In Matter of Fields

• Decision Date: 26 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 3:96-0534.,3:96-0534.
• Citation: 967 F.Supp. 969
• Parties: In the Matter of Joe Scotty FIELDS, an individual, and an owner of the Miss Ann, a 1971 Inca Cabin Cruiser, Tennessee Registration Number 8523AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

967 F.Supp. 969

In the Matter of Joe Scotty FIELDS, an individual, and an owner of the Miss Ann, a 1971 Inca Cabin Cruiser, Tennessee Registration Number 8523AL.

No. 3:96-0534.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

March 26, 1997.

Thomas H. Dundon, Leesa A. Hinson, Neal & Harwell, Nashville, TN, for Joe Scotty Fields.

John Edger Acuff, Barnes & Acuff, Cookeville, TN, for James Welch, Southern Heritage Ins. Co.

Jay R. Slobey, Blackburn, Slobey, Freeman & Happell, Nashville, TN, for Barry L. Guest.

Cynthia D. Plymire, Ortale, Kelley, Herbert & Crawford, Nashville, TN, for Sammy Finney, III, Wade Putnam, Ernest G. Burgess.

Allan B. Thorp, Thorp & Fones, Memphis, TN, for David L. Coleman, Lora Coleman.

Christopher K. Thompson, Murfreesboro, TN, for Allied Group.

Roger Wilson Hudson, Darrell L. Scarlett, Murfree, Cope & Moore, Murfreesboro, TN, for Emmett R. Ferrell, Nancy B. Ferrell, Fredlin H. Chapman.

Raymond Dale Bay, Lisa L. Ramsey, Lewis, King, Krieg & Waldrop, Nashville, TN, Jim H. Camp, Sparta, TN, for Cincinnati Ins. Co.

Jade A. Rogers, Wheeler, Adair & Schuerman, Goodlettsville, TN, for Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co.

David P. Canas, Stewart, Estes & Donnell, Nashville, TN, for American Underwriting Managers.

MEMORANDUM:

NIXON, Chief Judge.

Pending before the Court are numerous Summary Judgment Motions and Motions to Dismiss filed by Movants in the above-captioned matter. Movants contend that Fields' action should be dismissed in that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this action. In accordance with the reasoning articulated below, the Court hereby grants Movants' Summary Judgment Motions and Motions to Dismiss on subject matter jurisdiction grounds, and dismisses the case.

I. BACKGROUND:

To assert jurisdiction in this Court, Petitioner Scotty Fields brings this case as an admiralty and maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fields owned the Miss Ann, a 1971 Cabin Cruiser which was moored upon Center Hill Lake, which Plaintiff contends is a navigable waterway within this Court's jurisdiction. Fields maintains that at all times he used due diligence to insure that the vessel was seaworthy. The Miss Ann was moored at Edgar Evins Marina on October 29, 1995, when Fields requested that HMR Marine Services ("HMR") treat the boat's engine and fuel in preparation for the winter months. At the time Fields engaged HMR, Fields contends that the boat was in seaworthy condition, although it did have a leak in its right front gas tank. Fields informed the HMR owner and mechanic of the leak and instructed Rogers not to fill that particular tank. Between October 29 and October 31, HMR employees serviced the boat.

On the evening of October 31, Fields was contacted by a friend from the Marina and informed that Fields' boat's bilge pump was pumping gasoline into the water at the marina. Fields drove to the marina and discovered that not only was gasoline disbursed in the water around Fields and other boats, it was also in the hull of Fields' boat. It appeared to Fields that a tank on the left of the boat was leaking. Fields maintains that the left-side tanks were in good condition when Fields turned the boat over to HMR.

As Fields and another friend attempted to remove the gasoline from Fields' boat with a shop-vac, an explosion occurred and ignited Fields' boat. Fifteen boats were burned (including the Miss Ann), as well as a dock house. The Miss Ann, as well as another boat belonging to Fields were burned, and are considered a total loss.

Fields contends that the damages were caused by HMR, without Fields knowledge or privity and that Fields, pursuant to 46 U.S.C.App. § 181, et seq., the Ship Owner's Limitation of Liability Act, is entitled to be exonerated from all liability from the incident or, in the alternative to limit his liability to the post-accident value of his boat pursuant to 46 U.S.C.App. § 181 et seq.

A group of fifteen movants and claimants, comprised of the owners of boats which were damaged in the fire and various insurers, oppose Fields' theory. This group, hereinafter "Movants," contend that this action cannot be brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 — federal question jurisdiction. They argue that neither the Supreme Court nor the federal circuit courts have declared that a complaint brought under the Limitation of Liability Act automatically confers federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g. Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A., Ltd. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775, 779-780 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 272, 116 L.Ed.2d 224 (1991) (holding that the Limitation of Liability Act does not create independent jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Movants note that five additional federal appellate courts that have ruled on this issue have also held to this view. See, e.g. Seven Resorts, Inc. v. Cantlen, 57 F.3d 771, 773 (9th Cir.1995).

Additionally, Movants argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, Admiralty Jurisdiction, because Center Hill Lake is nonnavigable for admiralty jurisdiction purposes. Movants note that according to the U.S. Supreme Court, a party seeking to invoke admiralty jurisdiction and seeking protection of the Limitation of Vessel Owner's Liability Act must satisfy conditions of both location and connection with maritime activity. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 532-34, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 1048, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). They argue that in applying the location test, a court must determine whether the tort occurred on navigable water or whether injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. 46 U.S.C.App. § 740.

Movants contend that in applying the connection test, a court first must assess the "general features of the type of incident involved" to determine if the incident has "a potentially disruptive impact" on maritime commerce. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363-64, n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2897 n. 2, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990).

In applying the navigation test, the Supreme Court has identified four separate contexts in which "navigable waters" are defined:

(1) "Navigable waters" as used to define the scope of Congressional regulatory authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause.

(2) "Navigable waters" as used to determine the Corps of Engineers' legitimate authority under the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act. In this context, "navigable waters" are defined as "subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or presently used, or used in the past, or susceptible for use in interstate or foreign commerce."

(3) "Navigable waters" as used to establish the limits of admiralty jurisdiction conferred by Article III, § 2 of the Constitution.

(4) "Navigable waters" as used for navigational servitude purposes.

The third definition, Movants contend, is the appropriate test in the case at bar. However, Movants maintain that Center Hill Lake does not constitute a navigable waterway under any of these definitions. Additionally, they argue that under the Sixth Circuit's test, Center Hill Lake is nonnavigable. The test the Sixth Circuit employs, as derived from The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 77 U.S. 557, 557, 19 L.Ed. 999 (1870) states that:

Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. Rivers are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways of commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States ... when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States of foreign countries in the customary mode in which such commerce is conducted by water.

Movants state that Fields' boat was moored on Center Hill Lake, which was created in 1948 with the construction of the Center Hill Dam. Vessels cannot travel on the Lake beyond the dam, as there is not a lock allowing access to the Caney Fork or the Cumberland. Neither commercial transport of goods nor commercial fishing exists on the lake, and the lake is an inland body of water with boundaries within the state of Tennessee. Thus, Movants contend that Fields' boat was not moored on navigable water when the accident took place and therefore, this case does not fall within this court's jurisdiction.

Petitioner responds by arguing that whether Center Hill Lake is a navigable waterway is not dispositive of the Court's jurisdiction over the action. According to Petitioner, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over "any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1982). Petitioner notes that the criteria for determining whether admiralty jurisdiction exists in a given case depends on the type of claim presented.

Petitioner argues that while admiralty jurisdiction over tort is typically determined by reference to the location of the offending action, admiralty jurisdiction over a claim arising from or involving the performance of a contract is determined by reference to the nature and subject of the contract (i.e. the contract must be a "maritime contract." See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Boston Harbor Marina, Inc., 406 F.2d 917, 919 (1st Cir.1969); Ziegler v. Rieff, 637 F.Supp. 675, 677 (S.D.N.Y.1986); The Jack-O-Lantern, 258 U.S. 96, 99, 42 S.Ct. 243, 243-44, 66 L.Ed. 482 (1922); Southwest Marine of San Francisco, Inc. v. United States, 896 F.2d 532, 533-34 (Fed.Cir.1990)).

Petitioner contends that most importantly, a suit involving or arising from a contract to service, repair or store a boat falls within admiralty jurisdiction whether the suit is brought on a theory of breach of contract or in tort, e.g. on a theory of negligent...