In Re Andrew B. (the People Of The State Of Illinois

• Decision Date: 19 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. 107498.,107498.
• Citation: 341 Ill.Dec. 420,930 N.E.2d 934,237 Ill.2d 340
• Parties: In re ANDREW B. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee v. Andrew B., Appellant).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

237 Ill.2d 340

930 N.E.2d 934

341 Ill.Dec. 420

In re ANDREW B. (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee v. Andrew B., Appellant).

No. 107498.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 19, 2010.

Teresa L. Berge, Veronique Baker, Rockford, Laurel Spahn, Patrica Werner, Hines, of Ill. Guardianship & Advocacy Com'n, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor Gen., Richard S. Huszagh, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

The question presented in this appeal is whether section 3-611 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/ 3-611 (West 2006)) and the discharge provisions in sections 1-109 and 2-104 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/1-109, 2-104 (West 2006)) mandate full physical release of an individual previously ordered discharged before the State may file a subsequent petition for involuntary admission.

The circuit court of Winnebago County ordered that respondent be involuntarily admitted pursuant to section 3-600 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2006)). The appellate court affirmed, rejecting respondent's argument that the petition seeking his involuntary admission was untimely filed under section 3-611 of the Code. 386 Ill.App.3d 337, 347, 324 Ill.Dec. 848, 896 N.E.2d 1067. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

I. BACKGROUND

The instant case arises from a series of commitment proceedings involving respondent, Andrew B., an individual with a history of mental illness. On March 26, 2007, respondent voluntarily admitted himself to Singer Mental Health Center. On May 7, 2007, respondent expressed a desire to leave the facility, and a social worker filed a petition for respondent's involuntary admission under sections 3-403 and 3-404 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-403, 3-404 (West 2006)).¹ Ultimately, the State voluntarily dismissed the petition, and the trial court ordered respondent discharged on June 12, 2007, but respondent was not physically released. Instead, the next day a social worker filed a petition for respondent's emergency admission by certificate under section 3-600 of the Code ( 405 ILCS 5/3-600 (West 2006)). As with the previous petition, this petition was voluntarily dismissed by the State, and the court again ordered respondent discharged on June 19, 2007. Respondent, however, was not released, and on June 20, 2007, a social worker filed another petition for his emergency admission under section 3-600.

The June 20, 2007, petition is the subject of the instant appeal. The petition alleged that respondent was delusional, unable to protect himself from harm, consumed only one-third of his meals, refused his medications, and drank dangerous amounts of water. Two accompanying psychiatrists' certificates were attached to the petition and contained similar allegations. The trial court ordered respondent evaluated by a qualified examiner and scheduled a hearing on the matter.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that because he was never physically released pursuant to the court's previous discharge orders, his continued detention at the facility violated his rights under the Code and entitled him to a full and complete release. The court denied respondent's motion to dismiss, concluding “the failure to discharge [respondent], if there was, in fact, a failure, and it's not clear that there was” did not necessarily invalidate otherwise valid subsequent emergency admission proceedings.

At the hearing, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Howard Paul, a psychiatrist, and Dr. William Welch, the court-appointed examiner and clinical psychologist. Dr. Paul treated respondent since his admission, and he believed respondent needed immediate hospitalization because he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Dr. Paul opined respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm on himself or other individuals and had shown conduct that would cause others to believe respondent would harm them. Dr. Paul further opined respondent could not take care of his own basic physical needs because he consumed excessive quantities of water, causing potentially fatal seizures from a dangerously low level of sodium in his blood. According to Dr. Paul, on at least one occasion, respondent had a grand mal seizure as a consequence of his diminished blood-sodium level. Dr. Paul believed hospitalization was the least restrictive environment for respondent.

Dr. Welch, the court-appointed examiner, testified that respondent generally refused to talk during his interviews. Dr. Welch reviewed respondent's medical record and, in his opinion, respondent was seriously mentally ill and unable to care for his own basic physical needs.

Following the hearing, the trial court found the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was mentally ill and could not provide for his basic needs to protect himself from serious harm and, therefore, was subject to involuntary admission for 90 days. The court further found that hospitalization was the least restrictive alternative.

On appeal, respondent argued the trial court's order should be reversed because the emergency petition was untimely filed. 386 Ill.App.3d at 338, 324 Ill.Dec. 848, 896 N.E.2d 1067. According to respondent, although the trial court twice ordered his discharge from the facility, he was not physically released and was continually confined since his request to leave on May 7. Citing section 3-611's mandate that a petition be filed within 24 hours of admission (405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West 2006)), respondent argued that the petition at issue, filed June 20, was not filed within 24 hours of his admission and was therefore invalid.

The appellate court first determined that, while the expiration of the underlying 90-day admission period rendered respondent's appeal moot, his claims should be considered under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. The court next recognized that respondent's argument challenging the validity of the petition based on its timeliness and his continuous detention mirrored the arguments accepted by the courts in In re Helen S., 342 Ill.App.3d 330, 276 Ill.Dec. 945, 795 N.E.2d 298 (2003), and In re Nancy A., 342 Ill.App.3d 355, 277 Ill.Dec. 10, 795 N.E.2d 377 (2003). Helen S. and Nancy A. held that when a petition seeking involuntary admission of a patient was dismissed and the patient ordered discharged, but the patient was not physically released, any subsequent petitions were untimely under section 3-611 if not filed within 24 hours of the patient's initial admission.

The appellate court, however, disagreed with Helen S. and Nancy A. and reached the opposite conclusion. Relying on In re Shaw, 153 Ill.App.3d 939, 106 Ill.Dec. 749, 506 N.E.2d 456 (1987), the court concluded that when a petition seeking involuntary admission of a patient is dismissed and the patient ordered discharged, a new petition could still be filed, regardless of whether the individual was physically released. Citing Shaw, the court reasoned that after dismissal of the petition and entry of the discharge order, the facility no longer had authority to detain the individual because he or she could no longer be considered a patient.

Nonetheless, according to the court, if that individual thereafter exhibited symptoms warranting involuntary admission, the individual could be detained for 24 hours pending the filing of a new petition. The court explained that “[t]he validity of this new petition has no relation to the validity of the old petition, nor is it tainted by any impropriety in the respondent's prior detention. A new petition begins a new proceeding, to be judged for validity independent of any prior proceedings.” Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 386 Ill.App.3d at 347, 324 Ill.Dec. 848, 896 N.E.2d 1067.

We allowed respondent's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, respondent challenges the trial court's involuntary-admission order. Initially, however, we note this appeal is moot because respondent's underlying 90-day admission period has expired. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 350, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74 (2009). Therefore, we must determine whether an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d at 351, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74. We first consider the public interest exception because the appellate court found the exception allowed review of respondent's appeal. 386 Ill.App.3d at 340, 324 Ill.Dec. 848, 896 N.E.2d 1067. The State also agrees that the public interest exception applies here.

The public interest exception permits review of an otherwise moot appeal when: (1) the issue is of a public nature; (2) an authoritative determination is necessary to guide public officers in future cases; and (3) there is a likelihood the issue will recur. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d at 355, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74. This exception must be construed narrowly and established by a clear showing of each criterion. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d at 355, 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74.

Here, respondent challenges the validity of a petition seeking his involuntary admission filed after the facility did not physically release him following multiple discharge orders. This issue undeniably presents a question of public nature because it involves a dispute over the procedural requirements for involuntarily admitting individuals previously ordered discharged, thus satisfying the exception's first element. The second element is satisfied because our appellate court is divided on the issue, resulting in the need for an authoritative determination by this court. The third element is also satisfied because, as illustrated in this case, the issue is likely to recur when mental-health professionals believe continued involuntary admission is warranted...