Hyde v. State

• Decision Date: 13 March 2015
• Docket Number: CR–13–0566.
• Parties: Christy Westbrook HYDE v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

185 So.3d 501

Christy Westbrook HYDE
v.
STATE of Alabama.

CR–13–0566.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 13, 2015.

185 So.3d 502

Michael McCormick LaPlante, Anniston, for appellant.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

JOINER, Judge.

Christy Westbrook Hyde appeals the circuit court's decision to depart from the non-prison dispositional recommendation of the presumptive sentencing standards ("the presumptive standards"), see § 12–25–34.2, Ala.Code 1975, and, instead, to sentence her to prison. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

Hyde's appeal involves the 2012 amendment to the Alabama Sentencing Reform Act of 2003, which is codified at §§ 12–25–30 to –38, Ala.Code 1975. Before the 2012 amendment, the Alabama Supreme Court explained:

"Section 12–25–31(a) states the legislature's conclusion that the following are necessary for the provision of ‘a fair, effective, and efficient criminal justice system’:

" ‘(1) Voluntary sentencing standards used to guide judicial decision makers in determining the most appropriate sentence for convicted felony offenders.

" ‘(2) The abolition of traditional parole and good time credits for convicted felons.

" ‘(3) The availability of a continuum of punishment options.’

"Section 12–25–34 directed the Alabama Sentencing Commission (‘the Commission’) to develop statewide voluntary sentencing standards and to present those standards to the legislature

185 So.3d 503

over a three-year period beginning in 2004. On September 30, 2005, the Commission adopted the ‘initial voluntary sentencing standards' (hereinafter ‘the standards,’ ‘the initial standards,’ or ‘the voluntary sentencing standards'), along with accompanying worksheets and instructions. See § 12–25–34(a)(3); § 12–25–34.1. The legislature approved the initial standards, along with the accompanying worksheets and instructions, for implementation effective October 1, 2006. § 12–25–34.1, Ala.Code 1975....

"The general instructions for the initial standards and the accompanying worksheets state that the initial standards ‘cover the 26 most frequently sentenced offenses and 87% of sentenced cases.’ Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 22 (2006). If an offense is covered by the initial standards, the applicable worksheets must be completed. § 12–25–35, Ala.Code 1975. Specifically, there are ‘three sets of worksheets and prison sentence length tables that divide the covered offenses into three offense types designated property, drug, and personal offenses.’ Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 22.

" ‘For each offense type, there is an In/Out Worksheet and a Sentence Length Worksheet. Each sheet has a set of statistically relevant sentencing factors specific to each offense type. Examples of factors include: most serious current offense, other offenses being sentenced at the current sentencing event, prior convictions, previous incarcerations, juvenile/youthful offender adjudications, etc. The worksheets will result in a score that is calculated based on the information provided for each factor.

" ‘....

" ‘The In/Out Worksheet produces a score that recommends either a prison or a non-prison sentence. The Sentence Length Worksheet score tells the judge what sentence range (in months) is recommended based on the defendant's characteristics.’

"Id. at 122. Thus, each offender sentenced under the initial standards is given a sentence-disposition recommendation (prison or non-prison) and a sentence-length recommendation. Although the sentencing court must ‘consider’ the initial standards and the worksheets, the court may decline to follow the recommendations resulting from the application of the initial standards and instead impose a sentence ‘outside the voluntary sentencing standards in accordance with existing law.’ § 12–25–35(c), Ala.Code 1975."

State v. Jones, 13 So.3d 915, 916–17 (Ala.2008) (footnotes omitted).

In 2012, the legislature amended the Alabama Sentencing Reform Act of 2003 by enacting § 12–25–34.2, Ala.Code 1975,

"to implement presumptive sentencing standards in place of the voluntary sentencing standards. See Act No. 2012–473, Ala. Acts 2012. Section 12–25–34.2(b), Ala.Code 1975, provides:

" ‘The voluntary sentencing standards as provided for in Section 12–25–34, as applied to nonviolent offenses shall become presumptive sentencing standards effective October 1, 2013, to the extent the modification adopted by the Alabama Sentencing Commission become effective October 1, 2013. The standards shall be applied by the courts in sentencing subject to departures as provided herein. To accomplish this purpose as to the existing initial voluntary sentencing standards, the Alabama Sentencing Commission shall adopt modifications

185 So.3d 504

to the standards, worksheets, and instructions to the extent necessary to implement this provision including, but not limited to, defining aggravating and mitigating factors that allow for departure from the presumptive sentencing recommendations. The commission's modifications shall be presented to the Legislature in the commission's annual report within the first five legislative days of the 2013 Regular Session.’ "

Clark v. State, 166 So.3d 147, 149 (Ala.Crim.App.2014).

In accordance with § 12–25–34.2(b), Ala.Code 1975, the Alabama Sentencing Commission ("the Commission") submitted to the legislature "proposed modifications" to the voluntary sentencing standards, which were subsequently adopted by the legislature. See Clark, 166 So.3d at 151 ("The Commission's proposed modifications were not rejected by the legislature by the passage of a bill during the legislative session and, consequently, became effective on October 1, 2013. See § 12–25–34(d), Ala.Code 1975. Thus, the proposed modifications are the expressed intent of the legislature as to the application and administration of the presumptive sentencing standards."). The Commission's modifications retained the format of the voluntary standards to the extent that the presumptive standards also require the completion of both an In/Out Worksheet and a Sentence–Length Worksheet, which provide a dispositional recommendation (prison or non-prison) and a recommendation of sentence length, respectively. Although the voluntary standards required a circuit court only to consider the recommendations, the presumptive standards require circuit courts to follow both the dispositional and durational recommendation except "in exceptional cases, upon a finding of aggravating and/or mitigating factors."¹ Alabama Sentencing Commission 2013 Annual Report A15.

On November 25, 2013, after the presumptive sentencing standards became effective, Hyde, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pleaded guilty to first-degree theft of property, see § 13A–8–3, Ala.Code 1975. The circuit court determined that Hyde's offense was "covered by the sentencing standards" and imposed on Hyde a sentence length of 30 months. (C. 8.)

According to the circuit court's sentencing order, the presumptive sentencing standards recommended a durational sentencing range between 14 to 46 months straight, and 6 to 12 months split, and also recommended a sentence disposition of "non-prison."² (C. 8.) Additionally, the

185 So.3d 505

circuit court ordered Hyde to pay a $250 fine, a $175 bail-bond fee, a $50 Alabama crime victims' compensation assessment, an attorney fee, and $7,200 in restitution.

At the time she pleaded guilty and was given a 30–month–sentence length, the circuit court asked Hyde if she "wish[ed] to apply for probation," to which Hyde answered, "Yes, ma'am." (R. 10–11.) The circuit court then set a "probation hearing" for January 16, 2014.

On January 16, 2014, Hyde appeared, with counsel, before the circuit court for her "probation hearing." At the "probation hearing," Hyde explained to the circuit court that the presumptive sentencing standards applied to her case and that those standards "recommend[ed] a non-prison sentence." (R. 17.) Thereafter, the circuit court asked about the amount of restitution in this case; the circuit court then asked the following:

"The Court: ... All right. Do you have any other evidence you may want me to consider?

"[Hyde's counsel]: That's it. Your Honor.

"The Court: All right. Ms. Hyde, I hereby deny your application for probation. I turn you over to the custody of the sheriff. You will begin serving your sentence today.

"[Hyde]: Your Honor, can I say something?

"The Court: No, ma'am."

(R. 19.)

On January 17, 2014, Hyde filed what she styled as "Defendant's Motion to Vacate, Alter or Amend Order Denying Probation Under the Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines," in which Hyde argued, among other things, that the circuit court's departure from the dispositional "non-prison" recommendation in the presumptive standards was error because, she said,

"[t]he ‘In/Out’ portion of the presumptive sentencing guideline worksheet specifically stated that probation was recommended based on the charge and [Hyde's] history, or lack thereof. In addition, the District Attorney's Office never filed, or orally presented, any aggravating factors at the time of sentencing that

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