In Interest of B.S., 920160
Decision Date | 23 February 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 920160,920160 |
Parties | In the Interest of B.S., a Child. Rick SHIREY, Petitioner and Appellee, v. B.S., a child, and R.S. and B.S., his parents, Respondents and Appellants. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Tom Henning (argued), Asst. State's Atty., Dickinson, for petitioner and appellee.
Ronald A. Reichert (argued) of Reichert, Buresh, Herauf & Ficek, PC, Dickinson, for respondent and appellant B.S., a child.
B.S. (Brent, a pseudonym) and his parents R.S. (Richard, a pseudonym), and B.S. (Beth, a pseudonym), appeal from a juvenile court order declaring Brent to be a delinquent child in need of treatment. We hold that Brent was denied his right to counsel under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, Chapter 27-20, N.D.C.C., during an interrogation and that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to suppress Richard and Beth's testimony about what Brent said at that interrogation. Consequently, we reverse the order of the juvenile court.
The juvenile court found that Brent and a companion used BB guns to shoot and damage a personal residence, a high school and a band shell in the city of Dickinson. The court also found that Brent stole a magazine from a store in Dickinson. Based upon these findings, the court declared Brent to be a delinquent juvenile and ordered that his temporary legal custody be placed with the Division of Juvenile Services of the North Dakota Department of Corrections.
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court committed reversible error by allowing Brent's parents to testify about admissions Brent made, without representation by an attorney, during an interrogation by a police youth bureau officer. This court's scope of review under Chapter 27-20, N.D.C.C., is equivalent to the former procedure of trial de novo; we independently review the evidence presented to the juvenile court. In Interest of J.D.Z., 431 N.W.2d 272 (N.D.1988).
Section 27-20-26, N.D.C.C., says:
The "stages of any proceedings," under this provision, are not limited to those instances which take place in the courtroom but include circumstances, such as an interrogation, where the officer has focused his investigation on a particular suspect and is intent on gathering evidence. In Interest of J.D.Z., supra, 431 N.W.2d at 275. If a minor is not represented by a parent, guardian or custodian during an interrogation when the investigation has focused upon him, he or she has a right to have an attorney present, and that right cannot be waived. In Interest of D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114 (N.D.1978). If, however, the minor is represented by a parent, guardian or custodian during the interrogation, the minor has a right to have an attorney present, but that right can be waived if the waiver is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. In Interest of D.S., supra, 263 N.W.2d at 120.
Beth's testimony at the delinquency hearing is unrefuted and shows that Brent was not afforded his statutory right to have an attorney present at the interrogation and that he did not voluntarily waive that right:
On cross-examination Beth elaborated about what took place immediately preceding the officer's interrogation of Brent:
Beth's testimony shows that she and Richard were not able to "represent" Brent because they were totally unfamiliar with the proceedings and "didn't know what [they] were doing." The mere presence of a parent does not constitute representation. State v. Grenz, 243 N.W.2d 375 (N.D.1976). At the very least, in order to represent the interests of their child, Brent's parents would have had to understand that it was their role to advise him at the interrogation. Id., 243 N.W.2d at 380. They also would have had to take an "active role" at that proceeding, rather than simply being present and answering questions directed to them by the interrogating officer. See In Interest of J.D.Z., supra, 431 N.W.2d at 274.
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines the term "represent," in relevant part: "To represent a person is to stand in his place; to speak or act with authority on behalf of such person." Beth's testimony reveals that neither she nor Richard attempted to speak or act with authority on Brent's behalf, nor did they attempt to stand in Brent's place at the interrogation. Thus, they were not representing him. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Brent's right to an attorney at the interrogation was not waivable and that he was denied his right to counsel. In Interest of D.S., supra.
Even if Brent were represented by his parents at the interrogation, he was entitled to have an attorney present, unless he and his parents voluntarily waived that right. In deciding whether there was a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, we look at the totality of the circumstances. Huff v. K.P., 302 N.W.2d 779 (N.D.1981). Neither Brent nor Beth signed the attorney waiver form that the officer told them to sign. Brent's father, Richard, signed it, but only after he was assured that the officer would tell them when they needed an attorney. That statement by the officer obviously misled Brent and his parents into thinking that Brent did not...
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