IN RE ALTON D

• Decision Date: 28 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. CV-99-0071-PR.,CV-99-0071-PR.
• Parties: In re ALTON D.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

994 P.2d 402

196 Ariz. 195

In re ALTON D.

No. CV-99-0071-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc.

February 28, 2000.

Daniel Saint III, Phoenix, Attorney for Appellee.

Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Attorney by Patricia A. Nigro, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellant.

OPINION

McGREGOR, Justice.

¶ 1 We are asked to decide whether a trial judge who enters a final disposition order placing a juvenile on probation, after allowing a reasonable time for victims to present restitution claims, can later "re-open" the judgment to consider claims for restitution. For the following reasons, we hold that claims made after entry of the final order are barred.

I.

¶ 2 On April 1, 1998, the juvenile, Alton, admitted to criminal trespass in the first degree and agreed to pay restitution in an amount not to exceed $3,000. At his May 8th disposition hearing, the court placed Alton on probation and ordered that the restitution issue would remain open until June 10, 1998. It further ordered the county attorney and probation officer to notify the victims that if they did not submit a restitution request by that date, the restitution order would be deemed closed.¹

¶ 3 The state appealed, arguing that requiring a victim to file a claim within even a reasonable deadline conflicts with the victim's right to receive fair restitution. The court of appeals affirmed in part, holding superior courts may impose a reasonable deadline for submitting restitution claims. The court, however, also held that if a juvenile agrees to pay a specific restitution amount and the court places him on probation, the state can seek to modify the restitution order at any time during the probationary period to add additional restitution claims that fall within the agreed amount.

¶ 4 The court's latter holding brought its decision into direct conflict with In re Frank H., 193 Ariz. 433, 973 P.2d 1194 (App.1998), review denied (1999). In Frank, another panel of the court of appeals held that a victim who failed to submit a verified statement within the reasonable time limit set by the court lost any right to recover restitution. Id. at 437, 973 P.2d at 1198.²

¶ 5 We granted review to reconcile this conflict. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Constitution, article VI, section 5.3 and Rule 28 of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.

II.

¶ 6 Alton and Frank held, and we agree, that a trial court may impose a reasonable deadline within which restitution claims must be filed. The issue that remains involves the effect of a victim's failure to file a verified claim by the deadline. The state argues that because victims possess a right to recover restitution, the court must provide them a means to submit their claims, even after the deadline passes and the court enters its final order. In contrast, Alton argues that the trial court must enter a timely, final order so that a juvenile can appeal the disposition, and that an open-ended restitution order can unfairly penalize a juvenile for a victim's failure to comply with a reasonable deadline.

¶ 7 As the court of appeals observed, resolving this disagreement requires consideration of potentially conflicting interests. On the one hand, the juvenile is entitled to receive a timely, final disposition. See ARIZ. R. JUV. CT. 6.1 (West Supp.1999).³ On the other hand, victims are entitled to seek compensation for their losses, and juveniles, like adult criminal defendants, may be ordered to pay restitution as part of their probation. See ARIZ.REV.STAT. ANN. (A.R.S.) § 8-341.G.1 (West Supp.1999). Our decision must give effect to and balance these interests.

A.

¶ 8 Both the legislature and the courts have emphasized the importance of reaching a prompt final disposition in juvenile actions. Time periods for taking an appeal are short,⁴ and juvenile appeals must be given "precedence over all other actions except extraordinary writs or special actions." A.R.S. § 8-236.C (Supp.1999). As the court of appeals stated in Frank, reaching a speedy disposition "is essential to achieving one of the primary goals of the juvenile justice system: protection of the child through treatment and rehabilitation." Frank, 193 Ariz. at 436, 973 P.2d at 1197. Indeed, statutes and court rules recognize the importance to both juveniles and victims of reaching a speedy disposition. See A.R.S. § 8-414; ARIZ. R. JUV. CT. 6.1. Until a final order is entered, however, an aggrieved party cannot take an appeal. See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-74222, 20 Ariz.App. 570, 571, 514 P.2d 741, 742 (App. 1973)

.

¶ 9 In cases involving restitution, the restitution order constitutes the final order for appeal purposes. See In re Eric L., 189 Ariz. 482, 484, 943 P.2d 842, 844 (App. 1997)

; see also A.R.S. § 8-382.11 (West 1999) ("`Final disposition' means ... imposition of a disposition after an adjudication for a delinquent offense."). Before the court can impose an order of restitution, a victim must present evidence to establish that the victim's loss relates directly to the juvenile's offense, see In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-128676, 177 Ariz. 352, 356, 868 P.2d 365, 369 (App.1994), and to provide a basis for setting an amount that is not speculative. See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-96304, 147 Ariz. 153, 155, 708 P.2d 1344, 1346 (App.1985). Moreover, a court accepting a guilty plea from a juvenile must inform the juvenile of the restitution amount that may be imposed. See In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-110720, 156 Ariz. 430, 432, 752 P.2d 519, 521 (App.1988). Therefore, until the court can determine the amount due as restitution through evidence submitted by a victim, it cannot enter its final order.

¶ 10 If a judge cannot set a deadline for filing claims, the juvenile's right to a speedy appeal can be rendered meaningless. Requiring victims to file their claims for restitution within a reasonable deadline, after which the order of disposition becomes final and subject to appeal, thus directly furthers the significant interest in reaching a prompt, final resolution of juvenile actions.

B.

¶ 11 The state contends, however, that even after entry of its final order, the trial court should be permitted to consider additional restitution claims, either by "re-opening" the judgment or, in those cases involving probation, by modifying the terms of probation. Under that view, the trial court's disposition order is "final" for purposes of appeal, but not for purposes of determining restitution. We reject that approach for several reasons. ¶ 12 First, the statutes governing victims' rights in juvenile cases, A.R.S. §§ 8-381 to -419 (West 1999 & Supp.1999),⁵ clearly intend that victims submit claims for restitution prior to entry of the final disposition order.⁶ By statute, victims have the right to attend and be heard at all proceedings the juvenile is entitled to attend. See A.R.S. § 8-400. Importantly, however, the statutes distinguish between those hearings at which victims can present evidence, as is necessary to establish a restitution claim, and those hearings at which their role is more limited. Section 8-391 defines a victim's right "to be present and be heard at any predisposition or disposition proceeding pursuant to § 8-405." Section 8-405, in turn, provides that a victim "may present evidence, information and opinions that concern ... the need for restitution at any predisposition or disposition proceeding." (Emphasis added.) In contrast, the statute governing hearings to modify probation, while providing victims the right to be present and heard, gives no authority to victims to present evidence. See A.R.S. § 8-406. We find it significant that the legislature drew this distinction. The statutory language is clear: victims can present evidence related to restitution claims at predisposition or disposition hearings, before the judge enters the final order, but not at hearings set to consider modifying the terms of probation.

¶ 13 The state next argues that the trial court can consider restitution claims submitted after the final order becomes effective because the court retains jurisdiction to modify the terms of probation. See A.R.S. §§ 8-341, 8-344, and 8-345 (West Supp.1999). The court indeed does retain authority to modify terms of probation, but only for the purpose of "modifying the manner in which restitution payments ordered ... are made." A.R.S. § 8-344 (emphasis added). The statute provides no support for the argument that the court can entertain new claims submitted after it imposes the terms of probation and enters its final order.

¶ 14 Permitting the court to consider additional restitution claims after entry of final judgment not only contravenes statutory language, but also creates potentially harmful results. First, because a restitution order constitutes the final order for juvenile appeal purposes, a new order of restitution would create a new basis for appeal. As a practical matter, each time a victim came forward with an additional claim for restitution, the juvenile would have to return to the courtroom and, if appropriate, take another appeal. That procedure would vitiate the goal of a speedy appeal.

¶ 15 Second, permitting a victim to present a new claim for restitution could inequitably extend a juvenile's probation term. Under the terms of A.R.S. § 8-341.B, a juvenile's term of probation is limited to a maximum of one year unless, among other exceptions, restitution ordered has not been made. Alton argues that this provision, though designed to limit juvenile probation to one year, could be used to extend the probation period indefinitely. As the court pointed out in Frank, "a dilatory victim could potentially block a juvenile from appealing his delinquency adjudication until just before the juvenile court loses jurisdiction on the juvenile's eighteenth birthday," which would "arbitrarily nullify many...