Idoux v. Lamar University System

Decision Date13 July 1993
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 1:92CV440.
Citation828 F. Supp. 1252
PartiesJohn IDOUX v. LAMAR UNIVERSITY SYSTEM, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

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Laurence Wade Watts, Watts, Glover & Wells, Houston, TX, for John Idoux.

Hubert Oxford, III, Benckenstein Oxford & Johnson, Beaumont, TX, Amy R. Castaneda, Asst. Atty. Gen., General Litigation Div., Austin, TX, Robert J. Hambright, Orgain Bell & Tucker, Beaumont, TX, for Lamar University System, George McLaughlin, Board of Regents, for Lamar University System, Lanny Haynes, Mike Ramsey, Wayne Reaud, Madaline Kaye Savoy, Ron Steinhart.

Hubert Oxford, III, Benckenstein, Oxford & Johnson, Beaumont, TX, Amy R. Castaneda, Asst. Atty. Gen., General Litigation Div., Austin, TX, Lipscomb Norvell, Jr., Benckenstein Norvell & Nathan, Beaumont, TX, Toni Hunter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, Grant Cook, Curt W. Moy, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Houston, TX, Robert J. Hambright, Orgain Bell & Tucker, Beaumont, TX, for Ted Moor.

Ted Moor, pro se.

Hubert Oxford, III, Benckenstein Oxford & Johnson, Beaumont, TX, Amy R. Castaneda, Asst. Atty. Gen., General Litigation Div., Toni Hunter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, Grant Cook, Curt W. Moy, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Houston, TX, Robert J. Hambright, Orgain Bell & Tucker, Beaumont, TX, for Amelie Cobb.

Amelie Cobb, pro se.

Hubert Oxford, III, Benckenstein Oxford & Johnson, Beaumont, TX, Amy R. Castaneda, Asst. Atty. Gen., General Litigation Div., Toni Hunter, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, TX, Robert J. Hambright, Orgain Bell & Tucker, George Michael Jamail, Bernsen Jamail & Goodson, Beaumont, TX, for C.W. Conn.

Hubert Oxford, III, Benckenstein Oxford & Johnson, Beaumont, TX, Amy R. Castaneda, Asst. Atty. Gen., General Litigation Div., Austin, TX, for all defendants.

ORDER

KENT, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants C.W. Conn, Ted Moor, and Amelie Cobb, in their individual capacity. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS this motion as to the Plaintiff's claims brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, §§ 3, 19, and 29 claims of the Texas Constitution, but DENIES the motion as to the claim brought under article I, § 8. Because this state law claim is the sole remaining cause of action in this suit, the Court exercises its discretion to REMAND this case to the 60th Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas.

Facts

This case arises out of the alleged wrongful termination of the Plaintiff's employment as the interim president and executive vice-president of Lamar University ("Lamar"). The Plaintiff claims that this dismissal was in direct retaliation for his repeated disagreements with many of the practices and activities of Lamar's Board of Regents and George McLaughlin, Lamar's chancellor. Primarily, the Plaintiff feels that the Defendants terminated him for refusing to consent to what he felt were unauthorized and unethical payments to Al Barbre, Lamar's former woman's basketball coach. But, the Plaintiff also claims that his objections to other unethical, if not illegal, behavior also led to the dismissal. Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts that he opposed requests for improper "swapping" of restricted and unrestricted university funds, violations of the Plaintiff's authority to make equitable salary adjustments, permitting the faculty to engage in private enterprise at Lamar's expense, and violations of Lamar's alcohol policy.

Subsequent to his dismissal, the Plaintiff filed suit against Lamar, McLaughlin, the Board of Regents, the members of the Board of Regents in their official capacity, and C.W. Conn, Ted Moor, and Amelie Cobb in their individual capacity for allegedly violating the Plaintiff's rights guaranteed under the United States and Texas Constitutions. The Court has already dismissed Lamar, the Board of Regents, and the members of the Board of Regents in their official capacity from this suit. (Instrument # 42) Defendants C.W. Conn, Ted Moor, and Amelie Cobb now have also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. This motion asserts that the Court should dismiss these remaining Defendants because, as public officials, they are entitled to qualified immunity.

Qualified Immunity

The question of whether qualified immunity will protect an official is one of law for the Court to decide. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815-2816, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). To be entitled to qualified immunity, a governmental official must have been performing discretionary functions, and his conduct must not have violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).1 However, prior to considering whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, a district court must first address the threshold consideration of whether the plaintiff's complaint even states a violation of a constitutional right. See Siegert v. Gilley, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1791, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, then the district court must dismiss the plaintiff's case. See Quives v. Campbell, 934 F.2d 668, 670-71 (5th Cir.1991).2

Freedom of Speech

The Plaintiff first claims that the Defendants violated his constitutionally protected right to free speech. Specifically, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendants terminated his employment in retaliation for his speaking out on several matters concerning the university. It is well established that a public employee may not be discharged, disciplined, or punished for exercising the right to free speech. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987); Page v. Delaune, 837 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir.1988). However, in order for a public employee to establish a deprivation of free speech, the employee must demonstrate that:

1. the speech addresses a matter of public concern;
2. the employee's interest in communicating upon matters of public concern outweighs the defendant's interest in promoting the efficiency of the public service they perform; and
3. the employee's discipline was motivated by the uttered speech.

Thompson v. City of Starkville, 901 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.1990).

Whether a speech addresses a matter of public concern depends upon "the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). In the instant case, the Court has little doubt that the speech in question addresses matters of public concern. The Plaintiff's complaint indicates that throughout his term as interim president, the Plaintiff steadfastly objected and refused to consent to what he felt were unauthorized and unethical, if not illegal, practices on the part of McLaughlin and the Board of Regents. Allegations of mismanagement in schools almost always raises the imprimatur of public concern. See Brinkmeyer v. Thrall Independent School District, 786 F.2d 1291, 1294 (5th Cir.1986). Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has specifically held that misbehavior of any kind on the part of public officials implicates public concern. Brawner v. City of Richardson, 855 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir.1988). Even though these internal complaints were not immediately released to the public, they clearly relate to the evaluation of a governmental agency. In any event, "the fact that the speech was delivered privately ... rather than to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, does not necessarily render the speech any less protected." Brown v. Texas A & M University, 804 F.2d 327, 337 (5th Cir.1986) (citing Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 414-415, 99 S.Ct. 693, 696, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979)). Additionally, even though the activities and practices to which the Plaintiff objected are not particularly scurrilous, they must be viewed in the context of the investigation conducted by the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("N.C.A.A.") at that time. If some of these activities were indeed improper and had been discovered by the N.C.A.A., it is possible that Lamar could have been subject to severe sanctions and penalties and further public embarrassment and humiliation. Thus, the Court concludes that the speech set out in the Plaintiff's complaint is indeed public speech.

As to the second test of whether the Plaintiff alleges a violation of free speech, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff's interest in communicating these matters of public concern outweighs the Defendants' interest in promoting and administering an efficient university. There is little doubt that those who engage in whistleblowing occupy a special place in the protective bosom of the First Amendment. Brown, 804 F.2d at 337. "Public employees are uniquely qualified to reveal unseemly machinations by their fellow employees because they observe them on a daily basis." Id. The specter of public misconduct so often seems to haunt this country's institutions, eroding confidence and causing a debilitating sense of cynicism among the populace that hinders the ability of governments at all levels to effectively operate. The Court's desire to have all manner of illegal and unethical behavior exposed and punished forces the Court to conclude that only matters of national security and the like should ever prevent a public employee from revealing or generally objecting to improper public practices. In as much as it would be ludicrous to even suggest that such concerns affect the present case, the Court concludes that the Defendants' interest in promoting and administering an university does not even remotely outweigh the Plaintiff's, or anyone's, interest in revealing alleged public improprieties at Lamar.

The third factor in determining whether the...

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