Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Brookhaven Machine Co

• Decision Date: 19 February 1894
• Citation: 71 Miss. 663,16 So. 252
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. v. BROOKHAVEN MACHINE CO

16 So. 252

71 Miss. 663

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD CO. v. BROOKHAVEN MACHINE CO

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 19, 1894

October 1893

FROM the circuit court of Lincoln county.

HON. W P. CASSEDY, judge of the sixth district, presided, the HON J. B. CHRISMAN being disqualified by reason of relationship to a party in interest.

Replevin for certain machinery, brought by appellee against appellant in a justice court October 22, 1891. The affidavit averred that the property was of the value of $ 175. After the commencement of suit, plaintiff gave written notice of a claim of damages for the wrongful detention of the property amounting to $ 200. Plaintiff recovered judgment for the property and $ 50 damages. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the circuit court, where the defendant moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the justice court had no jurisdiction, the value of the property being more than $ 150. The motion was overruled. Thereupon plaintiff, by leave of court, filed a claim of damages amounting to $ 500 alleging wilful and oppressive wrong on the part of defendant in detaining the property. On the trial the court refused a peremptory instruction for defendant, and, at the instance of plaintiff, instructed the jury that the detention of the property by defendant was wrongful, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the same, together with such actual damages as it sustained by being deprived of its use. Further, the court instructed for the plaintiff that if the property was withheld wilfully, or under circumstances of insult or oppression, indicating a disregard of plaintiff's rights, then, in addition to actual damages, the jury might assess damages by way of punishment, not to exceed the amount demanded. Plaintiff recovered judgment for the property and $ 200 damages. Motion for new trial overruled. Defendant appeals. The opinion contains a further statement of the case.

Judgment reversed.

R. H. Thompson, for appellant.

1. The question as to the jurisdiction of justices of the peace between November, 1890, and April 1, 1892, in matters of contract, was settled by this court in Rich v. Calhoun, 12 So. 707. That decision must be construed with reference to the case then before the court. Section 23, article 6, constitution 1869, and section 171, constitution 1890, are practically identical. It was settled by the logic of the decision in Bell v. West Point, 51 Miss. 262, that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in matters of tort and replevin, was not conferred by the constitution, but by the statute. If this court gives any other effect to the slight change in the language of § 171, constitution 1890, than the one which is certainly wrought, then it must be held that an action of ejectment for land worth less than $ 200 can only be brought in the justice court, and other very serious consequences will flow from such a decision. The proposition asserted as the major premise of the argument is that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in actions of tort is statutory. There is nothing in the schedule of the present constitution variant from the premise. The minor premise is, that in October, 1891, there was no statute conferring jurisdiction on justices of the peace in replevin suit where the property exceeded in value $ 150.

2. The property, when delivered to the Chicago & Northwestern Railroad, was either that of Cullen or plaintiff. If it was the property of Cullen, then he delivered it to that road for transportation to Dixon, Ill. there to be delivered to defendant. In this way, he constituted the first carrier his agent to forward the property. Hutchinson on Carriers, § 108. Cullen being the owner, he, or his said agent, could impose any conditions on the shipment deemed proper, and the defendant was bound by those conditions. It would have been a violation of its duty to have delivered the property before the conditions were complied with. If the property remained in Cullen, the title was not in plaintiff when the suit was begun. If the property passed to plaintiff upon its delivery at Clinton, Iowa, then the first carrier became his agent, and defendant would not be liable for an error made by the agent as to freight charges. Therefore, in either view, it was error to refuse the peremptory instruction for defendant.

3. It distinctly appears from the testimony of Chrisman that the Brookhaven Machine Company is a partnership and not a corporation, and yet the names of the partners nowhere appear in the record. Blackwell v. Reid, 41 Miss. 102. To sustain the suit will be to repudiate the above decision, or else disregard the statute which dispenses with pleadings in cases begun in the justice court.

4. Plaintiff's instruction on the subject of exemplary damages should not have been given. In any view of the case, the exemplary damages were not warranted.

5. The motion for a new trial should have been sustained. The excessive verdict was the result of erroneous instructions given for the plaintiff.

Mayes & Harris, on same side.

Cassedy & Cassedy, for appellee.

1. The argument of opposite counsel is based upon an erroneous view of the decision in Bell v. West Point, 51 Miss. 262. The question involved here was decided by this court in Rich v. Calhoun, 12 So. 707. The language of the constitution of 1890 is, that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall extend to causes in which the principal amount in controversy shall not exceed the amount of $ 200. To say that this plain language confers jurisdiction only in causes ex contractu, is to do violence to every known rule of construction. The distinction between actions ex contractu and ex delicto, sought to be engrafted on the constitution by judicial construction, is purely fanciful.

2. The assumption that the Brookhaven Machine Company is a partnership is not sustained by the evidence. It was a partnership at the beginning, but Mr. Chrisman had become the owner of all the property, and was such before the suit commenced. It is immaterial that he continued business under the former name. But the proper mode of taking advantage of the defect complained of in a case where there is no pleadings would be by motion to dismiss.

3. The rule that where a carrier receives freight to be delivered to a connecting line for transportation to its destination, the first carrier is to be regarded only as the forwarder, does not abridge its power to make any contract with the shipper it may see proper. Here the contract was not for simple delivery to the connecting line, but for delivery at the point of destination. The first carrier selected the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and made its own contract with that company for delivery at Brookhaven. The latter company became the agent of the first carrier, and it had no right to detain the property when the stipulated freight charges were tendered. The fallacy of appellant's argument is in assuming that the first carrier was simply a forwarder. In support of the position that the contract between Cullen and the first carrier, and its delivery of the property to the defendant for transportation, made the latter the agent of the first carrier, we cite Falvey v. Railroad Co., 76 Ga. 597; Perkins v. Railroad Co. , 74 Am. Dec., 507; Najac v. Railroad Co., 83 Ib., 686; Williams v. Vanderbuilt, 84 Ib., 333; Wheeler v. Railroad Co., 89 Ib., 147; Peet v. Railroad Co., 91 Ib., 446; Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Douglass (Mich.), 1.

Charles Chrisman, on the same side.

1. Section 171, constitution 1890, plainly provides that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall extend to causes in which the principal amount in controversy shall not exceed the sum of $ 200. There is no authority for limiting this language to actions ex contractu. The constitution itself confers the jurisdiction of all our courts. To sustain the view of opposite counsel would be to overrule Rich v. Calhoun, 12 So. 707. Bell v. West Point, 51 Miss. 262, does not support the contention of counsel, but, on the contrary, sustains the jurisdiction in this case.

2. The evidence shows that Chrisman owned all the property of the Brookhaven Machine Company, and it was no longer a partnership. It is immaterial that he did business in the name of the company, and so brought the suit. But objection as to this was not properly made by the request for all instruction.

3. The testimony abundantly shows that the conduct of defendant in withholding the property was oppressive and malicious. The matter was adjusted as soon as suit was brought. Why was not this done before? The agent of defendant had access to the telegraph, and ample time to investigate before the suit was instituted.

COOPER, J.

OPINION

COOPER, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

A short time prior to the twenty-eighth day of September A.D. 1891 one Charles Chrisman, doing business by the name and style of the Brookhaven Machine Company, bought of one Cullen, at Clinton, in the state of Iowa, an engine and other machinery, conditional upon satisfactory freight rates being secured to Brookhaven, in this state. Cullen, having secured a rate with the Chicago & North-western Railway Company of seventy-five cents per hundred pounds, with five dollars for handling, communicated the facts to Chrisman, who thereupon agreed to purchase the engine, and requested shipment at once. On the twenty-eighth of September, 1891, Cullen shipped the property to Brookhaven, taking a written contract from the Chicago & North-western Railway for the delivery of the same at Brookhaven at the rate above named. In due time the property reached Brookhaven through the agency of the Illinois Central Railroad, an independent railway company, which connected with the Chicago &...