In re Andrew B.

• Decision Date: 02 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2-07-0781.,2-07-0781.
• Citation: 896 N.E.2d 1067
• Parties: In re ANDREW B., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andrew B., Respondent-Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

896 N.E.2d 1067

In re ANDREW B., Alleged to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Andrew B., Respondent-Appellant).

No. 2-07-0781.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

October 2, 2008.

Teresa L. Berge, Veronique Baker, Director (both Court-appointed), Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, Rockford, for Andrew B.

Philip J. Nicolosi, Winnebago County State's Attorney, Rockford, Lawrence M. Bauer, Deputy Director, Diane L. Campbell, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.

Justice O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Andrew B., appeals from the trial court's ruling that he be involuntarily admitted to the Department of Mental Health pursuant to section 3-600 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2006)). Respondent argues that the trial court's order should be reversed because the petition to involuntarily admit him was untimely filed. We affirm the trial court's decision.

Respondent was voluntarily admitted to Singer Mental Heath Center on March 26, 2007. On May 7, 2007, respondent requested to leave Singer, and a petition seeking respondent's involuntary admission pursuant to sections 3-403 and 3-404 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-403, 3-404 (West 2006)) was prepared and filed with the court the following day. On June 12, 2007, on the State's motion, the petition was dismissed without prejudice, and the court ordered that respondent be discharged from Singer. That same day, another petition, seeking emergency admission by certificate pursuant to section 3-600 of the Code, was prepared, and it was filed the next day. This petition was dismissed on the State's motion on June 19, 2007, and, again, the trial court ordered that respondent be discharged.

A third petition, which sought emergency admission by certificate pursuant to section 3-600 of the Code, was prepared on June 19, 2007, and filed the following day. This third petition, the petition at issue in this appeal, averred that respondent had been discharged by the court but continued to be delusional and unable to care for himself. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that he had not been released on June 19, 2007, despite being discharged by the court. The court denied the motion on the ground that "the failure to discharge [respondent], if there was, in fact, a failure, and it's not clear that there was," did not insulate respondent from subsequent valid admission proceedings. The matter then proceeded to a hearing, the petition was granted, and respondent was found to be subject to involuntary admission for 90 days. Respondent timely appeals.

After briefing was completed, the State filed a motion to cite In re Alfred H.H., 379 Ill.App.3d 1026, 320 Ill.Dec. 260, 887 N.E.2d 40 (2008), as additional authority on the question of whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot. Respondent objected on the basis that Alfred H.H. was not yet final, because a petition for rehearing was pending at the time. The petition for rehearing has since been denied. We hereby grant the State's motion.

Because the 90-day period of confinement that respondent now appeals has already expired, we begin with the threshold issue of whether the mootness doctrine precludes our review of the merits of his appeal. "An appeal is considered moot where it presents no actual controversy or where the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party." In re J.T., 221 Ill.2d 338, 349-50, 303 Ill.Dec. 103, 851 N.E.2d 1 (2006). Where an issue is moot, a reviewing court will generally not consider it on the merits, because "[i]t is a basic tenet of justiciability that reviewing courts will not decide moot or abstract questions or render advisory opinions." J.T., 221 Ill.2d at 349, 303 Ill.Dec. 103, 851 N.E.2d 1. However, reviewing courts will consider otherwise moot issues that fall within two widely recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine: the public-interest exception, which applies in cases that present questions of public importance that will likely recur and whose answers will guide public officers in the performance of their duties; and the exception for cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition but evade review. J.T., 221 Ill.2d at 350, 303 Ill.Dec. 103, 851 N.E.2d 1.

In Alfred H.H., the Fourth District criticized the appellate court's practice of "routinely" finding exceptions to the mootness doctrine in mental health admission and treatment cases and urged that courts instead conduct meaningful evaluation of the mootness of such appeals on a case-by-case basis. Alfred H.H., 379 Ill.App.3d at 1028, 320 Ill.Dec. 260, 887 N.E.2d 40; see, e.g., In re Nancy A., 342 Ill.App.3d 355, 359, 277 Ill.Dec. 10, 795 N.E.2d 377 (2003) ("Generally, the mootness doctrine does not apply to mental health cases"). The respondent in Alfred H.H. argued that the evidence was insufficient to warrant his involuntary admission and that his hospitalization was not the least restrictive treatment alternative. In holding that the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply, the court concluded that neither issue presented a question of public importance, "[n]or would either answer provide an authoritative determination to guide public officers in the performance of their duties in mental-health cases," because such answers would turn on the particular facts presented in such cases. Alfred H.H., 379 Ill.App.3d at 1028, 320 Ill.Dec. 260, 887 N.E.2d 40. Likewise, the court found inapplicable the exception for cases concerning events of short duration that are capable of repetition but evade review, because the evidence presented in support of any future petitions would differ from the evidence presented in support of the petition at issue. Alfred H.H., 379 Ill.App.3d at 1029, 320 Ill.Dec. 260, 887 N.E.2d 40. Lastly, the court concluded that it would no longer recognize the collateral-legal-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine in mental health cases. Alfred H.H., 379 Ill.App.3d at 1029, 320 Ill.Dec. 260, 887 N.E.2d 40. Given its restrictive view of the applicability of the mootness doctrine exceptions in mental health cases, the court in Alfred H.H. held the appeal to be moot, and it did not reach the respondent's arguments on their merits.

Alfred H.H. does not control here. Rather, this case is analogous to a more recent Fourth District case, In re A.W., 381 Ill.App.3d 950, 320 Ill.Dec. 687, 887 N.E.2d 831 (2008). A.W. raised the issue of the trial court's compliance with the Code. The appellate court addressed the mootness issue as follows:

"Given that (1) strict compliance with statutory procedures is required based on the important liberty interests involved in involuntary-treatment cases (In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill.App.3d 586, 590 [313 Ill.Dec. 67, 871 N.E.2d 794] (2007)) and (2) our supreme court has stated that `the procedures courts must follow to authorize the involuntary medication of mental[-]health patients involve matters of "substantial public concern"' (In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 46 [289 Ill. Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424] (2004), quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d 393, 402 [269 Ill.Dec. 440, 781 N.E.2d 237] (2002)), respondent's arguments regarding the involuntary-treatment order's compliance with the Code constitute questions of public importance. In addition, answers to respondent's arguments will provide an authoritative determination to guide public officers in the performance of their duties in mental-health cases. Finally, the circumstances in this case are likely to recur in other involuntary-treatment cases. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent clearly established the criteria necessary to satisfy the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine." A.W., 381 Ill. App.3d at 955, 320 Ill.Dec. 687, 887 N.E.2d 831.

Here, as in A.W., respondent argues that the State failed to strictly comply with the Code. Based on A.W., we conclude that the public-interest mootness exception applies here, and we reach respondent's arguments on their merits.

Respondent argues that, although the trial court twice ordered his discharge (on June 12 and June 19), the facility never actually released him, and thus he was continually confined from May 7 (when he first sought to leave the facility) onward. Because section 3-611 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West 2006)) mandates that a petition be filed within 24 hours of a respondent's admission, respondent contends that the petition at issue here, filed after the June 19 discharge order, came far after the May 7 commencement of his involuntary admission and was therefore invalid.

Respondent's argument mirrors the argument adopted by the Fifth District in Nancy A. There, the respondent had been admitted to a mental health center on April 8, but the petition seeking her involuntary admission was not filed until April 12. Nancy A., 342 Ill.App.3d at 357, 277 Ill.Dec. 10, 795 N.E.2d 377. On April 18, the trial court dismissed the April 12 petition (presumably for its untimeliness), but the respondent was not released from the health center before a new petition was filed that same day. Nancy A., 342 Ill. App.3d at 357, 277 Ill.Dec. 10, 795 N.E.2d 377. The respondent argued that "she was never discharged and that therefore the time and date of her admission (April 8, 2002) remained unchanged" when a new petition was filed on April 18. Nancy A., 342 Ill.App.3d at 361, 277 Ill.Dec. 10, 795 N.E.2d 377. The State countered that "a new clock for purposes of section 3-611 began to run when the first petition was dismissed and the second petition was filed." Nancy A., 342 Ill.App.3d at 361, 277 Ill.Dec. 10, 795 N.E.2d 377. The court agreed with the respondent:

"The respondent...