Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. LeBlanc

• Decision Date: 05 April 1897
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD Co. v. R. E. LEBLANC

21 So. 760

74 Miss. 650

ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD Co. v. R. E. LEBLANC

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 5, 1897

March 1897

FROM the circuit court of Pike county HON. W. P. CASSEDY, Judge.

In 1886 the Illinois Central Railroad Company, the lessee, and the Chicago, St. Louis & New Orleans Railroad Company, the lessor, jointly condemned about sixteen acres of land in section 11, adjacent to their main track near Chattawa, Pike county, and acquired the same in an eminent domain proceeding, from which to obtain gravel for the purpose of ballasting the roadbed, and established gravel pits thereon. The land, and that in section 14, just south of it, was assessed by legal subdivisions, including the right of way in both sections, on the general assessment roll of the county for the taxes of the year 1890, and, notwithstanding the railroad companies paid their taxes for said year under the laws then in force for the taxation of railroads, the lands while so assessed, in both sections were sold by the tax collector in March, 1891, for the taxes of 1890, and they were purchased at said sale by L. C. and M. Lenoir, to whom a regular tax collector's deed was executed. After the lapse of one year from the tax sale, the grantees in the tax deed sold to LeBlanc, who at once proceeded to drive the railroad employes from the gravel land. The railroad companies then enjoined LeBlanc from interfering with the laborers in the gravel pits and from preventing the appellants' use of the gravel. The bill sought to redeem the lands from the tax sale, upon the idea that sec. 79 constitution of 1890, gave two years for redemption, and independently of the redemption, to cancel the tax deed to the gravel lands. LeBlanc made his answer in the suit a cross bill, and sought to confirm his tax title to the gravel lands and to the lands in section 14 as well.

The chancery court of Pike county, by its decree, canceled LeBlanc's tax title to the gravel lands, and to the railroad right of way over section 11 and section 14, but confirmed it as to the other lands in his deed. LeBlanc appealed therefrom to the supreme court, and the case is reported, 72 Miss. 669. The supreme court affirmed the decree of the chancery court so far as it related to the right of way in section 11, and confirmed LeBlanc's tax title as to all other lands embraced in it. The confirmation, however of the tax title to the right of way in section 14 was caused, as was contended, by an error in entering the supreme court judgment, court and counsel overlooking the fact that a part of the railroad right of way was located on section 14. This error being discovered, a motion was made in the supreme court, after the adjournment of the term, to correct the decree, which motion was overruled. The motion is reported, 73 Miss. 463, and to the case as previously reported, on the appeal and on the motion, reference is made, as well as to the opinion herein, for additional facts involved in the present case.

Judgment affirmed.

R. H. Thompson, for appellant.

Has the circuit court jurisdiction of ejectment suits? It is recognized that sec. 147, constitution, would prevent a reversal if there be no other error in the record, but I so confidently believe other errors will be found that I proceed to say: All jurisdiction is expressly provided for by our constitution. The jurisdiction conferred on our courts by the constitution not only embraces all subjects, but that conferred on each is exclusive, except where concurrent jurisdiction is expressly provided for in the instrument itself. The circuit court is not given any specific grant of jurisdiction. It is a residuary legatee, so to speak; it only has such jurisdiction as is not vested in some other court. The language of sec. 156, constitution, is the equivalent of saying the circuit court shall not have jurisdiction of matters vested in other courts. By no sort of reasoning can a circuit court be held to have jurisdiction of (a) matters in equity, or (b) divorce and alimony, and the legislature is without power to confer it. If the chancery court's jurisdiction of the subject-matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of sec. 159, constitution, is exclusive, it is certainly so of the subject-matters of paragraphs (c), (d), (e) and (f) thereof. If this is true, why is it not true of the jurisdiction conferred on the chancery court by sec. 160, constitution? By that section the chancery court, in suits to try titles, etc., is given jurisdiction "to decree possession, and to displace possession and to decree rents, " etc. It must be noted that by paragraph (f), sec. 159, the chancery court has exclusive jurisdiction of "suits to try titles, " etc. That the jurisdiction of our courts generally is exclusive, is shown most conclusively by the fact that the constitution provides for concurrent jurisdiction, itself creating the only exceptions to the general rule, sec. 161. Where a general rule is announced by, or is deducible from, a constitutional or statutory enactment, and the same law specifies the exceptions thereto, it is almost conclusive that cases not found in the express exceptions are within the general rule. The notes under § 500, code 1892, show the extent to which this court has gone in the matter of equity jurisdiction in land suits; and all this is now made constitutional jurisdiction by paragraph (f), sec. 159, constitution. The mind cannot conceive of an ejectment suit the facts of which would not justify, if it be a case of merit, a suit in equity, or the facts of which could not be rightfully brought before a chancery court and full and complete relief be there given. If this be true, such controversies can only be rightfully brought in the chancery court. This court has decided that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in actions of tort is constitutional rather than statutory. Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brookhaven Machine Co., 71 Miss. 663. The logic of this decision is that justices of the peace have jurisdiction of ejectments for lands worth less than $ 200, if the jurisdiction thereof is at law; the only escape is to place ejectments in the chancery court.

The next question is, had the circuit court jurisdiction of the particular controversy? The point here made is that the chancery court had first obtained jurisdiction. If one court correctly obtains jurisdiction of a suit, its right to hear and determine the cause is exclusive of all other courts. Sec. 147, constitution, does not affect this rule.

Certainly, in this case, the chancery court of Pike county first obtained jurisdiction of Mr. LeBlanc's cause; it did try appellee's title, and it did--or this court on appeal therefrom did, which is the same thing adjudge his title to be good; it canceled appellant's title to the land now in controversy. If the constitution means anything, it means, to use its own words (sec. 160), that the chancery court "shall have jurisdiction in such cases to decree possession and to displace possession, " etc. If an express jurisdiction conferred by the constitution on the chancery court is exclusively in that court, then the right to hear and determine Mr. LeBlanc's cause was, and is, in the chancery court only, and not in the circuit court. It looks to the writer that this ought to be the end of this controversy. It cannot be possible that the chancery court, which is affirmatively given jurisdiction to decree possession and to displace possession by the fundamental law, is without power to enforce its own decrees.

Suppose for the moment that the circuit court has jurisdiction ordinarily of ejectment suits, and suppose a plaintiff had recovered a judgment in such an action, but had failed to obtain an order for the issuance of a writ of habere facias possessionem, would the chancery court entertain a bill simply to award him possession of the land? Certainly not. And yet the case before us is the exact case, the courts being reversed, of the one supposed. Each court is equally powerful to enforce its own judgments or decrees.

Our statute, § 1626, code 1892, has no application; that relates to causes of which no court has as yet obtained jurisdiction, and it does not repeal the rule that a court having obtained jurisdiction of a cause has the same to the exclusion of other courts.

The next question is one which must be considered on principle rather than upon Mississippi authority. There are to be found in our reports several cases of ejectment which have been maintained against railroads; but it will be found that only one of them gave room for consideration to the question now presented (Beck v. L., N. O. & T. R. Co., 65 Miss. 172), and it is respectfully submitted that due consideration was not given in that case to the public interests involved--in fact, the rights u of the public were not mentioned by the court, if they were considered at all.

The other cases are, naming them in the reverse order of their decision, L., N. O. & T. R. R. Co. v. Blythe, 69 Miss. 939, where the court below maintained the action, but it was reversed by this court; V. & M. R. R. Co. v Lewis, 68 Miss. 29, which did not involve a right of way but outlying lands; V. &. M. R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 67 Miss. 82, where the contention was only about that part of the lands off from the right of way. Madden v. L., N. O. & T. R. R. Co., 66 Miss. 258, does not appear to have involved a right of way for the main line of the road. The case of L., N. O. & T. R. R. Co. v. Day, 67 Miss. 227, was not, as erroneously said in Day v. L., N. O. & T. R. R. Co., 69 Miss. 590, an action of ejectment. Remember that the question is, can the railroad company--the Illinois Central Railroad Company, a going public railroad--be ejected from its right of way and main track, a...