State v. Randolph

• Decision Date: 20 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. A10–1557.,A10–1557.
• Citation: 800 N.W.2d 150
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Plaintiff,v.Walter Jamille RANDOLPH, Defendant,v.County of Rice, intervenor, Respondent,v.State Board of Public Defense, intervenor, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

800 N.W.2d 150

STATE of Minnesota, Plaintiff,

v.Walter Jamille RANDOLPH, Defendant,

v.County of Rice, intervenor, Respondent,

v.State Board of Public Defense, intervenor, Appellant.

No. A10–1557.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 20, 2011.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Legislature has not provided a statutory right to a public defender for indigent misdemeanant appellants, but the district court has inherent authority to appoint private counsel to represent indigent misdemeanant appellants to effectuate the constitutional right to counsel set forth in Morris v. State, 765 N.W.2d 78 (Minn.2009).

2. The plain language of Minnesota Statutes ch. 611 (2010), does not place financial responsibility for the costs of private counsel appointed to represent indigent misdemeanant appellants on either the Board of Public Defense or the counties.

3. Given the circumstances presented here, where private counsel was appointed and began working on the appeal with the expectation that his fees would be paid, and in the absence of an articulated legislative policy judgment as to how the right recognized in Morris is to be vindicated, the Minnesota Supreme Court has the inherent authority to order that the charges against an indigent misdemeanant appellant be dismissed in the event that the State of Minnesota does not agree to pay the reasonable attorney fees of appointed counsel.

4. Because there is no statutory right to a public defender, the State Board of Public Defense is not responsible for the costs of transcripts for indigent misdemeanant appellants, but the State of Minnesota is obligated to pay such costs.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, and G. Paul Beaumaster, Rice County Attorney, Terence Swihart, Assistant County Attorney, Faribault, MN, for respondent.Bradford S. Delapena, Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Brainerd, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota County Attorneys Association.Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Alan I. Gilbert, Solicitor General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae Minnesota Attorney General.William L. Bernard, Grannis & Hauge, P.A., Eagan, MN, John L. Fossum, Fossum Law Office, Northfield, MN, Richard P. Ohlenberg, Ohlenberg Law Office, Richfield, MN, for amicus curiae Criminal Law Section Minnesota State Bar Association.

OPINION

GILDEA, Chief Justice.

The questions presented in this case are: (1) whether the district court erred in ordering a public defender to represent an indigent misdemeanant on appeal; (2) whether the court erred in ordering the public defender system to pay for the representation costs of that appeal; and (3) whether the court erred in ordering the State Public Defender's office to pay for the transcripts required for that appeal. Because the Legislature has not authorized public defenders to represent indigent misdemeanants on appeal, we reverse the district court's order appointing the public defender and the district court's order that the State Public Defender's office pay for any required transcripts, and we reinstate an earlier order appointing private counsel.

Following a March 31, 2009 incident, the State charged Walter Jamille Randolph with one count of misdemeanor domestic assault, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) (2010), and one count of driving after suspension, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 171.24, subd. 1 (2010). The State later added one count of misdemeanor criminal damage to property, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.595, subds. 2, 3 (2010), and one count of disorderly conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2010). On May 15, 2009, the district court determined that Randolph qualified for a public defender under Minn.Stat. § 611.14(1) (2010) in connection with these charges and appointed the Third District Public Defender to represent Randolph at trial.

Following a jury trial on January 6, 2010, Randolph was convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault. On March 24, 2010, the district court sentenced Randolph to serve seven days in jail, pay a fine, and pay public defender co-pay and reimbursement costs. That same day, Randolph submitted an application for public defender representation on appeal. On March 26, the court reviewed and preliminarily approved Randolph's application for a public defender for his appeal. The record does not contain any order reflecting this approval. But on March 29, a different district court judge, the Honorable Bernard Borene, issued an order appointing private counsel, Jorma Cavaleri, to represent Randolph on appeal. Judge Borene's order referenced inapplicable juvenile protection statutes, Minn.Stat. §§ 260C.163, subd. 3, and 260C.331, subd. 3(4) (2010), as authority to appoint private counsel and to require Rice County to pay “reasonable attorney's fees” to cover the cost of appointed private counsel.¹

On May 27, 2010, the Rice County Attorney's Office submitted a letter to the district court objecting to Judge Borene's order appointing private counsel to represent Randolph and assigning financial responsibility for that private counsel to the County. The County's objection was referred to the Honorable Thomas Neuville, and he ordered a hearing to determine who should be appointed to represent Randolph on appeal and which entity is responsible for the costs of Randolph's representation. The court also joined intervenors Rice County and the State Board of Public Defense (“the Board”) as parties to the ancillary action to determine which entity has responsibility for Randolph's representation on appeal.

At the hearing on July 12, 2010, the County and the Board each argued that the other entity was responsible for the costs of Randolph's representation. After the hearing, the district court vacated the previous order appointing private counsel and ordered the State Public Defender's office or District Public Defender's office to either substitute one of its attorneys for the appointed private counsel or to pay appointed counsel “reasonable attorney's fees.” The court also ordered the State Public Defender's office to pay transcript costs.

The Board filed a notice of appeal to the court of appeals and then filed a petition for accelerated review to this court. We granted the Board's petition, and the court of appeals stayed Randolph's appeal pending resolution of the issues raised in the Board's petition.²

I.

We turn first to the question of whether the district court erred by appointing a public defender to represent Randolph, a misdemeanant, on appeal. Two years ago, we held that indigent persons convicted of misdemeanors are entitled to appointed counsel on first review of their conviction by postconviction proceeding. Morris v. State, 765 N.W.2d 78, 80–83 (Minn.2009). The right to counsel recognized in Morris for first review by postconviction proceeding logically applies as well to first review by direct appeal, as in this case. The parties do not dispute that Randolph is indigent and therefore entitled to court-appointed counsel under Morris. We also held in Morris that the constitutional right to court-appointed counsel is not necessarily coextensive with the statutory right to public defender representation. Id. at 84; see also State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn.2009). Where counsel is constitutionally required and there is no statutory right to a public defender, the district court exercises its inherent authority to appoint private counsel. See In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 540 (Minn.2010).

In this case, the district court appointed a public defender to represent Randolph on appeal. The Board argues that public defender appointment was erroneous because under Minn.Stat. § 611.14(2) (2010), only felons and gross misdemeanants enjoy the statutory right to public defender representation on appeal. The County responds that Minn.Stat. § 611.18 (2010) requires district courts to order a public defender to represent an otherwise eligible misdemeanant through all stages of his proceeding, including his appeal.

The parties' arguments present a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. J.B., 782 N.W.2d at 539. The object of all statutory interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010). When interpreting a statute, we “first assess[ ] whether the statute's language, on its face, is clear or ambiguous.” Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn.2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted). We “construe words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning.” Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.2000). A statute is read as a whole and each section is interpreted “in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.” Id. Whenever possible, “[e]very law shall be construed ... to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16. If statutory language is unambiguous on its face, “we do not look further to determine [its] meaning.” In re 2010 Gubernatorial Election, 793 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Minn.2010).

Minnesota Statutes ch. 611 (2010) defines the statutory right to public defender representation. We therefore first look to the plain language of chapter 611 to determine whether Randolph is entitled to public defender representation. The parties primarily rely on two provisions in this chapter.

The Board primarily relies on section 611.14 to support its position that there is no statutory right to public defender representation for misdemeanants on appeal. Section 611.14 provides certain indigent persons with the right to public defender representation. Relevant persons include:

(1) a person charged with a felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor ...;

(2) a person appealing from a conviction of a felony or gross misdemeanor, or a person convicted of a felony or gross misdemeanor, who is pursuing a postconviction proceeding and...