IN RE 2000-2001 DIST. GRAND JURY, No. 03SC209.

• Decision Date: 13 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03SC209.
• Citation: 97 P.3d 921
• Parties: In the Matter of the 2000-2001 DISTRICT GRAND JURY IN AND FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, State of Colorado, and Concerning the City of Black Hawk, Petitioner.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

97 P.3d 921

In the Matter of the 2000-2001 DISTRICT GRAND JURY IN AND FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, State of Colorado,

and Concerning the City of Black Hawk, Petitioner.

No. 03SC209.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

September 13, 2004.

Haddon, Morgan, Mueller, Jordan, Mackey & Foreman, P.C., Lee D. Foreman, Rachel A. Bellis, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.

David J. Thomas, District Attorney, Dennis Hall, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Golden, Colorado.

Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. Introduction

In this case, the City of Black Hawk ("Black Hawk") contests the court of appeals' decision in In re 2000-2001 District Grand Jury in and for the First Judicial District, State of Colorado, and Concerning the City of Black Hawk, 77 P.3d 779 (Colo.App.2003) ("Grand Jury II"), in which that court declined to interpret section 16-5-205.5, 6 C.R.S. (2003) to permit discovery of grand jury records. The statute authorizes a grand jury to release a report of its investigation even when it does not issue an indictment, and allows a person named in the report to issue a published response, to be included in the report itself.

Here, Black Hawk and several of its officials were parties named in a grand jury report, and were therefore entitled to submit a response to the report. Prior to finalizing a response, they sought discovery of much of the grand jury record. The trial court rejected the request and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that nothing within section 16-5-205.5 requires a district court to permit discovery of the grand jury record.

We granted certiorari to determine whether section 16-5-205.5 grants a party named in a grand jury report the right to inspect the grand jury record. We now hold that section 16-5-205.5 grants no such right. Neither the plain language of the statute nor principles of due process require a district court to permit wholesale discovery of the grand jury record. Accordingly, we hold that neither the district court nor the court of appeals committed any error in this case.

II. Facts

The case before us resulted from a citizen complaint filed in the spring of 2000 against Black Hawk. The complaint alleged that various Black Hawk officials attempted to block an annexation proposed by the City of Central City. The district attorney for Gilpin County submitted that complaint for grand jury review.

Following an investigation, the grand jury issued no indictment against Black Hawk officials. However, the grand jury did prepare a report of its investigation and sought authorization from the district court to release the report pursuant to section 16-5-205.5. In June 2000, the district court approved the release of the grand jury report and ordered a copy to be sent to all persons named therein.

As required by section 16-5-205.5(3), all persons or businesses named in the report ("named parties") were so notified. Section 16-5-205.5(3) permits these named parties to prepare a response to the report, which response will then be included in the published report itself. Black Hawk was one of the named parties and it sought to prepare a response. Before submitting its response, however, Black Hawk filed several motions with the district court that was supervising the grand jury. In some of those motions, Black Hawk sought discovery from and inspection of the record used to compile the grand jury report. Among other information, it sought disclosure of transcripts, exhibits, motions, orders, correspondence, instructions, jury lists, and information relating to the grand jury's impanelment.

On September 22, 2000, the district court denied all motions for discovery and inspection and directed the release of the report and all filed responses. It ruled that "[section] 16-5-205.5 does not provide for the release of such information. When no indictment issues, all that is allowed is the release of the report. The time-honored principles of grand jury secrecy remain in place."

Black Hawk appealed the denial of discovery to the court of appeals, and requested that the district court immediately stay its September 22, 2000, order. On September 29, 2000, the district court issued a stay of the order, to expire on October 16, 2000, unless otherwise extended. On October 5, 2000, Black Hawk filed a motion to quash and suppress the grand jury report. In that motion, Black Hawk argued that: (1) the grand jury was improperly impaneled; (2) the grand jury had no jurisdiction to author its report; and (3) the district attorney gave improper instructions to the grand jury before issuing the report.

On October 6, 2000, this court accepted original jurisdiction over the case to address whether the grand jury had jurisdiction to investigate and issue a report upon the subject of the citizen-filed complaint. Black Hawk was invited to — and did — join in that appeal.

In In re 2000-2001 District Grand Jury in and for the First Judicial District Concerning the Grand Jury Report on the Proland Annexation, ("Grand Jury I"), 22 P.3d 922, 928-29 (Colo.2001), we ultimately held that the grand jury had jurisdiction over the annexation dispute and that both the district court and the district attorney complied with section 16-5-205.5 in authorizing the release of the report. Accordingly, we remanded that case back to the district court to address unresolved matters and release the report. On remand, the district court took up Black Hawk's pending motion filed on October 5, 2000. Without conducting a hearing, the court denied Black Hawk's motion to quash and suppress on September 10, 2001. Black Hawk appealed that decision on September 26, 2001. Both the September 2000 order denying discovery and the September 2001 order were, at that point, before the court of appeals.

In Grand Jury II, the court of appeals held that Black Hawk failed to establish that it suffered any prejudice due to the manner in which the grand jury was impaneled, 77 P.3d at 783-84, and also held that there was nothing improper in the way that the district attorney instructed the grand jury, 77 P.3d at 786.

The court of appeals also addressed the district court's September 22, 2000, order concerning Black Hawk's discovery requests. Relying on our decision in Grand Jury I, as well as our past decisions regarding the nature of the grand jury process, the court of appeals held that nothing within section 16-5-205.5 compelled the district court to authorize discovery of the grand jury record and that, given this state's strong policy in favor of grand jury secrecy, the district court properly denied discovery of the grand jury record in this case. Grand Jury II, 77 P.3d at 784-85.

We granted certiorari in this case solely on the issue of "[w]hether a person named in a grand jury report has a right to discovery of grand jury records under [section] 16-5-205.5." We now conclude that such a person has no right to discovery under section 16-5-205.5.

III. Analysis

Section 16-5-205.5(1) states in relevant part that "[i]n any case in which a grand jury does not return an indictment, the grand jury may prepare or ask to be prepared a report of its findings if the grand jury determines that preparation and release of a report would be in the public interest." Subsection (3) of that statute states that

[w]ithin ten days after receiving a report of the grand jury... the prosecuting attorney shall notify in writing all persons and businesses named in the grand jury report to give such persons and businesses an opportunity to review the grand jury report and prepare a response to be submitted to the court with the grand jury report.

Black Hawk argues that, because section 16-5-205.5 permits a named party to issue a response to the published report, the statute necessarily permits that named party to inspect the grand jury record in order to prepare the response. Black Hawk bases its assertion on two independent grounds. Black Hawk first argues that, despite the statute's silence on the issue of discovery, the automatic right to discovery of the grand jury record is necessarily implied. Black Hawk alternatively argues that federal due process similarly mandates the right of discovery under section 16-5-205.5. We disagree with both arguments.

A. Statutory Analysis

1. Alleged Statutory Ambiguity

Black Hawk agrees that the section 16-5-205.5 is silent on the matter of discovery, but argues that such silence amounts to an ambiguity in the statute permitting us to resort to a number of different methods of statutory construction. We are not persuaded.

As with any statute, we endeavor to interpret the provisions of section 16-5-205.5 in strict accordance with the General Assembly's purpose and intent in enacting them. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Colo.2001). To discern that intent, we look first to the statute's plain language. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Costilla County, 88 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Colo.2004). Where the language of the statute is plain and clear, we must apply the statute as written. Univex Int'l, Inc. v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 914 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Colo.1996). Only where the wording in the statute is unclear and ambiguous will we resort to other modes of construction, such as relying on legislative history. Colo. Dep't of Labor & Employment v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189, 195 (Colo.2001).

Generally, an ambiguity exists in a statute only where at least one of its terms is susceptible to multiple meanings. See Mountain City Meat Co. v. Oqueda, 919 P.2d 246, 252-53 (Colo.1996) (superseded by statute on different grounds as stated in United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 993 P.2d 1152, 1158 (Colo.2000)). Where a statute is silent on a certain matter and that silence prevents a reasonable application of the statute, we must endeavor to interpret and apply the statute despite that silence all the while striving "to effectuate the General Assembly's intent and the...