IDS Leasing Corp. v. Hansa Jet Corp.
| Decision Date | 21 March 1975 |
| Citation | 82 Misc.2d 741,369 N.Y.S.2d 922 |
| Parties | IDS LEASING CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. HANSA JET CORPORATION et al., Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Heiko & Bush, P.C., Garden City, for plaintiff.
Doman & Beggans, New York City, for defendant Hansa Jet Corp.
McCarthy, Fingar, Donovan & Glatthaar, White Plains, for International Aviation Services.
In an action in replevin, plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) to dismiss certain affirmative defenses and counterclaims which have been interposed by defendants Hansa Jet Corporation and International Aviation Services Inc. Plaintiff urges that Lien Law § 184 on which the affirmative defenses and counterclaims are based is unconstitutional on its face and as it is applied to the case at bar.
Briefly stated the facts are as follows. In July 1973, the plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant Laneau whereby it either leased or sold to that defendant the aircraft which is the subject of the instant litigation. While plaintiff alleges that the contract is a lease of the aircraft, the defendants allege that it constitutes a sale with a security interest retained. However, for the purposes of this motion only, the contract shall be treated as a lease since on a motion to dismiss the Court treats the facts as alleged by the movant to be established for the purposes of the motion.
The lease provides that the lessee shall maintain the aircraft and obtain appropriate service and repairs. In February 1974, defendant Laneau allegedly defaulted in the payments due under the lease and plaintiff exercised its option under the lease demanded return of the aircraft.
Plaintiff located the aircraft to be at the Westchester County Airport in the possession of Hansa Jet Corporation and IDS Leasing Corporation and demanded its return. These defendants asserted liens totaling almost $80,000, pursuant to Lien Law § 184 for services performed and fuel supplied to the aircraft at the request of Laneau.
As a result, th plaintiff commenced this action in replevin and defendants interposed affirmative defenses and counterclaims based on Lien Law § 184. Plaintiff, in its reply, asserted that the statute is unconstitutional in that it violates due process under both the Federal and State Constitutions. Further, plaintiff alleged that the statute is unconstitutional as applied since it provides for the deprivation of one's property without notice or hearing.
Thereafter, by order of Mr. Justice Gagliardi dated May 23, 1974, plaintiff's motion to bond the lien by paying into court a sum of money was granted. The plaintiff was granted leave to deposit $100,000. with the court to secure the liens and to then obtain possession. Plaintiff thereupon paid into the court the $100,000. and obtained possession of the aircraft.
In his opinion, Mr. Justice Gagliardi noted that normally relinquishment of possession voids a lienor's lien under Lien Law § 184. However, since plaintiff was willing to guarantee payment of the lien if directed, it was permitted to do so. Implicit in the decision is the finding that plaintiff, by paying in to court a sum of money, did not waive its right to attack the constitutionality of Lien Law § 184. In substance, the lien was transferred from the aircraft to the cash deposit.
By order of Mr. Justice Rubenfeld dated December 3, 1974, the Attorney General was given notice of the attack on the constitutionality of a state statute as required by Executive Law 71 and he has filed a brief in support of the constitutionality of the statute.
Lien Law § 184 provides in part as follows:
'A person keeping a garage, hangar or place for the storage, maintenance, keeping or repair of * * * aircraft * * * and who in connection therewith stores, maintains, keeps or repairs any * * * aircraft or furnishes gasoline or other supplies therefor at the request or with the consent of the owner, whether or not * * * aircraft is subject to a security interest, has a lien upon such * * * aircraft for the sum due for such storing, maintaining, keeping or repairing of such * * * aircraft or for furnishing gasoline or other supplies therefor and may detain such * * * aircraft at any time it may be lawfully in his possession until such sum is paid * * *'.
This section which was originally enacted in 1909 has been held to be constitutional (Terminal & Town Taxi Corp. v. O'Rourke, 117 Misc. 761, 193 N.Y.S. 238 (1922)).
It is important to note that the attack on the constitutionality of the mechanics lien made herein is limited to Lien Law § 184 and this decision deals only with the provisions of § 184. This section serves to create the lien. This lawsuit and this decision are not directed at the enforcement provisions of article 9 of the Lien Law which were subject to attack in Hernandez v. European Auto Collison, (D.C.N.Y.) 346 F.Supp. 313, revd. on other grounds (2nd Cir.) 487 F.2d 378. .
In dealing with the constitutionality of a state statute of long standing the court is mindful of the admonition contained in Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty (68 Misc.2d 948, 950, 328 N.Y.S.2d 257, 259, affd. 40 A.D.2d 950, 338 N.Y.S.2d 386, revd. 33 N.Y.2d 15, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 300 N.E.2d 710) wherein Mr. Justice Gold stated:
Thus, in the case at bar we find that plaintiff is admittedly a large corporation well able to afford to have the money paid into court held pending determination of the issues raised in this action; the statute under attack has been on the books since 1909 and the statute is wide reaching and affects every garageman who renders repairs and furnishes services and materials to vehicles.
Despite the foregoing, the court does rule on the constitutional issue, particularly because the court is of the view that the statute may be sustained against the constitutional attack mounted herein.
In alleging that Lien Law § 184 denies the owner of the aircraft due process of law, plaintiff relies on the evolving concepts of due process as enunciated by the federal courts and a most recent State Court of Appeals decision based thereon. (Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406; Fuentes v. Shevlin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349; Sugar v. Curtis Circulation Corp., 383 F.Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.1974); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 300 N.E.2d 770).
For the purposes of this decision, it is not necessary to discuss the federal cases in detail. Further, the court assumes that the exercise by a private person of his lien under § 184 involves a form of state action. A major point of distinction from the instant case is that the cases cited involve a taking from an owner of some form of Personal property without a prior hearing and/or notice. Thus Sniadach involved a wage garnishment by a debtor, pursuant to a statute which allowed a Seizure of the wages prior to a hearing on the claim; Fuentes involved the replevin of household goods by a seller under a conditional sales contract and a statute which allowed the Seizure of the goods prior to judgment; Mitchell involved a...
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