In re 2010 Gubernatorial Election, A10-2022.

Decision Date07 December 2010
Docket NumberNo. A10-2022.,A10-2022.
Citation793 N.W.2d 256
PartiesIn re Petition regarding 2010 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

Because Minn.Stat. §§ 204C.20, subd. 1, and 206.86, subd. 1 (2008), use obsolete language that does not include the terms "polling place roster" or "voter's receipts," they do not unambiguously require local election officials to determine the numberof ballots to be counted based only on the number of signatures on the polling place roster or prohibit reliance on the number of voter's receipts.

Construing the legislative intent of the ambiguous language in Minn.Stat. §§ 204C.20, subd. 1, and 206.86, subd. 1, based on the purpose to be achieved by the statutes, the language of current and former statutes on the subject, and the longstanding administrative interpretation of the statutes, it is clear that the Legislature intended to permit reliance on either signatures on polling place rosters or voter's receipts to determine the number of ballots to be counted.

Sam Hanson, Diane B. Bratvold, Neal T. Buethe, Briggs and Morgan, P.A., and Tony P. Trimble, Matthew W. Haapoja, Trimble & Associates, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for petitioner Tom Emmer.

Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Darwin J. Lookingbill, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent Ramsey County.

Robert M.A. Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Thomas G. Haluska, Assistant Anoka County Attorney, Anoka, MN, for respondent Anoka County.

Marc E. Elias, Kevin J. Hamilton, Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, D.C.; and Charles N. Nauen, William A. Gengler, Lockridge Grindal Nauen PLLP, David L. Lillehaug, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Mark Dayton.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Alan I. Gilbert, Solicitor General, Kenneth E. Raschke, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for respondent Secretary of State Mark Ritchie.

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Daniel P. Rogan, Patrick S. Diamond, Assistant Hennepin County Attorneys, Minneapolis, MN, for respondent Hennepin County Auditor Jill Alverson.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

On Wednesday, November 17, 2010, Tom Emmer, the Republican Party's candidate for Governor of Minnesota, filed a petition under Minn.Stat. § 204B.44 (2008), alleging that the Minnesota State Canvassing Board was about to commit an error in certifying the correctness of the results of the November 2, 2010, general election. Petitioner alleged that local election officials had failed to properly determine the number of ballots to be counted on election night and that, as a result, there may have been more ballots counted than there were voters who cast ballots. Petitioner asked the court to order the State Canvassing Board, prior to its certification of the 2010 election results for Governor of the State of Minnesota, to conduct a statewide determination of the number of persons voting on Election Day by counting signatures on the precinct polling rosters, and not voter's receipts. Petitioner contends that the number of signatures must be used to determine the proper number of ballots to count in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 204C.20, subd. 1 (2008). After expedited briefing, we heard oral argument on November 22, 2010.1 We filed an order on November 22, 2010, denying the petition, with this opinion to follow.

This case involves the statutes that govern two processes that occur at the polling place on Election Day: the process by which voters obtain a ballot on which tovote, and the process of determining the correct number of ballots to count after the polls have closed. The first process is currently prescribed in Minn.Stat. § 204C.10 (2008). Under section 204C.10(a), an individual desiring to vote is required to "sign a polling place roster." After the individual signs the roster, an election judge gives the voter a "voter's receipt." Minn.Stat. § 204C.10(c). The voter gives the receipt to the election judge in charge of ballots and receives a ballot in exchange. Id.

The second process is prescribed in Minn.Stat. § 204C.20, subd. 1. After the polls close on Election Day, that statute requires election judges in each precinct to determine the number of ballots to be counted based on either "the number of signed voter's certificates" or "the number of names entered in the election register." Id.2 The statute provides:

The election judges shall determine the number of ballots to be counted by adding the number of return envelopes from accepted absentee ballots to the number of signed voter's certificates, or to the number of names entered in the election register. The election judges shall then remove all the ballots from the box. Without considering how the ballots are marked, the election judges shall ascertain that each ballot is separate and shall count them to determine whether the number of ballots in the box corresponds with the number of ballots to be counted.
Minn.Stat. § 204C.20, subd. 1 (emphasis added). If there are more ballots in the ballot box than the number of ballots to be counted, subdivision 2 of section 204C.20 prescribes additional steps that election officials are to take. See Minn.Stat. § 204C.20, subd. 2 (2008). If, "after following these steps," there remains "an excess of properly marked ballots," one election judge is to remove ballots from the ballot box "without looking" until the number of ballots remaining in the ballot box agrees with the number of ballots to be counted. Id.3

Petitioner asserts that local election officials did not perform the second process, determining the correct number of ballotsto be counted, in accordance with Minn.Stat. § 204C.20, subd. 1. Specifically, petitioner argues that section 204C.20, subdivision 1, requires election officials to count voter signatures on polling place rosters to determine the number of ballots to be counted. He asserts that at the election on November 2, local election officials counted voter's receipts instead of voter signatures and, because voter's receipts are not signed by the voter, determining the number of ballots to be counted based on the number of voter's receipts does not comply with section 204C.20. Petitioner further alleges that because the number of ballots to be counted was not properly determined, any "excess" ballots were not removed from the ballot box before the votes were recorded, as required by Minn.Stat. § 204C.20, subd. 2.4

Petitioner's argument is premised on section 204C.20, subdivision 1. He contends that the statute clearly requires officials to count voter signatures because the statute refers to the number of "signed" voter's certificates and because, he asserts, the election register—specified in subdivision 1 as the other means of determining the number of ballots to be counted—is the predecessor of the present day signed polling place roster.

Petitioner's claim presents an issue of statutory interpretation—that is, whether either section 204C.20 or section 206.86, or both, allows only voter signatures on the polling place roster to be considered in determining the number of ballots to be counted. The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2008). Our starting point is the language of the statutes. E.g., Middle-Snake-Tamarac Rivers Watershed Dist. v. Stengrim, 784 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Minn.2010). If the language of the statutes is unambiguous, we do not look further to determine their meaning. Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn.2005) ("We have repeatedly held that we must give effect to the plain meaning of statutory text when it is clear and unambiguous."). If the language is ambiguous, the Legislature has provided direction as to how its intent "may be ascertained." Minn.Stat. § 645.16. The first question then is whether the language of the statutes is ambiguous.

A.

Petitioner argues that sections 204C.20 and 206.86 are not ambiguous, and that the plain language of the statutes unambiguously requires determination of the number of ballots to be counted based only on the number of voter signatures on polling place rosters. He further argues that the plain language of the statutes precludes local election officials from using voter's receipts to determine the number of ballots to be counted.

The plain language of the statutes does not support petitioner's arguments. Neither section 204C.20, subdivision 1, nor section 206.86, subdivision 1, includes the terms "polling place rosters" or "voter's receipts"—the terms used in section 204C.10 to describe the current process by which a voter obtains a ballot. We cannot, therefore, conclude that the plain language of the statutes at issue either requires counting signatures on the polling place rosters or prohibits counting voter's receipts.

But, petitioner argues, the reference to "signed" voter's certificates in section 204C.20, subdivision 1, indicates the Legislature's intent that only documents signed by the voter may be considered in determining the number of ballots to be counted. The plain language of section 204C.20, subdivision 1, however, is not as limited as petitioner argues. In addition to referencing the number of signed voter's certificates, the statute also provides for counting "the number of names entered in the election register." Minn.Stat. § 204C.20, subd. 1. Likewise, section 206.86, subdivision 1, instructs election judges to compare the number of ballots to "the number of voters shown on the election register." Although it is no longer in use, the "election register," when it was used, was not signed by the voter. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 204A.295 (1978).

An examination of the process used when the election register system was in place demonstrates that that system did not involve voter signatures. The election register was a document used in precincts where there was no permanent voter registration system. Id., subd. 1. In the absence of permanent voter registration,...

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