new trial motions was "deliberate." Id. at 260. We went on to say:

Providing such a motion would be a step toward formalism, expense, and delay in obtaining final judgment. And new trial motions are incompatible with the legislature's desire that any party wishing so could appear without counsel.... Determining which, if any, of these often complex grounds [for new trial in rule 244] are present in a case, and preparing an argument as required by rule 244, that substantial rights of the litigant have been materially adversely affected would require the skills of an attorney.

... Finally, the appeal to district court under section 631.13 calls for the case to be examined anew. As the small claims court indicated, this right of appeal otherwise provides essentially the same relief as a new trial.

Id.

In subsequent cases involving posttrial motions in small claims court, we referred to these same considerations. See Schrock, 541 N.W.2d at 258; Midwest Recovery Servs., 465 N.W.2d at 856-57; Severson, 364 N.W.2d at 213. As to rule 252 and 253 motions, we said in Severson:

We find these same considerations [noted in Barnes ] persuasive here and militate against a recognition by us of a proceeding under rules 252 and 253 for vacation of a judgment in small claims court. No hint is given in chapter 631 of any such posttrial motions. Also, because the grounds for vacation of judgment are fairly complex, recognition of such procedure would almost certainly require the assistance of an attorney, a step toward the formalism sought to be avoided in small claims actions. It could, in effect, make a "federal case" out of a small claims action.

364 N.W.2d at 213.

Anania tries to distinguish Severson. He points out that in Severson the plaintiffs initially defaulted and then moved to vacate the judgment under rules 252 and 253. He argues that the case does not reveal whether the plaintiffs received notice of the judgment in time to file an appeal to the district court. So, he argues, Severson provides no guidance or precedent where the ground of the motion is the clerk's failure to provide notice of judgment entry in time for appeal.

The argument must fail. Our case law is clear that the small claims court has no jurisdiction to hear posttrial motions--and more specifically rule 252 motions--regardless of the grounds. It is true that in Severson, we noted by way of dictum that a party might have an independent action if the judgment is actually procured by fraud. Id. at 213-14. Anania does not claim the judgment was procured by fraud. In addition, Anania did not file an independent action. Rather, he has proceeded under rule 252(a). The small claims court had no jurisdiction to consider the rule 252(a) motion.

As mentioned, Iowa Code section 631.13(1) governs time for appeal from a small claims judgment:

An appeal from a judgment in small claims may be taken by any party by giving oral notice to the court at the conclusion of the hearing, or by filing a written notice of appeal with the clerk within twenty days after judgment is rendered.... No appeal shall be taken after twenty days.

(Emphasis added.) Anania did not appeal from the small claims judgment within twenty days following the entry of judgment. In fact, he never did appeal from that judgment; he only appealed from the small claims court's ruling on the rule 252(a) motion. Because the small claims court had no jurisdiction to consider the rule 252(a) motion, there was nothing for the district court to review regarding that motion.

Anania has a fall-back position. He thinks we should allow him the same slack we allow litigants in the district court where the clerk has failed to serve notice of a judgment entry. Anania has reference to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 82(f) (1997) and our case law interpreting rule 252(a) regarding a clerk's failure to serve notice of a judgment entry as rule 82(f) requires. Rule 82(f) provides in relevant part:

Immediately upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall serve a notice of the entry by mail in the manner provided for in this rule upon each party....

... Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the district court to relieve a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed.

This court has held that "a direct appeal, taken at the time notice of the order is received but outside the thirty-day period, is doomed to failure by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 82(f)." Uchtorff v. Dahlin, 363 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Iowa 1985) (citing In re Estate of Young, 273 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa 1978)). This is so even though the reason the party failed to file a timely appeal arose from the clerk's failure to send notice of the entry of the order or judgment. Id. at 265 (clerk failed to mail notice of ruling on rule 179(b) motion).

In Young, this court provided a way around the harsh...