Idaho Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Macdonald

• Decision Date: 16 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. 41733.,41733.
• Citation: 342 P.3d 671
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Parties: IDAHO PROPERTY MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., dba the Rental Connection, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Don MACDONALD, Defendant–Appellant.

342 P.3d 671

IDAHO PROPERTY MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., dba the Rental Connection, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Don MACDONALD, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 41733.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Dec. 16, 2014.

Reversed and remanded. Don Macdonald, Las Vegas, Nevada, pro se appellant.

Charles B. Lempesis, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

This dispute concerns financial liability for a mobile home on which defendant Don Macdonald was a lienholder and which was abandoned by the registered owners and left on property belonging to plaintiff Idaho Property Management Services, Inc. (IPMS). Macdonald appeals from a summary judgment in favor of IPMS. We reverse and remand.

I.

The district court thereby erred. A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to establish not only that there is no genuine issue of material fact, but also that, based upon evidence and legal authority, the movant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c); Harris v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298–99 n. 1, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159–60 n. 1 (1992); Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). As I.R.C.P. 56(e) states, it is only “[ w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,” that the burden shifts to the adverse party to “by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule ... set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” If the movant's burden is not sustained, the party in opposition need not respond with any contrary evidence at all. See McHugh v. Reid, 156 Idaho 299, 306, 324 P.3d 998, 1005 (Ct.App.2014).

Where, as here, it is the plaintiff that seeks summary judgment, the plaintiff must allege a cause of action recognized in the law and show undisputed facts establishing each element of the cause of action.¹ Id. If that burden is not met, summary judgment must be denied regardless of whether the defendant has responded with affidavits raising factual issues. Thus, we cannot affirm the summary judgment here on the basis stated by the district court.

However, if an order of a lower court was correct, but is based upon an erroneous theory, the order may be affirmed upon a correct theory that was presented below. Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 692, 302 P.3d 26, 32 (2013); Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179, 595 P.2d 709, 713 (1979). Because on review of an order granting summary judgment an appellate court applies the same legal standards that are used by the trial court, Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994); Washington Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Lash, 121 Idaho 128, 130, 823 P.2d 162, 164 (1992), we will independently examine the record and the parties' respective legal arguments to determine whether the summary judgment in favor of IPMS can be affirmed upon application of the appropriate standards.

B. Trespass

One of the legal theories on which IPMS sought summary judgment was that Macdonald was liable for trespass damages because he was allegedly the “owner” of the mobile home and did not remove it from the park on IPMS's demand. We conclude that IPMS was not entitled to summary judgment on that theory for two reasons.

First, such a cause of action was not pleaded by IPMS. The verified complaint is vague; it consists of a number of allegations of wrongdoing by Macdonald in consecutively numbered paragraphs without headings or separation into any identified causes of action. At best, it asserts a claim that Macdonald was liable to IPMS under Idaho Code § 55–2009A and a claim that Macdonald wrongfully filed a declaration of opposition to the plaintiff's proposed lien sale of the mobile home. IPMS did not, under any fair reading of its complaint, plead a cause of action against Macdonald for the tort of trespass. The fact that IPMS moved for summary judgment on a theory of trespass is immaterial, for a cause of action not raised in a party's pleading may not be considered on summary judgment. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 178–79, 75 P.3d 733, 739–40 (2003); Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950, 956 (1993).

Second, even if a cause of action for trespass could be fairly found within IPMS's complaint, Macdonald, as one holding a lien on the mobile home, has not been shown to be liable for trespass. The district court referred to Macdonald as the “legal owner” of the mobile home and to the Pattisons as the “titled owners.” The court based this terminology upon an ITD document, the “Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale,” which identified the Pattisons as the “registered owner” of the mobile home and Macdonald as the “legal owner.” Macdonald argued to the district court that he was not legally responsible for the placement or removal of the abandoned mobile home because he was merely a lienholder, but the district court relied upon the ITD record designating Macdonald as “legal owner.” The district court apparently did not realize, however, that the term “legal owner,” as used in the motor vehicle code and in ITD's document, means a lienholder. The motor vehicle code provides for the titling of some types of trailer homes or mobile homes as “vehicles.” See I.C. §§ 49–123(2)(a); 49–401A; 49–501. For purposes of these titling statutes, Idaho Code § 49–113(3) defines “legal owner” as “any person notated as ‘lienholder’ of a vehicle” on the certificate of title. “Lienholder” in turn is defined as “a person holding a security interest in a vehicle.” I.C. § 49–113(7).² Thus, the term “legal owner” within the ITD document means nothing more than a person noted on the title as holding a lien on the mobile home.

Applying this correct meaning of “legal owner” as it appears on the ITD documents reveals a gap in IPMS's trespass theory of liability. IPMS provided no legal authority to the district court nor to this Court supporting its contention that Macdonald, as a lienholder, was obligated to remove the mobile home from the mobile home park upon IPMS's demand. It likewise has cited no statute nor common law doctrine providing that a person holding a lien on personal property is legally responsible in trespass where the titled owner leaves that property on the land of another. Accordingly, IPMS has not shown that it was entitled to summary judgment on a theory that Macdonald committed trespass by not removing the mobile home from the lot owned by IPMS.

C. Idaho Code § 55–2009A

IPMS also moved for summary judgment on the ground that Macdonald was liable to it under the provisions of Idaho Code § 55–2009A(2), a cause of action which is pleaded in the complaint. Section 55–2009A was enacted as part of the Manufactured Home Residency Act ³ and provides:

(1) Any lienholder or legal owner of a home who wants to be protected under this section must so notify the landlord in writing of his secured or legal interest.

(2) If the resident becomes sixty (60) days in arrears in his rent or at the time of suspected abandonment by the resident on a lot, it is incumbent upon the landlord to notify in writing the lienholder and legal owner of the home and to communicate to the lienholder and legal owner the liability for any rent and other charges specified in the rental agreement. The lienholder shall be responsible for utilities from the date of notice. However, the landlord shall be entitled to a maximum of sixty (60) days rent due prior to notice to lienholder. Any and all costs shall then become the responsibility of the legal owner or lienholder of the home. The home may not be removed from the lot without a signed written agreement from the landlord or manager showing clearance for removal, showing all moneys due and owing paid in full, or an agreement reached with the legal owner and the landlord.

We conclude that the facts asserted by IPMS do not demonstrate that it is entitled to recover from Macdonald under this statute. Section 55–2009A(2) establishes at least one condition ⁴ that must be met before a landlord may make a claim for payment from a lienholder—the landlord must give proper and timely written notice to a lienholder/legal owner in order for the latter to incur any liability under the statute. It states: “If the resident becomes sixty (60) days in arrears in his rent or at the time of suspected abandonment by the resident on a lot, it is incumbent upon the landlord to notify in writing the lienholder and legal owner of the home and to communicate to the lienholder and legal owner the liability for any rent and other...