Idaho Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Macdonald
| Decision Date | 16 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 41733.,41733. |
| Citation | 342 P.3d 671,157 Idaho 959 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | IDAHO PROPERTY MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., dba the Rental Connection, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Don MACDONALD, Defendant–Appellant. |
Don Macdonald, Las Vegas, Nevada, pro se appellant.
Charles B. Lempesis, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.
This dispute concerns financial liability for a mobile home on which defendant Don Macdonald was a lienholder and which was abandoned by the registered owners and left on property belonging to plaintiff Idaho Property Management Services, Inc. (IPMS). Macdonald appeals from a summary judgment in favor of IPMS. We reverse and remand.
According to defendant Macdonald, he at some point loaned money to Christopher and Rebekah Pattison and acquired a lien on the title to their mobile home as security for the loan. In August 2010, the Pattisons leased a lot in a mobile home park from IPMS and placed the mobile home on the lot. The lease stated a rental rate of $295 per month and imposed certain late fees for rent that was not timely paid. Macdonald was not a party to the lease. A title to the mobile home was issued by the Idaho Transportation Department (ITD), and in ITD records the Pattisons were named as the "registered owner" and Macdonald was referenced as the "legal owner."
In early November 2011, the Pattisons abandoned the mobile home. Sometime thereafter IPMS, identifying itself as the "possessory lienholder," submitted a request to ITD pursuant to Idaho Code § 55–2009B for permission to conduct a lien sale of the mobile home. On March 27, 2012, ITD issued the requested authorization. On April 4, 2012, Macdonald filed with ITD a declaration of opposition to the sale. IPMS apparently did not go through with the sale.
On July 18, 2012, the attorney for IPMS wrote a letter to Macdonald maintaining that the mobile home "owned by you" is "illegally placed and constitutes a trespass pursuant to the provisions of Idaho law." The letter demanded payment of $4,390.09 for "delinquent rents, late charges and damages resulting from the continuing trespass," further demanded prompt removal of the mobile home from IPMS property, and also informed Macdonald that IPMS would sue if its demands were not met. Macdonald did not comply with the demands.
On October 11, 2012, IPMS filed a complaint against Macdonald in the district court seeking monetary damages and other relief. On July 1, 2013, IPMS moved for summary judgment on grounds that Macdonald was in trespass for not removing the mobile home from the lot in IPMS's mobile home park and that he was liable to IPMS for back rent and other expenses under the provisions of Idaho Code § 55–2009A. Following receipt of Macdonald's responsive materials and after a hearing, the district court granted IPMS's motion. Macdonald moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied without comment on the merits. The district court later awarded costs and attorney fees to IPMS under Idaho Code §§ 12–120 and 12–121. The final award against Macdonald was $10,349.26 for rent and late fees from November 25, 2011, through July 31, 2013, and for taxes paid on the property by IPMS, plus $11,657.95 for attorney fees and costs, for a total of $22,007.21.
Macdonald appeals from the judgment.
Summary judgment may be entered if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See also Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 173, 335 P.3d 14, 18 (2014) ; Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745, 747, 890 P.2d 331, 333 (1995) ; Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 742, 890 P.2d 326, 328 (1995). On appeal from a summary judgment, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party has shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Roles v. Townsend, 138 Idaho 412, 412–13, 64 P.3d 338, 338–39 (Ct.App.2003) ; Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App.1986).
Macdonald's arguments on appeal include an assertion that the district court erred in granting summary judgment without considering whether IPMS had met its burden, as the party moving for summary judgment, to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We agree. The district court granted summary judgment against Macdonald solely because Macdonald did not submit an affidavit contesting the facts alleged by IPMS, without the court examining whether the undisputed facts demonstrated that IPMS was entitled to any relief. At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, the district court declined to consider Macdonald's "affidavit" in opposition because it consisted almost entirely of legal argument. The court said:
In summary judgment you cannot rest upon your pleadings and you cannot rest upon your arguments. You have to submit affidavits that put facts into genuine issue. And those facts have to be material. If you don't put forth any facts, then I have to take the facts that the other party has put forward as being unopposed.
In neither its comments from the bench nor its memorandum decision did the court consider or discuss any of Macdonald's legal arguments. Rather, the district court recited a number of facts asserted by IPMS and then concluded that because Macdonald had not controverted these facts with admissible evidence in opposition, IPMS was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court did not identify any pleaded cause of action or theory of liability upon which it was granting summary judgment to IPMS.
The district court thereby erred. A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to establish not only that there is no genuine issue of material fact, but also that, based upon evidence and legal authority, the movant "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c) ; Harris v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298–99 n. 1, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159–60 n. 1 (1992) ; Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). As I.R.C.P. 56(e) states, it is only "[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, " that the burden shifts to the adverse party to "by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule ... set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." If the movant's burden is not sustained, the party in opposition need not respond with any contrary evidence at all. See McHugh v. Reid, 156 Idaho 299, 306, 324 P.3d 998, 1005 (Ct.App.2014).
Where, as here, it is the plaintiff that seeks summary judgment, the plaintiff must allege a cause of action recognized in the law and show undisputed facts establishing each element of the cause of action.1 Id. If that burden is not met, summary judgment must be denied regardless of whether the defendant has responded with affidavits raising factual issues. Thus, we cannot affirm the summary judgment here on the basis stated by the district court.
However, if an order of a lower court was correct, but is based upon an erroneous theory, the order may be affirmed upon a correct theory that was presented below. Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 692, 302 P.3d 26, 32 (2013) ; Anderson & Nafziger v. G.T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 179, 595 P.2d 709, 713 (1979). Because on review of an order granting summary judgment an appellate court applies the same legal standards that are used by the trial court, Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29, 30 (1994) ; Washington Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Lash, 121 Idaho 128, 130, 823 P.2d 162, 164 (1992), we will independently examine the record and the parties' respective legal arguments to determine whether the summary judgment in favor of IPMS can be affirmed upon application of the appropriate standards.
One of the legal theories on which IPMS sought summary judgment was that Macdonald was liable for trespass damages because he was allegedly the "owner" of the mobile home and did not remove it from the park on IPMS's demand. We conclude that IPMS was not entitled to summary judgment on that theory for two reasons.
First, such a cause of action was not pleaded by IPMS. The verified complaint is vague; it consists of a number of allegations of wrongdoing by Macdonald in consecutively numbered paragraphs without headings or separation into any identified causes of action. At best, it asserts a claim that Macdonald was liable to IPMS under Idaho Code § 55–2009A and a claim that Macdonald wrongfully filed a declaration of opposition to the plaintiff's proposed lien sale of the mobile home. IPMS did not, under any fair reading of its complaint, plead a cause of action against Macdonald for the tort of trespass.
The fact that IPMS moved for summary judgment on a theory of trespass is immaterial, for a cause of action not raised in a party's pleading may not be considered on summary judgment. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 178–79, 75 P.3d 733, 739–40 (2003) ; Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865, 865 P.2d 950, 956 (1993).
Second, even if a cause of action for trespass could be fairly found within IPMS's complaint, Macdonald, as one holding a lien on the mobile home, has not been shown to be liable for trespass. The district court referred to Macdonald as the "legal owner" of the mobile home and to the Pattisons as the "titled owners." The court based this terminology upon an ITD document, the "Authorization to Conduct a Lien Sale," which identified the Pattisons as the "registered owner" of the mobile home and Macdonald as the "legal owner." Macdonald...
To continue reading
Request your trial