In re Adrian R., 2008 Ohio 6581 (Ohio App. 12/11/2008)
Citation | 2008 Ohio 6581 |
Decision Date | 11 December 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 08-CA-17.,08-CA-17. |
Parties | In Re: Adrian R. Delinquent Child |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Licking County Juvenile Court Case No. A2005-0984.
Affirmed.
Kenneth Oswalt, Licking County Prosecutor, Licking County Administration Building, 20 South Second Street, Newark, Ohio 43055, Chris Reamer, Assistant Licking County Prosecutor, (Counsel of Record), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Office of the Ohio Public Defender, 8 East Long Street, 11th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, Brooke M. Burns, Assistant State Public Defender, (Counsel of Record), for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hon. John W. Wise, P.J., Hon. Julie A. Edwards, Hon. Patricia A. Delaney.
{¶1} Appellant Adrian R. appeals the January 14, 2008, Judgment Entry of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which adjudicated him a Tier III sexual offender subject to statutory registration requirements. The State of Ohio is the Plaintiff-Appellee.
{¶2} On December 22, 2005, Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with two counts of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), both felonies of the first degree if committed by an adult. In Counts 1 and 2 of the complaint, he was charged with engaging in sexual conduct with K.R., who was eight years old at the time of the offenses in 2004. On February 6, 2006, Appellant admitted to both counts of the complaint. The court continued disposition and ordered a PSI and sex offender assessment. Following the dispositional hearing on April 6, 2006, the court committed Appellant to the Department of Youth Services for a minimum of two years and a maximum not to exceed Appellant's twenty-first birthday.
{¶3} On January 14, 2008, Appellant again appeared in court, prior to being released from the custody of the Department of Youth Services, for a sex offender classification hearing. At that hearing, the court determined that, based on Senate Bill 10, which went into effect on July 1, 2007, Appellant was a Tier III sex offender who was not subject to community notification provisions.
{¶4} Senate Bill 10 was passed as a result of the federal Adam Walsh Act, and it reorganized Ohio's sex offender classification and registration scheme. Instead of having three levels of offenders classified as "sexually oriented offenders," "habitual sex offenders," and "sexual predators," the new law assigns offenders to a classification based on a tier system that relies on the offense of conviction and/or the number of convictions. See R.C. 2950.01 (E, F. and G).
{¶5} Effective January 1, 2008, Tier I offenders were required to register for fifteen years and must verify their residence with the sheriff on an annual basis. R.C. 2950.05(B)(3); R.C. 2950.06(B)(1). Tier II offenders must register for twenty-five years and periodically verify every 180 days. R.C. 2950.05(B)(2); R.C. 2950.06(B)(2). Tier III offenders must register for the rest of their life and periodically verify every 90 days. R.C. 2950.05(B)(1); R.C. 2950.06(B)(3). Adult Tier III offenders are also subject to automatic community notification, under which the sheriff is required to notify the offender's neighbors and certain other persons in the community of, the offender's residence, offense, and Tier III status.
{¶6} Revised Code 2152.83(B)(1) subjects juvenile sex offenders to registration requirements if a child is adjudicated a delinquent child for committing a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim oriented offense on or after January 1, 2002, and if the child offender is fourteen or fifteen years of at the time of the offense. After conducting a hearing, the court may determine that the offender is a Tier I, II, or III offender and has the discretion to impose community notification provisions on the offender if the offender meets certain requirements. Rape is classified as a Tier III offense pursuant to R.C. 2950.01. The trial court memorialized its ruling classifying Appellant as a Tier III sex offender in a Judgment Entry filed on January 15, 2008.
{¶7} It is from this judgment entry Appellant appeals, raising the following six assignments of error:
{¶8}
{¶9}
{¶10} [SIC]
CONSTITUTION AND THE RETROACTIVITY CLAUSE OF OHIO CONSTITUTION."
{¶12}
{¶13} [SIC]
{¶14} In Appellant's first assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred in classifying him as a juvenile sex offender because the parties and judge believed that Appellant was subject to mandatory classification. We find the record does not support this contention.
{¶15} When reviewing claims of whether a trial court erred in classifying a sex offender, Appellant suggests that we should apply a de novo standard of review. However, in his issue presented, he asks whether the trial court abused its discretion when it informed Appellant that he was a Tier III registrant. Appellee argues that the proper standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard. We agree with Appellee.
{¶16} A de novo standard of review is applied when an appellate court reviews the interpretation and application of a statute. State v. Sufronko (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 504, 506, 664 N.E.2d 596, 597. No such review is warranted in this case.
{¶17} An abuse of discretion standard, on the other hand, is applied when an appellate court must give deference to a trial court's application of guidelines to facts. See Buford v. U.S. (2001), 532 U.S. 59, 121 S. Ct. 1276. Under R.C. 2152.83, a trial court is given discretion to determine whether to classify a juvenile offender as a Tier I, II, or III sex offender. Moreover, the trial court is given discretion to determine whether a juvenile sex offender should be subject to community notification requirements. The trial court is able to listen to the defendant's statement, should he choose to make one, listen to victim impact statements, listen to the evaluation of the Department of Youth Services and Parole representatives, and review other factual matters in making its determinations as to registration and classification. Because the trial court is in a position to weigh and evaluate these considerations, deference should be given to the trial court's decision and that decision should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
{¶18} It cannot be said that the factual determinations made by the trial court in the present case did not guide the trial court's determination in this case. The victim in this case was eight years old at the time of the offenses and that fact alone supports the judge's finding that Appellant is a Tier III offender. Moreover, the court was aware that his determination was discretionary. While initially there appeared to be some confusion over the mandatory or discretionary nature of the classification, both parties clarified that the classification was in fact discretionary and the court recognized that understanding. Additionally, the court, in addressing the concerns regarding community notification, was well aware of the standards related to that issue and did not subject Appellant to community notification. The court spent an extensive amount of time discussing with Appellant the requirements placed upon him by classification and advised Appellant of the consequences of failing to meet those requirements. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court was unaware of the nature of the proceedings and abused its discretion. Therefore, Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} In Appellant's second assignment of error, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to educate himself about relevant juvenile offender classification procedures and failed to present the court with an accurate statement of the law as it related to Appellant's duty to register under R.C. 2152.83. We disagree.
{¶20} To succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong test. Initially, a defendant must show that his trial counsel acted incompetently. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In assessing such claims, "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In the Matter of Rodney C., 2010 Ohio 646 (Ohio App. 2/19/2010), 09 CA 71.
... ... Street, 11th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215, for Petitioner-Appellant Adrian R ... Before: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J., Hon. Sheila G ... The notice informed Rodney that beginning January 1, 2008, he would be reclassified as a Tier III Juvenile Sex Offender Registrant ... No. 08-CA-17, 2008-Ohio-6581) ... {¶8} Appellant R.C. now prosecutes this appeal, ... ...
- In Re: R.G. Minor Child
-
In re P.M., 2009 Ohio 1761 (Ohio App. 4/13/2009), No. 2008CA00152.
... ... 2008 JCR 00833 ... Affirmed ... John Ferrero, ... Adrian R. (December 11, 2008), Licking App. No. 08CA17, 2008 Ohio 6581. In the ... ...
-
In re M.E., 2009 Ohio 1762 (Ohio App. 4/13/2009)
... ... 2008 JCR 00831 ... Affirmed ... John D ... Adrian R. (December 11, 2008), Licking App. No. 08CA17, 2008 Ohio 6581. In the ... ...