Hyde v. City of Lake Stevens
| Decision Date | 03 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 72614-5-I,72614-5-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STEVEN W. HYDE and SANDRA D. BROOKE, husband and wife, Appellant, v. CITY OF LAKE STEVENS, Respondent. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DWYER, J. — The doctrine of res judicata prevents a plaintiff from bringing successive actions against the same defendant when the actions arise from the same transactional nucleus of facts. After Steven Hyde, the appellant in this matter, had his claim of negligence against the City of Lake Stevens dismissed, he filed a successive action against the City in which he alleged a claim of negligent misrepresentation. Because the negligent misrepresentation claim arose from the same events that formed the basis of Hyde's negligence claim, the trial court's dismissal of Hyde's negligent misrepresentation claim was justified by the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of Hyde's negligent misrepresentation claim. The record herein, however, does not support the trial court's imposition of Civil Rule 11 sanctions against Hyde's counsel. We reverse that order.
On June 2, 2009, the City of Lake Stevens offered Steven Hyde a position as a police officer. As part of his training, Hyde participated in taser training. He completed the written taser training on June 10, 2009 and on the next day, June 11, participated in the practical taser application and testing.
During this part of the training, Hyde was subjected to a short burst of the taser weapon in accordance with the taser training protocol. Before the tasing took place, Hyde signed a release from Taser International, the manufacturer of the weapon. Hyde then laid with his back on the floor and with clips attached to his right arm and left ankle. A taser instructor applied the taser to him. Later that same day, Hyde complained of back pain and filed an injury report.
On August 28, 2009, the pain not having resolved, Hyde had surgery on his back. On September 25, 2009, Hyde contacted Taser International, inquiring about the recommended methods of exposure during taser training. On September 30, Hyde received an e-mail from the training manager at Taser International, who informed him that the training guidelines state to target the subject's back or legs and that shoulder and foot exposures were not recommended.
Hyde then brought a lawsuit against the City. Therein, Hyde alleged that he had suffered injury as a result of being tased, and that the injury "was directly and proximately caused by the negligence of Defendant City of Lake Stevens." He requested that judgment be entered against the City for, among other things, general damages, medical costs and expenses (both present and future), financial loss, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of consortium, and emotional distress.
On August 23, 2012, the City moved for summary judgment on Hyde's claim of negligence. Its motion was granted and Hyde's negligence claim was dismissed.
Hyde moved for reconsideration. In doing so, Hyde argued that a claim of negligent misrepresentation was included within his complaint, and that this claim was based on his discovery, on June 20, 2011, that, contrary to assertions made to him at the taser testing, being tased was not a requirement to become a police officer. Hyde's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hyde appealed. In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the dismissal of Hyde's negligence claim. Hyde v. City of Lake Stevens, noted at 179 Wn. App. 1007, 2014 WL 232214, review denied, 180 Wn.2d 1029 (2014). Therein, we observed that Hyde had not pleaded a claim of negligent misrepresentation but, rather, first asserted such a claim in his motion for reconsideration. Hyde, 2014 WL 232214, at *4.
Subsequently, Hyde filed this action in Snohomish County Superior Court. Herein, he claims that "[t]he representation that tasing was a requirement of the job was a negligent misrepresentation." His complaint requests that judgment be entered against the City for, among other things, general damages, medical costs and expenses (both present and future), financial loss, pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of consortium, and emotional distress.
After the complaint herein was filed, the City's attorney informed Hyde's attorney that the complaint was "a clear violation of the claim-splitting doctrine," and notified Hyde's attorney that the City would seek attorney fees, costs, and sanctions if the complaint was not voluntarily dismissed. Shortly thereafter, the City's attorney reminded Hyde's attorney of the City's intent to seek fees and sanctions and, in doing so, stated, "It is our position that you are in violation of the claim splitting prohibition, res judicata, collateral estoppel, CR 11, and the statute of limitations for statements allegedly made (negligent misrepresentation) in June 2009 has expired."
On July 24, 2014, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. Therein, the City argued that Hyde's second complaint was barred by the prohibition on "claim-splitting," as well as the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The City requested that the trial court dismiss Hyde's complaint, award the City attorney fees, and impose monetary terms against Hyde's attorney and in favor of the City.
On September 5, 2014, the trial court granted the motion, dismissing the complaint. Pursuant to CR 11, the court awarded the City reasonable attorney fees and sanctions in the amount of $5,000 against Hyde's attorney. Commenting on the imposition of CR 11 sanctions, the trial court stated, "This second lawsuit was brought in blatant violation of the claim splitting prohibition, res judicata, collateral estoppel, was frivolous, and has harassed the City and caused it to incur unnecessary legal bills and expenses."
Hyde's motion for reconsideration was denied. Therein, the trial court determined that a reasonable attorney fee to be awarded to the City was in the amount of $17,145.
Hyde appeals.
Hyde contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim of negligent misrepresentation. We disagree. Dismissal was proper under the doctrine of res judicata.
We review a summary judgment order de novo. Lokan & Assocs., Inc. v. Am. Beef Processing, LLC, 177 Wn. App. 490, 495, 311 P.3d 1285 (2013). When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Brown v. Brown, 157 Wn. App. 803, 812, 239 P.3d 602 (2010). "The motion should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Mayer v. City of Seattle, 102 Wn. App. 66, 75, 10 P.3d 408 (2000).
Generally speaking, res judicata bars the relitigation of claims and issues that were litigated or could have been litigated in a prior action. Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 763, 887 P.2d 898 (1995); see In re Marriage of Aldrich, 72 Wn. App. 132, 138, 864 P.2d 388 (1993) (). "When res judicata is used to mean claim preclusion, it encompasses the idea that when the parties to two successive proceedings are the same, and the prior proceeding culminated in a final judgment, a matter may not be relitigated, or even litigated for the first time, if it could have been raised, and in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been raised, in the prior proceeding." Kelly-Hansen v. Kelly-Hansen, 87 Wn. App. 320, 328-29, 941 P.2d 1108 (1997) (footnotes omitted). "[I]t has been held that a matter should have been raised and decided earlier if it is merely an alternate theory of recovery, or an alternate remedy." Kelly-Hansen, 87 Wn. App. at 331 (compiling Washington Supreme Court cases); see also Sound Built Homes, Inc. v. Windermere Real Estate/South, Inc., 118 Wn. App. 617, 631-32, 72 P.3d 788 (2003) ().
In Washington, these principles have been reduced to a four-part test. Res judicata applies "where a prior final judgment is identical to the challenged action in '(1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons and parties, and (4) the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.'" Lynn v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 130 Wn. App. 829, 836, 125 P.3d 202 (2005) (quoting Loveridge, 125 Wn.2d at 763). Whether an action is barred by res judicata is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Lynn, 130 Wn. App. at 837.
Hyde concedes that the persons and parties, as well as the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made, are the same. Accordingly, only the first two elements necessitate analysis.
The first element, which requires a concurrence of identity in subject matter, is met: both actions involve the events that occurred during the June 11, 2009 taser training session.
The second element, which requires a concurrence of identity in the causes of action themselves, is also met. For purposes of this second element, "[a] claim includes 'all rights of the [claimant] to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose,' without regard to whether the issues actually were raised or litigated." Fluke Capital & Mgmt. Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wn.2d 614, 620, 724 P.2d 356 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 24(1) (1982)); accord Hadley v. Cowan, 60 Wn. App. 433, 804 P.2d 1271 (1991).
Hyde filed his first complaint, in which he alleged a claim of negligence, before learning that being tased was not a precondition of becoming a police officer. However, the City did not move...
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