Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mississippi R. Commission

• Decision Date: 01 November 1926
• Docket Number: 25893
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. et al. v. MISSISSIPPI R. COMMISSION et al. [*]

109 So. 868

143 Miss. 805

ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO. et al. v. MISSISSIPPI R. COMMISSION et al. ^[*]

No. 25893

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 1, 1926

Division A

APPEAL from circuit court of First district, Hinds county, HON. W H. POTTER, Judge.

Certiorari by the Illinois Central Railroad Company and others against the Mississippi Railroad Commission, wherein the Alabama &amp Vicksburg Railway Company was permitted to become a party plaintiff, and representatives of the Mississippi Cottonseed Crushers' Association and others intervened, defending validity of the order of respondent Railroad Commission. From a judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the order, petitioners appeal, with supersedeas. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Chas N. Burch, H. D. Minor, C. H. McKay, R. V. Fletcher, May, Sanders & McLaurin, J. Carter Fort, R. H. and J. H. Thompson, for appellants.

I. Appellants were confronted in limine in the circuit court and likewise in this court with one of the grounds of the motion to quash to the effect that "the action of the commission in said matter and the determination and order therein complained of were legislative and administrative in their nature and character, and the actions of the commission therein were the exercise of a legislative and administrative function, which is not reviewable by certiorari."

It is the contention of appellants that the order of the commission is plainly divisible in two parts. The first portion of the order; that is, that portion finding that the then existing rates were unreasonable, is the judicial ascertainment of a then existing fact. In ascertaining a then existing fact the commission was exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function.

The remaining portion of the order fixing rates for the future was a legislative act. We concede that under the decisions of this court a purely legislative or administrative order of the commission cannot ordinarily be reviewed by certiorari, though, as we shall hereafter show, this rule is not without some limitations and exceptions. G. & S. I. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 85 Miss. 772; Cumberland Tel. Co. v. State, ex rel., 135 Miss. 835; Board of Supervisors v. Melton, 123 Miss. 615.

II. The Mississippi Railroad Commission exercises both judicial or quasi-judicial functions and also legislative or quasi-legislative functions. A plain illustration of the exercise of judicial functions by the commission is found in the case of R. R. Co. v. Adams, 85 Miss. 772, in the exercise by the commission of its duty to classify the railroads for the purpose of privilege taxation.

An illustration of the exercise of a legislative function by the commission is found in Cumberland Tel. Co., etc., v. State, 135 Miss. 835. In that case it appeared that the Telephone Company had petitioned the commission for an increase in rates. The railroad commission granted the application and made an order fixing a schedule of rates for future observance. That was the only order sought to be reviewed by certiorari. There was no order under review adjudging existing rates unreasonable.

Another illustration of the Mississippi rule that purely administrative or legislative acts cannot ordinarily be reviewed by certiorari is found in Board of Supervisors v. Melton, 123 Miss. 615, wherein was involved an administrative order of a board of supervisors.

III. While the Constitution of Mississippi provides for three departments of government, executive, legislative and judicial, and prohibits any one department from exercising the powers of another, yet these provisions of the Constitution do not apply to such inferior tribunals as boards of supervisors or the railroad commission. Ex parte Fritz, 86 Miss. 221.

IV. Findings of Mississippi Railroad Commission are not final but subject to judicial review. Telegraph Co. v. R. R. Commission, 74 Miss. 92.

V. We are here reviewing a judicial act of the commission. The commission may in the same order exercise judicial and legislative functions. Interstate Commerce Commission v. C. N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 497. An examination of the annotations of this case in Rose's Notes of the United States Supreme Court Decisions will disclose that the above statement of the law has been followed in practically all of the state courts. The above statement of the law is entirely in accord with the Mississippi cases above referred to. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 85 Miss. 795.

VI. Mississippi decisions definitely determine that the Mississippi Railroad Commission exercises both legislative and judicial functions. Decisions to the contrary by other courts are, therefore, not in point. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 228, is not in point here for two reasons: (1) Because the supreme court of Mississippi has definitely determined that the Mississippi Railroad Commission exercises both judicial and legislative functions, as illustrated in R. R. Co. v. Adams, 85 Miss. 772, and Cumberland Tel. Co. v. State, ex rel., 135 Miss. 835; (2) In the United States supreme court case just referred to, that court was asked to declare unconstitutional an act of the Kentucky legislature which defined the powers of the Kentucky Railroad Commission. The contention was made that the act of the Kentucky legislature conferred both legislative and judicial powers upon the Kentucky Commission and, therefore, the act was void as being in conflict with the Kentucky Constitution. In the approach to the decision of this question, the United States supreme court expressed, as it always does, its reluctance to decide that a state statute is in conflict with a state Constitution before the validity of that statute has been passed upon by the highest court of the state. In short, the United States supreme court always avoids such a question if it can possibly be avoided, leaving the decision to the highest court of the state, where it properly belongs. It was under such circumstances that the United States supreme court was asked to declare unconstitutional the aforesaid act of Kentucky and it was under such circumstances that it stated that the "nature of the final act" (fixing rates for the future) determines "the nature of the previous inquiry."

VII. For sections of code relative to certiorari see, sections 72-73, Hemingway's Code (sections 90-91, Code of 1906).

VIII. For sections of code stating power of commission as to fixing rates, see sections 7634 and 7627, Hemingway's Code.

IX. The commission has no implied powers. G. & S. I. R. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 94 Miss. 134.

X. The commission acted erroneously in not following principles prescribed by statute. The public interest, which is the prime consideration, was not considered.

The problem of the commission in determining whether rates are reasonable is to be solved on these principles: (1) The nature and kind of the service, the entire business of the carrier and its earnings; (2) justice to the public and the railroad and other common carriers; and (3) that the commission shall keep its hands off of interstate rates. In the instant case it is our insistence that the record on its face shows that the commission did not follow these principles.

XI. Long maintenance of rates is an admission of reasonableness. Green Bay Business Men's Ass's v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 15 I. C. C. 63.

XII. Rate comparisons have no probative effect without full disclosure of all facts and circumstances. Raymond v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 1 I. C. Rep. 231; South Canon Coal Co. v. C. & S. Ry. Co., 17 I. C. C. 286; I. C. R. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 1 F. (2) 805.

XIII. The order is void as regulating interstate commerce. L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Eubanks, 184 U.S. 27; R. R. Commission v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563; Houston E. & W. T. R. R. Co. v. U.S. 234 U.S. 342; N. C. & St. L. Ry. v. State of Tenn., 262 U.S. 318.

XIV. How courts test validity of commission orders: G. & S. I. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 85 Miss. 772; Interstate Commerce Com. v. U. P. R. R. Co., 222 U.S. 547; P. & R. R. Co. v. Interstate Com. Com., 240 U.S. 334; Seaboard A. L. R. Co. v. U.S. 254 U.S. 57; Florida East Coast R. R. Co. v. U.S. 234 U.S. 185.

F. H. and F. J. Lotterhos, for appellees.

I. Rate making is legislative and not subject to certiorari. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 135 Miss. 835, 100 So. 378, covers this case squarely and is fortified by the authorities therein cited, among which are the notables one of I. C. R. R. Co. v. Dodd, 105. Miss. 23, 61 So. 743; Board of Supervisors v. Melton, 123 Miss. 615, 86 So. 369; Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 211 U.S. 210, 53 L.Ed. 151; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298, 58 L.Ed. 229. See, also, 4 R. C. L., p. 608.

II. The investigation upon which rates are made is not judicial, but is treated as submerged in the making of the rate for the future. Much is said in appellant's brief about the Mississippi Railroad Commission having legislative and judicial functions. The legislature has committed to this commission more duties and powers than those incident to rate making alone; and, while certiorari may run to a proceeding in which some judicial function is exercised, it is not applicable to one definitely decided by this court to be legislative. This appears from the decision of this court in R. R. Co. v. Adams, 85 Miss. 795. The soundness of this principle cannot be more clearly stated than appears from 4 R. C. L., p. 623.

The supreme court of the United States holds that a legislature or a railroad commission in exercising its delegated power in rate making may require a hearing, the consideration of relevant statutes, evidence, and arguments, and determine whether existing rates are excessive; and that upon these conditions being fulfilled, the questions of fact which might...