Ill. State Treasurer v. Ill. Workers' Comp. Comm'n

Decision Date16 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. 117418.,117418.
Citation30 N.E.3d 288
PartiesILLINOIS STATE TREASURER, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al., Appellees.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Mary C. Labrec, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Matthew J. Belcher and Brian J. Wiehe, of Belcher Law Office, of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice KARMEIER

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal presents a single question of law: when acting in his capacity as custodian of the Injured Workers' Benefit Fund (Fund), is the Illinois State Treasurer (the Treasurer) required to file an appeal bond pursuant to section 19(f)(2) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2)

(West 2012)) in order to obtain judicial review of a decision by the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission affirming an arbitrator's award of benefits to an injured worker? The appellate court answered this question in the affirmative and concluded that because the Treasurer had not filed the requisite appeal bond, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Treasurer's appeal. 2013 IL App (1st) 120549WC, 377 Ill.Dec. 435, 2 N.E.3d 351. We granted the Treasurer's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Janina Zakarzecka worked as a home healthcare provider, caregiver, and companion to Joseph Meuse, an elderly man who was legally blind. Her job responsibilities included retrieving Meuse's mail and answering his front door. These duties required Zakarzecka to walk down a flight of stairs at Meuse's home.

¶ 4 On May 10, 2007, a deliveryman brought a package to the house for Mr. Meuse. For sanitary reasons, Mr. Meuse required Zakarzecka to wear special shoes while working inside the house and to change into her street shoes when answering the door or going outside. When Zakarzecka heard the deliveryman on May 10, she hurriedly attempted to change her shoes at the top of the stairwell so she could get to the front door before the deliveryman left. In the process, she fell down the stairs, breaking both wrists and suffering partial loss of the use of both hands.

¶ 5 Zakarzecka subsequently filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq.

(West 2012)) to obtain benefits for her injuries. Zakarzecka's application named Meuse as the employer/respondent. While her claim was pending, Meuse passed away, so Zakarzecka amended the claim to add as respondents Meuse's estate and the individual who owned and operated the employment agency that had placed Zakarzecka with Meuse. Because Meuse lacked workers' compensation insurance at the time of her injury, Zakarzecka also looked to the Fund for relief.

¶ 6 The Fund is governed by section 4(d) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/4(d)

(West 2012)) and serves as a source of payment for injured employees when the employer has failed to provide the coverage required by law and has failed to pay the benefits due to the injured employee. The money in the Fund comes from penalties and fines collected from employers, service or adjustment companies and insurance carriers pursuant to section 4(d) of the Act. The custodian of the Fund is the Illinois State Treasurer, who serves in that capacity ex officio. As required by section 4(d), Zakarzecka joined the Treasurer, in his role as the Fund's custodian, as an additional party respondent in the case. See 820 ILCS 305/4(d)

(West 2012).

¶ 7 The matter proceeded to a hearing before an arbitrator for the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission. The arbitrator found that Zakarzecka's accident arose out of and in the course of her employment with Meuse and awarded her temporary total disability benefits, medical expenses, and compensation for the permanent and partial loss of both of her hands. Under the terms of the decision, an award was made to Zakarzecka and against the Fund “to the extent permitted and allowed under § 4(d) of the Act, in the event of the failure of Respondent–Employer to pay the benefits due and owing [her].”

¶ 8 The Treasurer, as the Fund's custodian, appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Commission. The Commission unanimously affirmed and adopted the decision rendered by the arbitrator. Acting again as custodian of the Fund, the Treasurer then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)

(West 2012)).

¶ 9 The circuit court confirmed the Commission's ruling. The Treasurer subsequently sought further review of the Commission's decision in the appellate court. Initially the appellate court reversed the Commission's award of benefits based on its determination that Zakarzecka had failed to present evidence supporting a reasonable inference that her injuries arose out of a risk associated with her employment. Following that ruling, however, Zakarzecka filed a timely petition for rehearing arguing, for the first time, that the courts lacked jurisdiction to consider the Treasurer's appeal.

¶ 10 Zakarzecka's jurisdictional challenge was premised on two alternative grounds. First, she contended that her claim under the Fund was actually against the State of Illinois and the award in her favor was therefore not subject to any judicial review pursuant to section 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1)

(West 2012)). Alternatively, Zakarzecka argued that judicial review was barred by section 19(f)(2) of the Act because the Treasurer had not filed an appeal bond, a statutory prerequisite for invoking the circuit court's jurisdiction. See 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2012). Believing that both of these arguments raised issues of first impression, the appellate court ordered the State to respond to Zakarzecka's petition and allowed Zakarzecka to file a reply.

¶ 11 Following the additional briefing, the appellate court rejected the argument that Zakarzecka's claim was against the State and therefore not subject to judicial review under section 19(f)(1) of the Act. The appellate court concluded, however, that under the plain terms of section 19(f)(2), the Treasurer was required to post a bond if he wished to seek judicial review, that the statutory bond requirement was jurisdictional, and that because no appeal bond had been filed in this case, the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Treasurer's appeal. The appellate court therefore withdrew its prior ruling in the case and dismissed the Treasurer's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 2013 IL App (1st) 120549WC, ¶¶ 22–32, 377 Ill.Dec. 435, 2 N.E.3d 351

. The Treasurer now challenges that judgment, arguing that it should be exempt from the normal bond requirement of section 19(f)(2) and that the appellate court's dismissal of its appeal for lack of jurisdiction should therefore be reversed.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 Whether a court has jurisdiction to review an administrative decision presents a question of law. We review such questions de novo. Board of Education of Roxana Community School District No. 1 v. Pollution Control Board, 2013 IL 115473, ¶ 17, 376 Ill.Dec. 323, 998 N.E.2d 1256

. De novo review is also appropriate in this case because resolution of the jurisdictional question turns solely on the construction of section 19(f) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2012)), and statutory construction is likewise a question of law. People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Booth, 215 Ill.2d 416, 423, 294 Ill.Dec. 157, 830 N.E.2d 569 (2005).

¶ 14 Illinois courts are courts of general jurisdiction and enjoy a presumption of subject matter jurisdiction. Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 13, 372 Ill.Dec. 833, 992 N.E.2d 1234

. That presumption is inapplicable, however, where administrative proceedings are involved. Illinois courts are empowered to review administrative actions only “as provided by law.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 (appellate court), § 9 (circuit court). When the legislature has, through law, prescribed procedures for obtaining judicial review of an administrative decision, a court is said to exercise “special statutory jurisdiction” when it reviews an administrative decision pursuant to that statutory scheme. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 2014 IL 116642, ¶ 10, 386 Ill.Dec. 655, 21 N.E.3d 418. Special statutory jurisdiction is limited by the language of the act conferring it. A court has no powers from any other source. A party seeking to invoke a court's special statutory jurisdiction must therefore comply strictly with the procedures prescribed by the statute. If the mode of procedure set forth in the statute is not strictly pursued, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court. Id.

¶ 15 It is well established that these principles are fully applicable to proceedings seeking judicial review of decisions by the Workers' Compensation Commission. In such proceedings, the jurisdiction of the courts is never presumed. Arrington v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Ill.2d 505, 508, 71 Ill.Dec. 712, 451 N.E.2d 866 (1983)

. To the contrary, in order to vest the courts with jurisdiction to review Commission decisions, strict compliance with the provisions of the Act is necessary and must affirmatively appear in the record. Id.;

Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 13, 372 Ill.Dec. 833, 992 N.E.2d 1234 ; Daugherty v. Industrial Comm'n, 99 Ill.2d 1, 5, 75 Ill.Dec. 387, 457 N.E.2d 381 (1983). Accordingly, our analysis in the case before us must focus on determining precisely what the Act requires in order to invoke the courts' jurisdiction and then evaluating whether those requirements have been satisfied. Jones v. Industrial Comm'n, 188 Ill.2d 314, 320, 242 Ill.Dec. 284, 721 N.E.2d 563 (1999).

¶ 16 Judicial review of decisions by the Workers' Compensation...

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