Igoe v. Department of Labor

• Decision Date: 11 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC 85945.,SC 85945.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: John IGOE, Respondent, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF the STATE of Missouri, et al., Appellants.

152 S.W.3d 284

John IGOE, Respondent, v. The DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS OF the STATE of Missouri, et al., Appellants.

No. SC 85945.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

January 11, 2005.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., James R. Layton, State Solicitor, James R. McAdams, Deborah Bell Yates, Asst. Attys. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Appellants.

William E. Moench, Patavee Vanadilok, St. Louis, MO, for Respondent.

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge.

Introduction

John Igoe was one of many qualified applicants in 1997 competing for one of two administrative law judge positions and one of two legal advisor positions in the Division of Workers Compensation in the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations. He was not selected. Igoe applied again in 1999 for one of several new administrative law judge and legal advisor positions and again was not selected.

After his first rejection, Igoe filed complaints with the Missouri Human Rights Commission and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that he had been discriminated against on the basis of age — he was age 63 when he first applied — and sex. After his second rejection, Igoe complained to the Missouri Human Rights Commission he had been discriminated against on the basis of age, sex, and retaliation for filing his first complaint with the commission.

After receiving notices of his right to sue, Igoe filed suit on his claims, alleging sex and age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the chapter 213 RSMo¹, and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec.2000 et seq.

Section 287.610 gives "the division" the authority to appoint administrative law judges and legal advisors. In this case, however, because the workers compensation division director was a candidate for one of the administrative law judge positions in both 1997 and 1999, the director of the department — at the direction of the governor's staff — assumed the role of screening candidates and formally making the appointments.

The Department of Labor and Industrial Relations and the Division of Workers Compensation, but not the governor, were named as defendants in Igoe's suit. The defendants moved to transfer venue to the circuit court of Cole County, where the acts of alleged discrimination occurred. The circuit court of the City of St. Louis overruled the motion for change of venue.

The St. Louis circuit court heard Igoe's claims with an advisory jury.² After the verdict, the circuit court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in favor of Igoe, awarding damages that were determined by the jury and that matched Igoe's claims. The circuit court also ordered that Igoe be instated to an administrative law judge position. After opinion in the court of appeals, this court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

The Nature of Igoe's Claims

When Igoe applied for these positions in 1997, he was one of 27 applicants. In 1999 there were over 50 applicants. Igoe met the minimum experience and training requirements — a law degree and admission to The Missouri Bar for at least two years — as did all of the applicants.

The statutory duties of an administrative law judge include conducting hearings on workers' claims for compensation that result from injuries on the job. Section 287.610.5. The judge makes findings of facts and conclusions of law in decisions that are then reviewed by the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission. Once appointed, an administrative law judge serves until retirement, unless removed for cause. Section 287.610.1. Legal advisors are appointed to assist all parties in making sure their claims are presented and heard. Section 287.642. A legal advisor can also serve in the capacity of an associate administrative law judge. Section 287.616.

These judge and legal advisor positions, the state points out, represent the governor's administration in dealing with the resolution of workers' compensation claims. The governor's staff told the director that the governor wanted candidates who would best represent his administration and emphasized a combination of skills and personal attributes that would best serve the public. As an elected official, the governor — not the department director — is held politically responsible for those who are chosen for these executive-branch administrative law judge positions. Further, an administrative law judge may be discharged or removed only by the governor. Section 287.610.1.

The director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations reviewed applications for these positions and interviewed candidates. The governor's staff reviewed the applications and told the department director the names of the persons who were to be appointed. Under the constitutional and statutory scheme, the governor can tell the department director which candidates he wants selected. The governor appoints the director of the department.³ The director serves at the governor's pleasure. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 17. Though a statute may assign the appointment authority to a department or division, the director serves at the pleasure of the governor and can be removed if he or she fails or refuses to carry out the governor's wishes. Mo. Const. art. IV, sec. 17.⁴

The state contends that the judgment in this case violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The Missouri Constitution establishes three departments (commonly referred to as branches) of government — executive, legislative and judicial — and provides that "no person ... charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others." Mo. Const. art. II, sec. 1. The courts "have the duty and obligation to protect the right of the legislative... [or] ... the executive branch," the state argues, "to exercise those powers specifically delegated to it in the same manner we would [protect against] a similar challenge to the powers of the judiciary." State on Information of Danforth v. Banks, 454 S.W.2d 498, 500 (Mo. banc 1970).

Igoe's claims actually were started in the executive branch with the filing of his complaints with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, an executive branch agency. The filing of a complaint with the commission is a prerequisite to seeking judicial relief. Section 213.111. The commission had an opportunity to determine, in the first instance, the validity of Igoe's claims because the commission and its staff have the statutory authority to investigate, to determine whether there is probable cause to believe discrimination has occurred, and to hold a hearing. Section 213.075. The commission did not hold a hearing on Igoe's claims. No inference, however, can be drawn from the commission's inaction. The commission has very limited resources and must determine which few cases to investigate thoroughly in order to proceed with its own hearing and determination of the claims. The other option is for the claims to be litigated — as Igoe's were — after the commission has issued a letter giving notice of his right to sue. See Stuart v. General Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621 (8th Cir.2000). In this case the commission issued Igoe a letter giving notice of his right to sue; this action was commenced under section 213.111 within 90 days of the notice.⁵

Venue in Missouri Human Rights Act Cases

Although Igoe received a right-to-sue letter, he filed suit in the wrong venue. The basic question posed by the judgment of the circuit court — whether and to what extent the executive branch appointment authority over these administrative law judge positions is subject to the constraints of chapter 213 — need not be addressed at this time. Reversal is warranted because venue was not proper in the circuit court of St. Louis City.

Igoe chose to assert claims under chapter 213 and to file those claims in state court. His action is subject to Missouri venue provisions. The fact that Igoe asserts a federal claim under Title VII does not make the federal venue statute, 42 U.S.C. sec.2000e-5(f)(3), applicable. Where a federal claim is brought in state court, venue is determined by reference to the laws of the state, not the federal statute. Bainbridge v. Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co., 287 U.S. 278, 280-81, 53 S.Ct. 159, 77 L.Ed. 302 (1932).

Section 213.111.1 provides that "an action may be brought in any circuit court in any county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred...." This is a specific venue provision; it supersedes the general venue statute, section 508.010. State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Kinder, 698 S.W.2d 4,6 (Mo. banc 1985). Section 213.111 was interpreted in State ex rel. Diehl v. O'Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 91, fn. 18 (Mo. banc 2003) as limiting venue to "a county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred" and not subjecting a defendant "to the range of plaintiff's venue options in chapter 508 available for civil cases generally." Id.

Igoe, in his petition, was not required to plead facts establishing venue. When the state defendants challenged venue in St. Louis, however, Igoe had the burden of showing that the city of St. Louis is "a county in which the unlawful discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred." The procedure for challenging venue is now expressed in Rule 51.045, but the burden of showing that venue is proper always has been with the plaintiff when venue is...