Pegler v. Inhabitants of Hyde Park

• Decision Date: 17 May 1900
• Citation: 57 N.E. 327,176 Mass. 101
• Parties: PEGLER v. INHABITANTS OF HYDE PARK.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

176 Mass. 101

57 N.E. 327

PEGLER v. INHABITANTS OF HYDE PARK.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

May 17, 1900

COUNSEL

Henry Hyde Smith, for petitioner.

J. E Cotter and Benton & Clarke, for respondent.

OPINION

KNOWLTON, J.

The petitioner's leasehold estate in property used for greenhouses was taken under St. 1896, c. 257, and St. 1890 c. 428. Under section 5 of St. 1890, c. 428, as amended by St. 1891, c. 123, the damages are to be determined 'in the same manner and under like rules of law as damages may be determined when occasioned by the taking of land for the locating and laying out of railroads and public ways in such cities or towns.' This land was taken for a way. The evidence of the value of the plants, flowers, and potted soil of the petitioner on the premises, and of the amount of business done by him, was admitted only for a single purpose and was carefully limited in the instructions to the jury. The jury were told that no damages could be allowed for the good will, or for injury to the business, or to the plants or flowers, and that this evidence was admitted only as bearing upon the question of the capacity of the real estate for use. The view of the premises which the jury had taken did not enable them to see the property as it was at the time of taking, for the greenhouses had been taken down, and a part of the land had been filled up. We are of opinion that with this instruction no injustice was done to the respondent by the admission of the evidence. Teele v. City of Boston, 165 Mass. 88, 92, 42 N.E. 506; Maynard v City of Northampton, 157 Mass. 218, 31 N.E. 1062.

The judge rightly ruled that the respondent could not set off against the petitioner's claim for damages the value of his occupation of the property for a time after the taking. This subject has been considered in different aspects in several cases, and it is unnecessary to discuss it. Imbescheid v. Railroad Co., 171 Mass. 209, 50 N.E. 609; Railroad Co. v. Miller, 125 Mass. 1; Edmands v. City of Boston, 108 Mass. 535.

The cancellation of the petitioner's lease was not to be considered in estimating his damages. This is not a case in which the entire damages for the taking of the land are to be estimated at one time, as they would be if the owner of the reversion had not been paid. In such a case, if there had been an assignment of a lease to the landlord, or a cancellation of it, with an assignment of the lessee's claim for damages, that fact would be material. Dickenson v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546, 549, 558. But in this case the landlord was only paid the damages to her own estate as reversioner, and the petitioner is entitled to receive compensation for the injury to his interest. His interest at the time of the taking was as lessee entitled to hold the whole property to the end of his term. When he entered into the agreement with the landlord to cancel the lease, his interest was in property a part...