People ex rel. Director of Corr. v. Booth

• Decision Date: 19 May 2005
• Docket Number: No. 99329.,99329.
• Citation: 830 N.E.2d 569,215 Ill.2d 416
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant, v. Lonnie BOOTH, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 569

830 N.E.2d 569

215 Ill.2d 416

The PEOPLE ex rel. DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant, v. Lonnie BOOTH, Appellee.

No. 99329.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 19, 2005.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

Justice KARMEIER delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue in this case is whether section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)), which exempts from judgment, attachment or distress for rent payments of up to $7,500 made on account of personal bodily injury of the debtor, applies to actions brought by the state under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)) against persons committed to the Department of Corrections (Department) to obtain reimbursement for the costs of their incarceration. The circuit court held that the exemption was applicable. The appellate court affirmed. 352 Ill.App.3d 297, 287 Ill.Dec. 403, 815 N.E.2d 1206. We granted a petition by the state for leave to appeal 177 Ill.2d R. 315. For the reasons that follow, we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

The facts are not in dispute. Lonnie Booth was sentenced to the Department of Corrections and incarcerated from April of 2001 until September of 2004. The month after he began serving his sentence, Booth received a payment in settlement of a personal injury action he had brought against the Pace Suburban Bus Division of the Regional Transportation Authority. The payment amounted to $41,715.57 after attorney fees and costs.

After the state became aware that Booth had obtained this settlement, it brought an action against him in the circuit court of Rock Island County to obtain reimbursement for the cost of Booth's imprisonment. The action was predicated on section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)). That statute makes persons committed to the Department responsible for the expenses incurred because of their incarceration (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(a) (West 2002)) and establishes how the expenses are to be calculated (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(b) (West 2002)), proved (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(c) (West 2002)), and recovered by the state (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(d) (West 2002)).

The statute provides that when the Director of Corrections or his designee knows or reasonably believes that a committed person or his estate has assets which may be used to satisfy all or part of a judgment for incarceration costs, the Director must submit a report to the Attorney General which includes information regarding the person's assets. The Director is also required to authorize the Attorney General to institute proceedings against the committed person or the person's estate to recover the expenses of incarceration. When the Attorney General has received such authorization, the statute provides that he or she "shall institute actions on behalf of the Department * * * to recover from committed persons the expenses incurred by their confinement." 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(d) (West 2002).

When the state succeeds in obtaining a judgment against a person for the costs of his or her incarceration, the assets it can reach to satisfy that judgment are extensive. For purposes of the statute, a committed person's assets include "any property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due to a committed or formerly committed person including income or payments to the person from social security, worker's compensation, veteran's compensation, pension benefits, or from any other source whatsoever and any and all assets and property of whatever character held in the name of the person, held for the benefit of the person, or payable or otherwise deliverable to the person." 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002).

To prevent an incarcerated person from concealing, dissipating or otherwise placing covered assets beyond the court's reach during the pendency of the proceedings, the statute states that

"[a]t the time of a legal proceeding by the Attorney General under this Section, if it appears that the committed person has any assets which ought to be subjected to the claim of the Department under this Section, the court may issue an order requiring any person, corporation, or other legal entity possessed or having custody of those assets to appropriate any of the assets or a portion thereof toward reimbursing the Department as provided for under this Section." 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002).

The statute further specifies, however, that "[n]o provision of this Section shall be construed in violation of any State or federal limitation on the collection of money judgments." 730 ILCS 5/3-7-6(e)(3) (West 2002).

In its complaint against Booth, the state contended that it was entitled to recover $40,656.89 as reimbursement for the costs of Booth's incarceration, plus costs and interest. After filing that complaint, the state moved for issuance of an order for attachment against the proceeds from Booth's personal injury settlement pursuant to section 4-101(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/4-101(11) (West 2002)). That motion was granted. The court subsequently convened a hearing. Booth, who was incarcerated, did not attend the hearing or retain counsel to represent him there. When he failed to appear, the court found him to be in default and entered judgment against him for $40,656.89, the full amount sought by the state in its complaint.

Booth subsequently filed pleadings requesting that the court reconsider its judgment and declare that the money he had received in settlement of his personal injury claim was subject to the exemption set forth in section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)). That provision exempts from judgment, attachment or distress for rent a

"debtor's right to receive, or property that is traceable to:

* * *

(4) a payment not to exceed $7,500 in value, on account of personal bodily injury of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent [.]" 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002).

The state moved to dismiss Booth's request for declaratory relief and requested summary judgment on its claim for reimbursement of the full amount it had expended on Booth's incarceration. As grounds for its motion, the state argued that no material facts were in dispute and that the Department of Corrections had a statutory right to reimbursement of the incarceration costs under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)). The circuit court granted the state's motion and entered summary judgment in its favor. In so doing, however, the court held that section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure was applicable and that $7,500 of the award paid to Booth for his personal injuries was therefore exempt and could not be reached by the state to satisfy the judgment.

The state appealed, challenging that portion of the circuit court's judgment shielding $7,500 of Booth's personal injury settlement from collection. The appellate court denied the state's motion for a stay of the judgment pending appeal and ultimately affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 352 Ill.App.3d 297, 287 Ill.Dec. 403, 815 N.E.2d 1206.

After we allowed the state's petition for leave to appeal, it filed a brief with our court. Booth did not, just as he failed to file a brief in the appellate court. Although the lack of an appellee's brief obviously does not aid Booth's position, it does not compel entry of judgment for the state either. While a court of review is not obligated to serve as an advocate for the appellee or search the record for the purpose of sustaining the judgment of the trial court, it may do so when justice requires. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill.2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). The appellate court considered this to be such a case. We share that assessment.

We note, moreover, that the record in this case is brief, the facts are straightforward, and the claimed error can easily be resolved without the aid of an appellee's brief. Where such circumstances have been present in previous cases, our court has held that we should decide the appeal on the merits. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill.2d 129, 135, 289 Ill.Dec. 610, 820 N.E.2d 386 (2004); People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d 220, 223, 273 Ill.Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260 (2003). There is no reason to depart from that approach here. The state does not argue otherwise. Accordingly, we shall proceed to the merits of the appeal.

We begin by pointing out what is not in dispute. No one questions that the state had the right to seek reimbursement from Booth under section 3-7-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-7-6 (West 2002)) for the expenses it incurred in keeping him incarcerated. The state's compliance with the relevant requirements for initiating a claim for reimbursement under the statute is not challenged. The amount Booth owed was calculated in accordance with statutory requirements, and the accuracy of the state's calculations is conceded. No procedural irregularities have been raised with respect to the circuit court's handling of the case. The judgment awarded by the circuit court has ample support in the record.

Under the statute, Booth clearly owes the state the sum of $40,656.89, as the circuit court found. Booth does not dispute that he owes the state this amount. The issue is simply whether the full amount of the $41,715.57 payment made to Booth in settlement of his personal injury action can be reached by the state to satisfy the judgment.

Resolution of that issue turns on a single question: Does the $7,500 statutory exemption for personal injury payments set forth in section 12-1001(h)(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) (West 2002)) apply to actions...