McHugh v. Reid

• Decision Date: 16 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. 40886.,40886.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Parties: Barry McHUGH, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Jeffrey A. REID and Sandra M. Snyder–Reid, Parties Aggrieved–Appellants, and One Blue 2007 Toyota FJ Cruiser, Vin No. JTEBU11F470014172, and One Thousand, Seven Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents ($1,700.00) of Lawful U.S. Currency, Defendants.

156 Idaho 299

324 P.3d 998

Barry McHUGH, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, Plaintiff–Respondent,

v.Jeffrey A. REID and Sandra M. Snyder–Reid, Parties Aggrieved–Appellants,andOne Blue 2007 Toyota FJ Cruiser, Vin No. JTEBU11F470014172, and One Thousand, Seven Hundred Dollars and Zero Cents ($1,700.00) of Lawful U.S. Currency, Defendants.

No. 40886.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

April 16, 2014.

Nicolas V. Vieth, Coeur d'Alene, for appellants.

Barry McHugh, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney; Jamila D. Holmes, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Jamila D. Holmes argued.

MELANSON, Judge.

Jeffrey A. Reid and Sandra M. Snyder–Reid appeal from the judgment of civil forfeiture of the Reids' 2007 Toyota FJ Cruiser. Specifically, they assert that the district court erred in partially granting Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney Barry McHugh's motion for summary judgment with regard to the vehicle. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and remand.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Jeffrey Reid was stopped while driving his 2007 Toyota FJ Cruiser after an officer observed him speeding. The officer had been on the lookout for the vehicle after receiving a report that the individual driving the vehicle had allegedly dumped marijuana plants on the side of the road. During a consensual search of the vehicle, loose green plant material identified as marijuana was found. Reid was arrested and the vehicle was impounded. Near the same time, a detective went to the Reids' home and received consent to search the home from Reid's wife, Sandra Snyder–Reid. The search revealed marijuana, paraphernalia, $1,700 in cash, and equipment for growing marijuana.

Reid pled guilty to delivery of a controlled substance, I.C. § 37–2732(a)(1)(A), and Snyder–Reid pled guilty to manufacturing a controlled substance, I.C. § 37–2732(a)(1)(B). As part of a plea agreement, additional charges of trafficking in marijuana were dismissed. The district court withheld judgment and placed the Reids on supervised probation for three years.

While the criminal cases were pending, McHugh filed a complaint in rem seeking forfeiture of the vehicle, money, and hydroponic growing equipment found in the Reids' home. The Reids filed unverified answers, followed by a motion to dismiss the complaint approximately two months later in which they claimed that McHugh had failed to set the matter for a hearing. The district court held a hearing and denied the motion to dismiss, finding that I.C. § 37–2744 did not require McHugh to set the matter for a hearing within a specified timeframe.

McHugh subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted as to the vehicle and denied as to the money. The Reids filed a motion to reconsider the denial of their motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. McHugh was granted attorney fees and costs associated with the Reids' motion to reconsider.

The parties then filed a stipulated dismissal of the action with prejudice in which they agreed to each bear their own attorney fees and costs. Both an order of dismissal with prejudice and a judgment of civil forfeiture were signed by the district court. The judgment noted that it was pursuant to the stipulation of the parties; however, no stipulation to the judgment was ever filed. The judgment ordered that McHugh receive $1,000 and all right, title, and interest to the vehicle; in return, the Reids received $700. The district court also noted in the judgment that the stipulation settled with prejudice all existing material claims related to the seizure and forfeiture of the vehicle and currency.¹ The Reids appeal, challenging the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the vehicle.² McHugh requests an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B.V., 148 Idaho 89, 101, 218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009). Summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App.1986). When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but rather is entitled to reach the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 13, 232 P.3d 330, 334 (2010) ; Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). Drawing probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible because the court, as the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving conflicting inferences at trial. Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 222, 220 P.3d 575, 578 (2009) ; Riverside Dev. Co., 103 Idaho at 519, 650 P.2d at 661. However, conflicting evidentiary facts must still be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party. Losee, 148 Idaho at 222, 220 P.3d at 578.

The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct.App.1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini–Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App.2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show, via further depositions, discovery responses, or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). The nonmoving party cannot rest upon mere speculation and must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. Cantwell v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 133, 191 P.3d 205, 211 (2008). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 695, 698 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case. Cantwell, 146 Idaho at 133, 191 P.3d at 211.

III.ANALYSIS

A. Waiver of Right to Appeal

Initially, we address McHugh's contention that the Reids are precluded from bringing the instant appeal because they agreed to a stipulated judgment that resolved all issues in the case with prejudice and failed to explicitly reserve their right to appeal. As a result, the errors they allege are waived. The Reids respond that they did not appeal from the judgment of forfeiture and, instead, appeal from the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of McHugh as to the vehicle. However, the notice of appeal filed with the district court states that they appealed to this Court "from the Judgment of Forfeiture entered into" by stipulation of the parties in the case. The notice of appeal avers that the judgment is appealable pursuant to I.A.R. 11(a)(1), which allows for appeals from final judgments; the judgment of forfeiture is the only final judgment in this case, as the district court declined to enter an I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification of final judgment from the grant of partial summary judgment. Thus, the Reids' appeal is from the judgment of civil forfeiture.

Generally, a consent judgment is not subject to appellate review. Pac. Nat. Bank of Wash. v. Mount, 97 Idaho 887, 556 P.2d 70 (1976) ; Kershaw v. Pierce Cattle Co., 87 Idaho 323, 329, 393 P.2d 31, 34 (1964). An exception to this general rule is made in those cases where it appears there is a lack of actual consent to the judgment; lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; where the judgment was obtained by fraud, collusion, or mistake; or where the judgment adversely affects the public interest. Pac. Nat. Bank, 97 Idaho at 888, 556 P.2d at 71. The Idaho Supreme Court has also recognized an exception for consent judgments explicitly entered into to expedite an appeal. See Harvey v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 2 Idaho 732, 734, 24 P. 30, 31 (1890) (stating that a party may appeal from a "pro forma judgment" to which it consented to expedite an appeal if it appears from the record that the party reserved all rights to an appeal and both sides understood that the party did not intend to abandon its right to appeal the consent judgment). Where none of the listed exceptions apply, a decree that appears by the record to have been rendered by consent is always affirmed without considering the merits of the cause. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324, 48 S.Ct. 311, 314, 72 L.Ed. 587, 596 (1928) ; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. United States,

113 U.S. 261, 266, 5 S.Ct. 460, 462, 28 L.Ed. 971, 973 (1885) ; Pac. Nat. Bank, 97 Idaho at 888, 556 P.2d at 71.

McHugh asserts that the Reids waived their...