In re Clark

• Decision Date: 15 November 1945
• Docket Number: 29680.
• Citation: 24 Wn.2d 105,163 P.2d 577
• Parties: In re CLARK.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

163 P.2d 577

24 Wn.2d 105

In re CLARK.

No. 29680.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 15, 1945

Department 1.

Proceeding in the matter of the application of Charles L. Clark for a writ of habeas corpus. From an order denying the petition petitioner appeals.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; E. D. Hodge, judge.

Harry E. Foster, of Seattle, for appellant.

Smith Troy and R. Paul Tjossem, both of Olympia, for respondent.

STEINERT, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the release of the petitioner from detention in the Washington state penitentiary.

Appellant Charles L. Clark, as petitioner filed in this court his application for such writ, alleging in his petition that since April 7, 1939, he has been wrongfully and unlawfully detained and imprisoned in the state penitentiary, without lawful commitment, but solely upon a purported warrant of commitment issued by the superior court for King county pursuant to an alleged judgment which is void and without legal force, and that his imprisonment is in violation of the Federal and State Constitutions. Attached to the petition and by reference made parts thereof, are copies of the warrant of commitment and judgment.

Upon presentment of the petition, the chief justice referred the matter to the superior court for Pierce county and at the same time issued an order directing the superintendent of the state penitentiary to show cause Before that court, on a day fixed, why the petition should not be granted.

The superintendent in due time made a written return, alleging therein that on March 22, 1939, the appellant petitioner was, by information filed in the superior court for King county, charged with the crime of carnal knowledge, as shown by a copy of the information attached to and by reference made a part of the return; that thereafter appellant was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the crime charged; that on April 7, 1939, judgment was entered sentencing him to confinement in the penitentiary for 'the term of not less than to be set by the Parole Board and not more than twenty years'; and that on the same day a warrant of commitment was duly issued, and that the appellant is now held in custody under and by virtue of such judgment, sentence, and commitment.

The information referred to above charged the appellant with the crime of carnal knowledge in that on March 9, 1939, he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously did carnally know and abuse a named female child under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: of the age of fifteen years.

The judgment, referred to in appellant's petition, recited that appellant, the defendant named in the judgment, upon coming into court, was by the court informed of the nature of the information against him for the crime of carnal knowledge, and of his plea of guilty of the offense charged, and was then and there asked whether he had any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he replied that he had none. The judgment by its terms then declared the defendant guilty of the crime of carnal knowledge, imposed the sentence set forth above, and ordered that appellant be delivered into the custody of the proper officers to be transported to the penitentiary.

In response to the return thus made by the superintendent, appellant herein demurred thereto on the ground that it showed no legal excuse for his detention, and at the same time moved for judgment directing the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that no issue had been tendered by the return. The matter then came on for hearing Before the court on the demurrer and, after argument by counsel, the court entered an order overruling the demurrer and denying the petition for such writ. From that order, this appeal was taken.

The assignments of error allege that the court erred (1) in holding the answer and return of the superintendent to be good, and in denying the motion and overruling the demurrer addressed thereto; (2) in holding the judgment and sentence likewise to be good; and (3) in refusing to discharge the appellant from the detention of which he complains.

Under these assignments, appellant, in his brief, contends that the judgment is void because (1) it does not contain the necessary jurisdictional recitals; (2) it does not sufficiently designate the character of the carnal knowledge with which he was charged; and (3) it directs the parole board, an agency no longer in existence, to fix the term of imprisonment. Upon the oral argument, appellant made the additional contentions (a) that there is no such crime as 'carnal knowledge'; (b) that the judgment fails to show that appellant is an adult person, as designated in the statute under which he was charged; and (c) that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional. We shall first consider, in sequence, the contentions made by appellant in his brief.

Appellant does not in the brief inform us as to what jurisdictional recitals are lacking in the judgment, and so we must deal with the subject somewhat generally.

A judgment is the determination or sentence of the law, pronounced by a competent judge or court, as the result of an action or proceeding instituted in such court, affirming that, upon matters submitted for its decision, a legal duty or liability does or does not exist. State v. Siglea, 196 Wash. 283, 82 P.2d 583; State v. King, 18 Wash.2d 747, 140 P.2d 283.

It is undoubtedly true that to render a judgment immune from collateral attack by a habeas corpus proceeding, the court must have had not only jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person against whom the judgment is pronounced, but also authority to render the particular judgment in question. Ex parte Horner, 19 Wash.2d 51, 141 P.2d 151.

The judgment here involved shows on its face that it was rendered by the superior court of the state of Washington for King county, which court is one of original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony and in all cases of misdemeanor, if not otherwise provided for by law. Washington constitution, Art. IV, § 6. The offense with which appellant was charged, and of which he was convicted, is a felony. Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 2436 (amended by Rem.Supp.1943, § 2436). The court therefore had jurisdiction of the subject matter.

The judgment also shows on its face that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the appellant, for it recites that he appeared in court and pleaded guilty to the charge.

The statute just referred to provides that every adult male person who shall carnally know and abuse any female child of fifteen, and under eighteen, years of age, not his wife, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than twenty years. When the judgment is read in the light of the statute, of which this court takes judicial notice, it is apparent that the sentencing court had authority to render the judgment here in question.

In addition to the foregoing jurisdictional requirements, there are also certain statutory exactions which must be satisfied. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2187 provides that when a defendant is found guilty, the court shall render judgment accordingly. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2196 declares that if the conviction be for an offense punishable by imprisonment, the defendant must be personally present when judgment is entered. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2198 commands that when the defendant appears for judgment he must be informed by the court of the verdict of the jury and be asked whether he has any legal excuse to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him. The judgment in this instance shows on its face that all these requirements, substituting appellant's plea of guilty, in place of a verdict of the jury, were fulfilled to the letter.

It is generally held that in criminal actions the judgment is sufficient if it contains a clear and concise statement of the names of the parties, the character of the offense, the verdict, the sentence given thereon, and the penalty imposed, without setting out all the facts constituting the record. 24 C.J.S. 130, Criminal Law, § 1600.

While the judgment must be responsive to the offense charged and in accord with the verdict of the jury, and must also be sufficiently definite, certain, and specific to identify the offense involved, it is not necessary that the judgment describe the offense with technical precision or specify the particular statute which defines the offense and prescribes the penalty therefor.

In our opinion, the judgment in this instance recited every necessary jurisdictional element and was otherwise sufficient in form and content.

Appellant's next contention is that the judgment does not sufficiently designate the character of the carnal knowledge of which he was charged and of which he was convicted. His argument, as we understand it, is that Rem.Rev.Stat. (Sup.) § 2436 referring to carnal knowledge of children, mentions two or more ways in which it may be committed, and fixes a different penalty according to the age of the child victim. It is true that the statute makes it an offense, whether committed by an adult male person upon a female child under the age of eighteen years, or by a female person upon a male child under the same age, and further prescribes a penalty of life imprisonment if committed upon a child under the age of fifteen years, and a penalty of imprisonment for not more than twenty years if committed upon a child of fifteen, and under eighteen, years of age.

Certainly the appellant cannot be heard to say, as he seemingly contends, that it is impossible to ascertain from the judgment and sentence whether the crime was committed by a male or by a female...