In Interest of T.D., No. 7-418/07-0485 (Iowa App. 7/25/2007)
| Decision Date | 25 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 7-418/07-0485,7-418/07-0485 |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF T.D., Minor Child, W.L.C., Mother, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karla J. Fultz, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter.
AFFIRMED.
Patricia K. Wengert, Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Annette Taylor, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Judd Kruse of Kruse & Dakin, L.L.P., Boone, for appellee father.
Kathryn Miller, Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, for the minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
W.L.C. is the mother of T.D., born in 2001. In 2004, the State initiated child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings against W.L.C., based on her repeated efforts to document sexual abuse of the child by the child's father. The proceedings culminated in a petition to terminate W.L.C.'s parental rights to T.D. That petition was granted and this appeal followed.
A detailed summary of the facts precipitating the underlying child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings is included in the first of two unpublished opinions filed by our court. In re T.D., No. 06-1758 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2006); In re T.D., No. 06-0765 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006). We will not repeat those facts except as necessary to illuminate the issues facing us in this appeal. Those issues are numerous, but fall under one of the following broad categories: (1) challenges to evidentiary rulings, (2) constitutional challenges, (3) challenges to the reunification efforts of the Department of Human Services, (4) challenges to the adequacy of the evidence supporting the court's decision, and (5) challenges based on the best interests of the child.1
W.L.C. raises several evidentiary issues, which we will address before proceeding to the merits of the court's ruling.
The court held a hearing on the termination petition in February and March 2007. Shortly before the beginning of the hearing, the juvenile court ruled that the testimony would be limited to evidence adduced after a review hearing in October 2006. W.L.C. takes issue with this ruling, contending the court improperly applied res judicata principles.
Our court has stated that principles of res judicata bar re-litigation of previously decided issues. In re D.S., 563 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). The proceedings on or before the October 2006 review hearing were the subject of two appeals and the two appellate opinions cited above. Therefore, W.L.C. was not deprived of a "`full and fair opportunity' for a trial" by virtue of the juvenile court's decision to limit the evidence adduced at the termination hearing.
Having said that, we emphasize that the entire juvenile court record is before us on our review of a termination ruling. In re C.M., 652 N.W.2d 204, 211 (Iowa 2002). That record is afforded de novo review. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.
W.L.C. also challenges the juvenile court's decision to reject a filing captioned "Objections and Corrections of State's Petition for termination of parental rights and Submission of Exculpatory Evidences withheld from the Court and Request for Constitutional Review of Evidences." This document was offered at the beginning of the final day of the termination hearing. The State's attorney objected on the ground that the proffer violated court-prescribed filing deadlines announced two months earlier. The juvenile court agreed, stating "[i]t's untimely and the Court will not accept it." We discern no ground for reversal, given the belated date on which the document was offered.
W.L.C. finally contends that the State withheld two pages of a service provider's master treatment plan that would have shown an improvement in W.L.C.'s behavior. As the record contains a seemingly complete master treatment plan dated February 14, 2007, we reject this contention.
W.L.C. raises what she characterizes as constitutional challenges to the juvenile court's ruling. In our view, none of the challenges implicate the United States or Iowa Constitutions.
Some of the claimed constitutional issues are in fact challenges to the evidence supporting the termination ruling. Those issues will be addressed below.
Other issues are challenges to the court's procedural rulings, such as the court's decision to (1) quash subpoenas, (2) allow commencement of termination proceedings before the statutory removal period expired, and (3) proceed with the termination hearing after W.L.C. and her attorney elected to leave the proceedings. Those procedural rulings did not implicate the procedural due process requirements of notice and an opportunity for a hearing. In re J.S., 470 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). First, the court quashed the subpoenas issued by W.L.C. because the information to be gleaned from the subpoenaed witnesses arose before the October 2006 review hearing. Second, although the State initiated the termination action before the statutory removal period expired, the juvenile court did not terminate W.L.C.'s parental rights until after the period expired. See In re J.L.H., 326 N.W.2d 284, 285-86 (Iowa 1982). Finally, the juvenile court admonished W.L.C. and her attorney that, if they chose to leave based on the perceived unfairness of the hearing, the court would "continue this matter in [their] absence." As W.L.C. was forewarned of the consequences of leaving, we conclude she was not deprived of procedural due process.
W.L.C. raised other constitutional challenges such as (1) "[m]other would have to waive [her] constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in order to have any contact with her daughter" and (2) the hearing was substantively unfair. Similar challenges have been rejected by our highest court. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148-50 (Iowa 2002); In re D.J.R., 454 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1990).
The Department is obligated to make reasonable efforts to reunify parent with child. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). W.L.C. acknowledges the Department offered her reunification services. She further acknowledges that the juvenile court granted her request for additional therapy. She maintains, however, that the additional therapy was not adequate. She also challenges supervised visitation services.
W.L.C. requested additional services following an October 2006 juvenile court review order continuing placement of her daughter with the child's father. The matter was scheduled for a contested hearing. Following the hearing, the juvenile court granted W.L.C.'s request for additional individual therapy and, over the Department's objection that it lacked funds to pay for therapy, ordered the Department to "make such funding available to" W.L.C. so that she could see the therapist of her choice. That therapist advised the Department that he held six psychotherapy sessions within the month following the court's order. The sessions were scheduled "to process and work on DHS directives for therapy." We conclude the Department satisfied its court-ordered mandate to provide W.L.C. with additional individual therapy sessions.
W.L.C. also takes issue with the services of LifeWorks, Inc., a provider retained by the Department to supervise visits. She contends "[t]here was a total absence of honesty and integrity in LifeWorks social workers' written reports and testimony in court." She specifically challenges the provider's comments on her belief about whether the child was sexually abused, contending the provider had no authority to address this issue.
We agree that LifeWorks was not charged with assessing W.L.C.'s belief about whether sexual abuse of T.D. occurred. However, LifeWorks was asked to supervise visits and "to work with the family on how to provide and establish safe boundaries with the child." LifeWorks's employees stated that, while supervised visits went well, "[s]essions (outside of visits) have been difficult, as [W.L.C.] becomes angry and defensive, and it is difficult to address how her actions could be damaging her daughter." We conclude this comment and others relating to W.L.C.'s behaviors fell within LifeWorks's charge.
The juvenile court terminated W.L.C.'s parental rights on two grounds, Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) () (2005) and (f) (requiring proof of several elements including proof that child cannot be returned to parent's custody). W.L.C. directly challenges the second ground and indirectly challenges the first ground. We may affirm if we find clear and convincing evidence to support either one of the grounds. In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). On our de novo review, we conclude the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f).
After T.D. was adjudicated a child in need of assistance, she remained in her mother's care for more than a year.2 The child was removed when W.L.C. disclosed that she videotaped T.D.'s genitalia in an effort to document physical signs of sexual abuse. Following this action, the juvenile court placed T.D. with her father. In a split opinion, our court affirmed this ruling. In re T.D., No. 060-765 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006).
The majority and dissent cited the testimony of a physician who specialized in examining children for signs of sexual abuse. This physician testified that, when she examined T.D. in 2003, she found no physical indications of sexual abuse. Despite...
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