State v. Jones

Decision Date21 November 2008
Docket Number1070536.
Citation13 So.3d 915
PartiesEx parte State of Alabama. (In re STATE of Alabama v. Dennis Lee JONES).
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

M. David Barber, dist. atty., and Brandon K. Falls, deputy dist. atty., Birmingham, for petitioner.

Richard Izzi, Birmingham, for respondent Dennis Lee Jones.

William M. Dawson, Birmingham, for respondent Judge Tommy Nail.

SMITH, Justice.

The State of Alabama seeks a writ of mandamus directing Judge Tommy Nail to vacate his order suspending the confinement portion of the split sentence he imposed upon Dennis Lee Jones's conviction. We deny the petition.

Facts and Procedural History

This petition for the writ of mandamus involves the Alabama Sentence Reform Act of 2003. Act No. 2003-354, Ala. Acts 2003. As amended by Act No. 2006-312, Ala. Acts 2006, the Alabama Sentence Reform Act of 2003 is codified at §§ 12-25-30 to -38, Ala.Code 1975 ("the Act"). Section 12-25-31(a) states the legislature's conclusion that the following are necessary for the provision of "a fair, effective, and efficient criminal justice system":

"(1) Voluntary sentencing standards used to guide judicial decision makers in determining the most appropriate sentence for convicted felony offenders.

"(2) The abolition of traditional parole and good time credits for convicted felons.

"(3) The availability of a continuum of punishment options."

Section 12-25-34 directed the Alabama Sentencing Commission ("the Commission")1 to develop statewide voluntary sentencing standards and to present those standards to the legislature over a three-year period beginning in 2004. On September 30, 2005, the Commission adopted the "initial voluntary sentencing standards" (hereinafter "the standards," "the initial standards," or "the voluntary sentencing standards"), along with accompanying worksheets and instructions. See § 12-25-34(a)(3); § 12-25-34.1. The legislature approved the initial standards, along with the accompanying worksheets and instructions, for implementation effective October 1, 2006. § 12-25-34.1, Ala.Code 1975. According to § 12-25-34(a)(4), the initial standards are scheduled to be replaced by the "voluntary truth-in-sentencing standards," which the Commission is to present for approval during the 2009 regular session of the Alabama Legislature; if approved, the voluntary truth-in-sentencing standards will be effective October 1, 2009.

The general instructions for the initial standards and the accompanying worksheets state that the initial standards "cover the 26 most frequently sentenced offenses and 87% of sentenced cases." Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 22 (2006).2 If an offense is covered by the initial standards, the applicable worksheets must be completed. § 12-25-35, Ala.Code 1975. Specifically, there are "three sets of worksheets and prison sentence length tables that divide the covered offenses into three offense types designated property, drug, and personal offenses." Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 22.

"For each offense type, there is an In/Out Worksheet and a Sentence Length Worksheet. Each sheet has a set of statistically relevant sentencing factors specific to each offense type. Examples of factors include: most serious current offense, other offenses being sentenced at the current sentencing event, prior convictions, previous incarcerations, juvenile/youthful offender adjudications, etc. The worksheets will result in a score that is calculated based on the information provided for each factor.

"....

"The In/Out Worksheet produces a score that recommends either a prison or a non-prison sentence. The Sentence Length Worksheet score tells the judge what sentence range (in months) is recommended based on the defendant's characteristics."

Id. at 122. Thus, each offender sentenced under the initial standards is given a sentence-disposition recommendation (prison or non-prison) and a sentence-length recommendation. Although the sentencing court must "consider" the initial standards and the worksheets, the court may decline to follow the recommendations resulting from the application of the initial standards and instead impose a sentence "outside the voluntary sentencing standards in accordance with existing law." § 12-25-35(c), Ala.Code 1975.

In the underlying case, the grand jury indicted Jones on charges of the unlawful distribution of clonazepam, a controlled substance, in violation of § 13A-12-211, Ala.Code 1975, within a three-mile radius of a school, in violation of § 13A-12-250, Ala.Code 1975, and failure to affix tax stamps, a violation of § 40-17A-4, Ala. Code 1975. On November 5, 2007, Jones pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to violating § 13A-12-2113 and § 40-17A-4.

A violation of § 13A-12-211 is a Class B felony and a "covered offense" under the initial standards; consequently, the worksheets were completed for Jones.4 The instructions for the in/out worksheet for a drug offense recommend "prison" if the in/out score is eight or more. Jones's in/out score was 14; therefore, the in/out worksheet recommended "prison" for Jones.

The in/out worksheet has three recommended alternatives of sentence disposition if a recommendation of prison results from the completion of the worksheet: "Department of Corrections," "DOC at Community Corrections," or "DOC Split Sentence." Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 35-36. The instructions state as follows regarding those alternatives:

"Several prison alternatives are provided.

"Department of Corrections should be checked if the sentence is a straight prison sentence.

"DOC at Community Corrections should be checked if the offender is sentenced to DOC and ordered to a community corrections program.

"DOC Split Sentence should be checked if the sentence is a split sentence. Any split to be served in DOC or DOC Community Corrections is considered a prison sentence.

"The sentence disposition type should be checked even if it is not consistent with the recommended disposition. This information will be useful for possible modification of the worksheet recommendations."

Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 36 (emphasis in original).

The instructions state that "[w]here Prison is the sentence disposition on the In/Out Worksheet, the prison sentence must be chosen from within the recommended range for the corresponding score on the Prison Sentence Length Ranges Table ...." Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards & Worksheets 27. Jones's score on the prison-sentence-length worksheet for a drug offense was 199.5 The Prison Sentence Length Ranges Table recommends the number of months—designated low, mid, and high—to serve for the "Total Sentence" and the "Time to Serve On Split."6 For Jones's score of 199, the recommendations are as follows:

                  "Total Sentence                      Time to Serve On Split
                  "Low   Mid   High                    Low   Mid   High
                  "45    87    130                     24    30    36."
                

Judge Nail sentenced Jones to serve 5 years (60 months); that sentence was split, and Jones was to serve 24 months in the penitentiary followed by 2 years on supervised probation. Judge Nail then "probated" the "split portion of [Jones's] sentence ... condition[ed] on [the] completion of [an] alternate sentencing plan." State's brief, Exhibit B. Judge Nail cited Soles v. State, 820 So.2d 163 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), in support of his decision to probate the confinement portion of Jones's split sentence.

The State petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing Judge Nail to set aside the sentence and "to enter a sentence consistent with either the Initial Voluntary Sentencing Standards or to sentence under applicable law without regard to the Sentencing Standards." State's brief, p. 6. In an unpublished order, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the petition. Jones v. State (No. CR-07-0293, Jan. 7, 2008), ___ So.3d ___ (Ala.Crim.App.2008). The State has filed a similar petition in this Court.

Standard of Review

"Our review of a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on an original petition for a writ of mandamus is de novo. Rule 21(e)(1), Ala. R.App. P.; Ex parte Sharp, 893 So.2d 571, 573 (Ala.2003). The standard for issuance of a writ of mandamus is well settled:

"`A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and is appropriate when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'

"Ex parte BOC Group, Inc., 823 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Ala.2001) (citing Ex parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So.2d 153, 156 (Ala.2000))."

Ex parte McCormick, 932 So.2d 124, 127-28 (Ala.2005).

Discussion

The State contends that the sentence imposed on Jones is an illegal sentence because, the State argues, it complies with neither the initial standards nor existing law outside the initial standards. Citing § 12-25-35(c) and (f), Ala.Code 1975, Judge Nail and Jones contend that because Judge Nail indicated that he sentenced Jones under the initial standards, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the State's petition challenging the legality of Jones's sentence.

Generally "[t]he State may file a mandamus petition challenging an illegal sentence." State v. Monette, 887 So.2d 314, 315 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (citing Smith v. State, 447 So.2d 1334 (Ala.1984)). Section § 12-25-35(f) provides: "Failure to follow any or all of the provisions of this section, or failure to follow any or all of the provisions of this section in the prescribed manner, shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief." The initial standards were patterned after Virginia's Sentencing Guidelines, and § 12-25-35(f) is nearly identical to § 19.2-298.01.F, Va.Code Ann.7 See Initial Voluntary...

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  • State v. Smith (In re Smith)
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 11 Enero 2019
    ...parte Inverness Constr. Co., 775 So.2d 153, 156 (Ala. 2000) ).’" Ex parte McCormick, 932 So.2d 124, 127–28 (Ala. 2005)." State v. Jones, 13 So.3d 915, 919 (Ala. 2008).Discussion I. Immunity Smith argues that he is immune from prosecution pursuant to § 13A-3-23, Ala. Code 1975.2 Section 13A-......
  • Hyde v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 13 Marzo 2015
    ...a sentence ‘outside the voluntary sentencing standards in accordance with existing law.’ § 12–25–35(c), Ala.Code 1975."State v. Jones, 13 So.3d 915, 916–17 (Ala.2008) (footnotes omitted).In 2012, the legislature amended the Alabama Sentencing Reform Act of 2003 by enacting § 12–25–34.2, Ala......
  • State v. Watters (Ex parte Watters)
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    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • 21 Octubre 2016
    ...Inverness Constr. Co. , 775 So.2d 153, 156 (Ala. 2000) ).'" Ex parte McCormick , 932 So.2d 124, 127–28 (Ala. 2005)." State v. Jones , 13 So.3d 915, 919 (Ala. 2008).Discussion Watters, in her petition to this Court, argues that, before being required to stand trial, she is entitled to a pret......
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    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
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    ...794 So.2d 1153, 1157 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). Though there are few cases addressing the Act, the Alabama Supreme Court in State v. Jones, 13 So.3d 915 (Ala. 2008), recently considered a mandamus petition filed by the State after a trial judge suspended the confinement portion of the split senten......
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