In re Christopher B.

• Citation: 156 Cal.App.4th 1557,68 Cal.Rptr.3d 253
• Decision Date: 20 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. A117235.,A117235.
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re CHRISTOPHER B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Christopher B., Defendant and Appellant.

68 Cal.Rptr.3d 253

156 Cal.App.4th 1557

In re CHRISTOPHER B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Christopher B., Defendant and Appellant.

No. A117235.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4.

November 20, 2007.

Sara Zimmerman, for Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Martin S. Kaye, Supervising Deputy Attorney.General, Jeffrey M. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.

REARDON, J.

In a proceeding on a subsequent petition alleging that the court's ward committed residential burglary and vandalism, the sole evidence implicating the minor was the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The juvenile court denied the defense motion to dismiss the case due to insufficient evidence, on authority of In re Mitchell P. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 946, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144 (Mitchell P.) The Mitchell P. court held that Penal Code section 1111, prohibiting a conviction upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, does not apply to juvenile court proceedings (Mitchell P., supra, at p. 949, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144). We affirm the jurisdictional order, as we must. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.) Nevertheless, as we explain, with the passage of nearly 30 years and attendant significant changes in juvenile law, the rule of Mitchell P. is well positioned for reassessment.

I. BACKGROUND

Michelle Crawford returned home from work around 5:30 p.m. on December 14, 2006. She noticed that a piece of one of the blinds in the living room had been broken off, a lamp was leaning over the couch and a window had been broken by a basketball-size piece of cement.

Crawford's bedroom had been ransacked. Missing were two gold bracelets, an XBox 360, cell phone, CD's and a PSP (play station portable).

Ten-year-old Fiona, a next-door neighbor, looked out her bedroom window around 3:00 that afternoon. She saw three African-American teenagers—two males and one female. One youth was Brice M., the brother of a friend. Fiona heard a crash that sounded like a broken window, coming from the ground floor of the Crawford home. She saw the girl standing in front of the Crawford home. Brice and the other youth were in the street.

Brice had befriended Mrs. Crawford's son, who is legally blind. Brice had been to their home once or twice a week to download music.

On December 15, 2006, the Solano County District Attorney filed a subsequent petition under Welfare and Institutions Code¹ section 602, subdivision (a), charging appellant Christopher B. with residential burglary and vandalism. Accompanying the petition, for the court file alone, was a list of two co-responsibles, including Brice M.

Prior to testifying at appellant's contested jurisdictional hearing, Brice had admitted the burglary and his wardship proceeding had progressed through the dispositional hearing. At the hearing Brice testified that no deals had been made in exchange for his testimony. Brice initially told the police he had no involvement with the burglary, but had seen Christopher with the stolen goods and put the entire blame on him. Finally, after a police officer told him there was a witness who identified him at the scene, Brice admitted his involvement, but still tried to shift most of the blame to Christopher. Brice also admitted that in November 2006 he had stolen two iPods from the same residence and sold one at school. The grand theft and vandalism charges were dropped. As result of his admission, Brice was released from custody.

Brice further testified that he burglarized the Crawford home after school with Christopher and Shontanae H. When they arrived, Christopher went into the back yard. Brice heard a crash. They all ran away, returning five to ten minutes later. Shontanae entered through the broken window and let the boys inside. Brice took the PSP and a cell phone; Christopher took the Xbox and a piggybank. Brice threw the cell phone over a fence.

The PSP was found at Brice's home; the Xbox was recovered from Shontanae. Nothing was found at Christopher's home or on his person.

Appellant's neighbor testified that appellant normally came to her home every day after school until his stepfather came to pick him up. The time would vary between 3:30 and 6:00 p.m., depending on whether he had football practice, etc. On December 14, 2006, appellant came over around 5:00 p.m., said he was not feeling well and lay down on the floor.

At the close of evidence, counsel for Christopher moved to dismiss for insufficient evidence, arguing that the only testimony implicating his client was "that of an unreliable accomplice witness." Denying the motion, the court cited Mitchell P. to the effect that the Penal Code section 1111 limitation on the use of accomplice testimony is not controlling in juvenile court. The court also stated that Brice's testimony had been corroborated, pointing to Fiona's observation of three individuals "standing around the house, one of which she identifies as Mr. Brice M[.], the race of the individuals, being African-American, the minor here obviously being African-American is consistent with another male subject out there, and then Mr. M[.'s] testimony that he stole and kept the PSP, threw the cell phone over the fence. The officer found those things, as Mr. M[.] testified."²

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework

Penal Code section 1111 provides: "A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." This cautionary rule has its roots in "the fact that experience has shown that the evidence of an accomplice should be viewed with care, caution and suspicion because it comes from a tainted source and is often given in the hope or expectation of leniency or immunity." (People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803, 808, 197 P.2d 734.) A coperpetrator has a natural incentive to shift blame to the accused in hopes of minimizing his or her own culpability. (People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 80, 21 P.3d 758; People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 837, 848-849, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 891.) This may be especially true where the accomplice is a minor, as a minor "'may be under great parental or social pressure'" to testify and blame certain conduct on the accused. (In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 109, 185 Cal. Rptr. 120, 649 P.2d 703.) Additionally, accomplice testimony frequently is cloaked with plausibility because the accomplice has first-hand knowledge of the facts of the crime and can weave a convincing story. (People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953, 967, 127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335.) Indeed with the enactment of Penal Code section 1111, accomplice testimony "has been legislatively determined never to be sufficiently trustworthy to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt unless corroborated." (People v. Tewksbury, supra, at p. 967, 127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 1335.)

Notwithstanding the acclaim that the accomplice corroboration rule has received in our caselaw, as well as the significant benefit afforded a criminal defendant by virtue of its application in a given case, nearly 30 years ago our Supreme Court refused to apply the rule to juvenile adjudications. (Mitchell P., supra, 22 Cal.3d 946, 151 Cal.Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144.) The court initially, and mechanically, held that Penal Code section 1111 did not pertain to juvenile adjudications because a finding of wardship does not constitute a "conviction" within the meaning of the statute.³ (Mitchell P., supra, at p. 949, 151 Cal. Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144.) In other words, the Legislature's choice of the word "conviction" demonstrated an intent to create two classes of defendants—adults subjected to conviction in criminal court who would benefit from the rule, and juveniles subjected to wardship adjudication in juvenile court, who would not.

Additionally, the court rejected the minor's equal protection challenge, framing the issue as whether the state could require a lesser quality of evidence—which it distinguished from the required degree of proof—-in juvenile proceedings. (Mitchell P., supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 950, 151 Cal.Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144.) Employing the rational basis test, the Supreme Court reasoned that disparate treatment with respect to the quality of evidence in adult and juvenile settings was reasonably related to the rehabilitative purpose served by the juvenile court. Specifically, it posited that the Legislature could consider that judicial intervention to rehabilitate an impressionable youth may outweigh the policy against the use of uncorroborated testimony. (Id. at p. 952, 151 Cal.Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144.) Also persuasive was the assumption that a judge sitting as trier of fact would be more likely than a jury to accord accomplice testimony its appropriate weight. (Id. at p. 951, 151 Cal.Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144.) Finally, the court also observed: "[I]t must be acknowledged that a person convicted of a serious crime is generally exposed to a greater and more onerous term of confinement than a juvenile ward charged with the same misconduct." (Id. at p. 952, 151 Cal.Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144.) The dissenting opinion emphasized that because a minor's guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, the purpose and intent expressed in Penal Code section 1111 applied equally to juvenile proceedings. (Mitchell P., supra, at p. 956, 151 Cal.Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144 [dis. opn. of Bird, C.J.].)

In 1985 the...