In re Boggie, 29707.

• Decision Date: 15 November 1945
• Docket Number: 29707.
• Citation: 163 P.2d 575,24 Wn.2d 102
• Parties: In re BOGGIE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

163 P.2d 575

24 Wn.2d 102

In re BOGGIE.

No. 29707.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 15, 1945

Department 1.

Proceeding in the matter of the application of Clarence G. Boggie for a writ of habeas corpus. From a judgment denying the petition petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; Ernest M. Card, judge.

Harry E. Foster, of Seattle, for appellant.

Smith Troy and Rudolph Naccarato, both of Olympia, for respondent.

MILLARD, Justice.

In March 1945 a petition was filed in this court by Clarence G Boggie for a writ of habeas corpus seeking his discharge from the custody of the superintendent of the Washington State Penitentiary. The petition was referred to the superior court for Pierce county where hearing thereon resulted in denial of the petition. The petitioner has appealed to this court.

In his return to the order to show cause why the writ should not issue respondent superintendent alleged that he held the petitioner in custody by virtue of a judgment and sentence and a commitment issued pursuant thereto by a judge of the superior court of the state of Washington for Spokane county. Copy of the judgment, sentence and commitment attached to respondent's return recites that appellant, represented by counsel, came into open court for pronouncement of judgment and sentence, 'Thereupon, it is now by the Court considered and adjudged upon the verdict of the jury finding the defendant guilty of the crime of * * * Murder in first degree * * * as charged in said information, that the defendant now Before the Court is guilty and it is now by the Court considered, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that said defendant Clarence G. Boggie be punished by confinement at hard labor in the Washington State Penitentiary for a term of his natural life, * * *.'

The challenge of counsel for appellant to the sufficiency of the information cannot be sustained as trial errors cannot be reviewed or informations tested by a writ of habeas corpus. Grieve v. Webb, Wash., 158 P.2d 73.

It is argued that our statute, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2392, defines the crime of murder in the first degree as the 'killing of a human being,' therefore the omission from the information of the words 'human being' was the omission of descriptive words essential to define the crime and which must necessarily be proved to establish the crime; from which it follows that evidence was inadmissible to establish a point not alleged, hence the information...