Ihegword v. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist.

• Decision Date: 07 March 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H–10–5180.
• Citation: 929 F.Supp.2d 635
• Parties: Edith IHEGWORD, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a Ben Taub General Hospital d/b/a Lyndon Baines Johnson General Hospital d/b/a Quentin Mease Community Hospital d/b/a Various Community Health Centers, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

929 F.Supp.2d 635

Edith IHEGWORD, Plaintiff,

v.HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a Ben Taub General Hospital d/b/a Lyndon Baines Johnson General Hospital d/b/a Quentin Mease Community Hospital d/b/a Various Community Health Centers, Defendant.

Civil Action No. H–10–5180.

United States District Court,

S.D. Texas,

Houston Division.

March 7, 2013.

S. Nasim Ahmad, Cline Ahmad Attorneys and Counselors at Law, The Woodlands, TX, for Plaintiff.

Matthew Thomas Deffebach, Meghaan C. McElroy, Haynes and Boone LLP, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIM LAKE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Edith Ihegword, brings this action against defendant, Harris County Hospital District d/b/a Ben Taub General Hospital d/b/a Lyndon Baines Johnson General Hospital d/b/a Quentin Mease Community Hospital d/b/a Various Community Health Centers (“HCHD”), for (1) national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., (2) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., (3) failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and Chapter 61 of the Texas Labor Code, and (4) retaliation.¹ Pending before the court are Defendant Harris County Hospital District's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Docket Entry No. 46), and Defendant's Motion to Strike and Objections to Plaintiff's Declaration in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 60). After having carefully considered Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 58) and Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike and Objections to Plaintiff's Declaration in Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 64), as well as Defendant Harris County Hospital District's Reply to Plaintiff's Response to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 59), the court concludes that defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted, and that defendants' motion to strike and objections to plaintiff's declaration should be denied.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a nurse who began her employment with HCHD in 1988 at Ben Taub Hospital.² Plaintiff's national origin is Nigeria.³ In 2002 plaintiff transferred to Quentin Mease Community Hospital (“Quentin Mease”) to work in the Geriatric Progressive Care Unit (“GPCU”).⁴ In 2006 Jimmie Anglin became the plaintiff's supervisor when she took over the role of Nurse Manager for the GPCU.⁵ Anglin is an African–American female.⁶ During the relevant period Anglin reported to Celeste McLaughlin, Quentin Mease's Assistant Director of Nursing.⁷

During her employment with HCHD, plaintiff suffered from osteoarthritis of her knees.⁸ In late 2007 plaintiff requested a modified work schedule as a reasonable accommodation for her osteoarthritis. Defendant granted plaintiff's request for a modified work schedule effective December 2, 2007. ⁹

On March 26, 2009, Anglin counseled plaintiff and placed her on a 90–day probation for taking lunch breaks that exceeded the 30–minute period allowed by the HCHD.¹⁰ Plaintiff filed a grievance arguing that she should not have been disciplined for taking long lunches and received a hearing on her grievance.¹¹

On May 29, 2009, HCHD discharged plaintiff from her employment.¹² Plaintiff filed a grievance with HCHD arguing that she should not have been discharged, and received two hearings at which she was assisted by a union representative.¹³ The Grievance Panel upheld plaintiff's discharge. ¹⁴

On July 30, 2009, plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, and discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA. ¹⁵ Plaintiff also complained that she had been “subjected to retaliation for complaining of violations of these Acts.” ¹⁶

II. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims because she is unable to cite evidence capable of raising a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is authorized if the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law entitles it to judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Disputes about material facts are “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to mandate the entry of summary judgment “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A party moving for summary judgment “must ‘demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,’ but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) ( en banc ) (per curiam) (quoting Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553–2554).

If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553–2554). In reviewing the evidence “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). Unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence. Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994). The nonmovant is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. Id. at 1537. District courts are under no duty “to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–16 & n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992)). Factual controversies are to be resolved in favor of the nonmovant, “but only when ... both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

B. Plaintiff's Disability Discrimination Claim Fails

Plaintiff alleges that the HCHD discriminated against her on the basis of disability by “refus[ing] to allow [her] requested reasonable accommodation.” ¹⁷ Defendant argues that plaintiff's disability discrimination claim fails because HCHD provided her the only reasonable accommodation she ever sought: a modified work schedule.

1. Plaintiff Cannot Defeat Summary Judgment with New Theory

Without disputing HCHD's argument that her request for a reasonable accommodation was granted, plaintiff responds that her disability claim is not based on HCHD's failure to grant her request for a reasonable accommodation but, instead, “that she was terminated because of her disability, [because of] her request for an accommodation, and because of her complaints to upper management and Human Resources when Ms. Anglin failed to address her accommodation request.” ¹⁸

The argument that her disability discrimination claim is not based on HCHD's alleged failure to provide her a reasonable accommodation but, instead, on HCHD's decision to discharge her has no merit because plaintiff's complaint expressly alleges disability discrimination based on HCHD's alleged failure to provide her a reasonable accommodation, not on HCHD's decision to discharge her. Under the heading “Disability Discrimination in Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990” Plaintiffs' Original Complaint alleges:

87. Defendants are an employer that at all relevant times were subject to the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).

88. Plaintiff informed Defendants of her need for a reasonable accommodation due to her disability.

89. Defendants refused to allow the requested reasonable accommodation.

90. Defendants have thus violated the ADA as to Ms. Ihegword.¹⁹Because a properly pleaded complaint must give “fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1961, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), the fact that plaintiff's original complaint alleges that HCHD discriminated against her on the basis of her disability by failing to provide her a reasonable accommodation, and did not allege that HCHD discharged her because of her disability, precludes plaintiff from using her discharge as a means to defeat HCHD's motion for summary judgment on her disability discrimination claim. See Cutrera v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir.2005) (courts disregard claims raised not in a complaint but in response to a motion for summary judgment).

2. Plaintiff Received the Modified Work Schedule that She Sought as a Reasonable Accommodation

The ADA requires employers to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue...