Idaho Farm Development Co. v. Brackett

• Citation: 213 P. 696,36 Idaho 748
• Parties: IDAHO FARM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. IRA BRACKETT, SARAH BRACKETT, FRANK CLARK, INEZ CLARK et al., Respondents
• Decision Date: 03 March 1923
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

213 P. 696

36 Idaho 748

IDAHO FARM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. IRA BRACKETT, SARAH BRACKETT, FRANK CLARK, INEZ CLARK et al., Respondents

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 3, 1923

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING - MEASURE OF DAMAGES - LOSS TO CONDEMNEE - BENEFIT TO CONDEMNOR - MARKET VALUE FOR CERTAIN PURPOSE - EVIDENCE AS TO VALUE OF OTHER LANDS - VALUE AS PART OF LARGER TRACT ADAPTABLE TO CERTAIN USE - INCOME FROM OTHER LANDS - PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

1. It is error in a condemnation proceeding to admit evidence of the income or profit which the condemnor expects to gain from his use of the property for the purpose for which it is being condemned.

2. The condemnee may show whether the property sought to be condemned has a market value for a certain purpose, and, if so, what that market value is.

3. Where the value of a specific tract of land sought to be condemned as a reservoir site is the issue, it is error to admit evidence as to the market value of reservoir sites in southern Idaho of similar capacity and dimensions.

4. Compensation to the owner of one of many parcels of land taken by eminent domain for a reservoir site should not include any part of an increase in value for that purpose due to its union with other parcels, if such union would not have been practicable, or have been attempted, except by the intervention of eminent domain.

5. Where the issue is the market value of land which has been used as a stock ranch, evidence as to the income which has been derived from other stock ranches is not admissible.

6. The giving of correct instructions as to the measure of damages in a condemnation proceeding does not render harmless the introduction of improper evidence as to value, where it appears likely that the improper evidence influenced the verdict.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District for Twin Falls County. Hon. Wm. A. Babcock, Judge.

Condemnation proceeding. Judgment for damages in favor of condemnees. Reversed.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. Costs on appeal awarded to respondents.

Edwin Snow and Ostrom & Green, for Appellant.

Requiring the general manager of the plaintiff company to answer interrogatories as to the estimated cost to appellant of the irrigation project and the expected price to be received by appellant from the sale of its water rights had the effect of making appellant pay not the reasonable value of the property condemned but the value or benefit of the property to the condemnor. (Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irr. Co. v. Portneuf Irr. Co., 19 Idaho 483, 114 P. 19; Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, 26 Idaho 37, 141 P. 74.)

The value in terms of money, that is, the price which one or another witness might think the land would bring for any specific purpose, is not admissible as an element in determining market value. (Sacramento Southern R. Co. v Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 P. 981, and cases cited; Vallejo & N. R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 147 P. 238, and cases there cited; Rawson-Works Lumber Co. v. Richardson, supra; Weiser Valley Land & Water Co. v. Ryan, 190 F. 417, 111 C. C. A. 221; Revell v. City of Muskogee, 36 Okla. 529; 129 P. 833.)

Where there is no evidence that the defendants' land standing by itself is eligible as a water storage reservoir, the fact that it is so situated as to be available for a union with other lands to make up a reservoir site does not make admissible evidence showing the value of the aggregate lands for reservoir purposes. (McGovern v. City of New York, 229 U.S. 363, 39 S.Ct. 876, 57 L.Ed. 1228; City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 36 S.Ct. 25, 60 L.Ed. 143; Medina Valley Irr. Co. v. Seekatz, 237 F. 805, 151 C. C. A. 47; In re Bensel, 230 F. 932.)

The profits of a business conducted on land may not be shown. (C. S., sec. 7414; 13 Ency. of Evidence, 444; Cox v. Philadelphia R. Co., 215 Pa. 506, 64 A. 729; Becker v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 177 Pa. 252, 35 A. 617, 35 L. R. A. 583; Gauley Eastern R. Co. v. Conley, 84 W.Va. 489, 100 S.E. 290; Buchanan R. Co. v. Great Scott Coal Co., 75 W.Va. 423, 83 S.E. 1031.)

S. T. Hamilton, Walters & Hodgin, R. P. Parry and C. A. Bailey, for Respondents.

The respondents were entitled to present to the jury every available use for which the lands were adapted, including their adaptibility for reservoir purposes. (Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 13 S.W. 123, 8 L. R. A. 123, and note; Chicago, M. & St. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 47 Wash. 131, 91 P. 626; Ranck v. Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563, 111 N.W. 1027; Tracey v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 165 Iowa 435, 146 N.W. 83; Kansas City O. L. & T. Ry. Co. v. Weideman, 77 Kan. 300, 94 P. 146; Idaho Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Conference, 20 Idaho 568, 119 P. 60, 38 L. R. A., N. S., 497; 10 R. C. L., pp. 128, 129, par. 112, and cases cited.)

The respondents were entitled to prove the value of the lands for special uses in dollars and cents. (San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372, and authorities cited; Sanitary District of Chicago v. Loughran, 160 Ill. 362, 43 N.E. 359; Kind v. Minneapolis Union Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 224, 20 N.W. 135; West Chicago Street Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago, 172 Ill. 198, 50 N.E. 185; Conness v. Commonwealth, 184 Mass. 541, 69 N.E. 341; Holyhood Cemetery v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 215 Mass. 255, 102 N.E. 340; Nelson Theatre Co. v. Nelson, 216 Mass. 30, 102 N.E. 926; Lawton Rapid Transit Co. v. City of Lawton, 31 Okla. 458, 122 P. 212; Missouri Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. v. Rowe, 77 Kan. 224, 94 P. 259, 15 L. R. A., N. S., 679, and note; Colorado M. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 15 Colo. 125, 25 P. 87; Providence W. R. Co. v. City of Worcester, 155 Mass. 35, 29 N.E. 56; Wellington v. City of Cambridge, 220 Mass. 312, 107 N.E. 976; Five Tracts of Land v. United States, 101 F. 661, 41 C. C. A. 850; note to Sargent v. Inhabitants of Merrimac, 196 Mass. 171, 124 Am. St. 528, 81 N.E. 970; Brack v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 125 Md. 378, Ann. Cas. 1916E, at 880, 93 A. 994.)

It was not error to prove the returns from the operation of the lands in question as cattle ranches by the witnesses Bussell and Chester Brackett. (Weyer v. Chicago W. & N.W. R. Co., 68 Wis. 180, 31 N.W. 710; Haslip v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 102 N.C. 376, 8 S.E. 926; Hosmer v. Warner, 15 Gray (Mass.), 46; Kennebec District v. Waterville, 97 Me. 185, 54 A. 6, 60 L. R. A. 856; Gearhart v. Clear Springs Water Co., 202 Pa. 292, 51 A. 891; 5 Cyc. 735, and cases cited; Stolze v. Manitowac Terminal Co., 100 Wis. 208, 75 N.W. 987; Laflin v. Chicago W. N. R. Co., 33 F. 415.)

In condemnation proceedings a liberal rule is applied in the reception of evidence as to value. (13 Ency. of Evidence, 432, and cases cited.)

The great weight of modern authority justifies the trial court in allowing testimony, in dollars and cents, of value of lands for reservoir purposes. (Snouffer v. Chicago & N.W. R. R. Co., 105 Iowa 681, 75 N.W. 501; Colo. M. Ry. Co. v. Brown, supra; National City Bank v. United States, 275 F. 855; Roberts v. Scurvin Ditch Co., 22 Colo. App. 120, 125 P. 552; New York L. & W. Co. v. Junction Canal Co., 27 Hun (N. Y.), 116; Portland & S. R. R. Co. v. Skamania Boom Co., 59 Wash. 191, 109 P. 814; Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 25 L.Ed. 206; Seattle etc. Ry. v. Land, 81 Wash. 206, 142 P. 680.)

Admission of testimony of engineers, even if improper, does not justify reversal of case if there is sufficient other competent evidence to sustain the verdict, and no abuse of discretion by trial judge. (Seattle etc. Co. v. Murphine, 4 Wash. 448, 30 P. 720; Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Baumbach, 270 Ill. 128, 110 N.E. 331; Petersburg School District v. Peterson, 14 N.D. 344, 103 N.W. 756.)

Admission by trial court of evidence of Bussell and Brackett as to gross revenue of ranch in past years was proper to show market value under the circumstances in this case. (Weyer v. Chicago, 68 Wis. 180, 31 N.W. 710; Pegler v. Hyde Park, 176 Mass. 101, 57 N.E. 322; Stolze v. Manitowoc Terminal, 100 Wis. 208, 75 N.W. 987; Gerhart v. Clear Springs Water Co., 202 Pa. 292, 51 A. 891; Avondale v. Cincinnati etc. Co., 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 82; State v. Suffield etc. Co., 82 Conn. 460, 74 A. 775; Columbia etc. Co. v. Giese, 38 N.J.L. 39; In re Davies, 28 Ont. Law Rep. 544.)

MCCARTHY, J. Budge, C. J., and Dunn, J., concur.

OPINION

MCCARTHY, J.

Appellant is an irrigation company in Twin Falls county. By means of a reservoir it stores the waters of Cedar Creek and tributary streams. In the construction of the reservoir it became necessary to acquire by condemnation two parcels of land, one belonging to respondents Ira and Sarah Brackett, and the other to respondents Frank and Inez Clark. The Brackett lands comprise 320 acres, of which appellant sought to acquire 262.1. The Clark lands comprise 210 acres, of which appellant sought to acquire 108.8. This action is one for condemnation of these lands. The court having determined all the preliminary issues, the case was tried to a jury upon the single issue of the amount of damages to be awarded respondents. Judgment upon the verdict was for respondents Brackett in the sum of $ 32,918, and for respondents Clark in the sum of $ 19,999. The appeal is from that portion of the judgment awarding damages.

Appellant assigns as error (1) the ruling of the court requiring witness Meredith, manager of appellant, to testify over objection as to what the dam would cost appellant, as to the price for which appellant was selling its water rights, as to the area of the reservoir, and as to the cost of the irrigation project; (2) the ruling of the court in permitting certain engineer witnesses to testify as to the market value of a reservoir site in Southern Idaho having a capacity of...