Hyde v. Atlanta & W.P.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 June 1933
• Docket Number: 22918,22951.
• Citation: 169 S.E. 854,47 Ga.App. 139
• Parties: HYDE v. ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO. ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO. v. HYDE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

169 S.E. 854

47 Ga.App. 139

HYDE v. ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO.

ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO. v. HYDE.

Nos. 22918, 22951.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, First Division

June 17, 1933

Syllabus by the Court.

Visitor on railroad premises, invited by passenger to transact personal business while passenger's train waited in station, held "licensee," not "invitee."

A "licensee" is a person who is neither passenger servant, nor trespasser and does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises, and is permitted to come upon the premises for his own interest, convenience, and gratification.

1. One who enters the premises or platform of a railroad company at a station, for the purpose of seeing a passenger, who is passing the station on a train, on business purely personal as between them, occupies, as to the railroad company, the position of a licensee, and not of an invitee. This is true although the passenger may have "sent word" to such person to come to the train to talk to him while passing through. In such case there is no mutuality of interest so far as the railroad company is concerned.

2. The court did not err in sustaining the demurrer to the petition as amended.

Error from City Court of Newnan; W. L. Stallings, Judge.

Suit by Alvin M. Hyde against the Atlanta & West Point Railroad Company. Demurrer to petition was sustained, and plaintiff brings error, defendant filing a cross-bill of exceptions.

Affirmed on main bill of exceptions, and cross-bill of exceptions dismissed.

Hall & Jones, of Newnan, for plaintiff in error.

Howell Heyman & Bolding, and Allen Post, all of Atlanta, and Stanford Arnold, of Newnan, for defendant in error.

GUERRY Judge (after stating the foregoing facts).

It becomes necessary to determine whether the allegations of the amendment are sufficient to withstand the ruling heretofore made by this court in this case. The petition originally alleged that the plaintiff went to the station "for the purpose of transacting some important business with a party who petitioner was informed was a passenger on said train, said business being of interest to said passenger and petitioner, being a matter of reciprocal concern to both." Does the amendment, setting out the name of the prospective passenger and the further allegation that petitioner was there upon the invitation of such passenger to transact business with which the defendant company was not concerned, take the petition as amended without the scope of the ruling heretofore made? We think not. If the relationship of the plaintiff to the defendant be that of trespasser or licensee, then there can be no recovery under the allegations as made, for the reason that no wanton or willful negligence is alleged, nor is there any allegations that any mantraps or pitfalls were being maintained by the defendant. Do the amendments offered make the relationship between the parties that of invitee and invitor? The Plummer v. Dill Case 156 Mass. 426, 31 N.E. 128, 129, 32 Am.St.Rep. 463, is probably the leading case in decisions of this character and has been quoted approvingly by our courts of review. The real principle governing matters of this kind is set forth in the following language: "To come under an implied invitation, as distinguished from a mere license, the visitor must come for a purpose connected with the business in which the occupant is engaged, or which he permits to be carried on there." See Gordon v. Cummings, 152 Mass. 513, 25 N.E. 978, 9 L.R.A. 640, 23 Am.St.Rep. 846; Rome Furnace Co. v. Patterson, 120 Ga. 521, 48 S.E. 166. In Gainesville & Gulf R. Co. v. Peck, 55 Fla. 402, 46 So. 1019, 1022, it is said: "A licensee is a person who is neither a passenger, servant, or trespasser, and not standing in any contractual relations to the railroad [owner of the premises], and is permitted *** to come upon its premises for his own interests, convenience, or grantification. " (Italics ours.) In the case of Jones v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 22 Ga.App. 717, 97 S.E. 112, it was held that the owner of premises owes, to those who come upon his premises upon an express or implied invitation for any lawful purpose, the duty to exercise ordinary care in keeping his premises safe. He owes no such duty to those who come upon the premises not upon an express or implied invitation, but for their own purposes, however laudable such purposes may be. In that case it was held that those who visited an office building for the purpose of transacting business with the tenants therein are invitees and entitled to the exercise of ordinary care in keeping the premises safe for the use of such invitee. It was also held that no such obligation exists towards those who elect to come upon the premises, not for the purpose of doing such business with the owners or his tenants as the public is expressly or impliedly...