In re C.P.J.

Decision Date04 August 2003
Docket NumberNo. 05-02-01639-CV.,05-02-01639-CV.
Citation129 S.W.3d 573
PartiesIn the Interest of C.P.J. and S.B.J.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Brian L. Webb, Webb & Ackels, P.C., Dallas, for Appellant.

Mary D. McKnight, Law Office of Mary D. McKnight, Dallas, for Appellee.

Before Justices JAMES, FRANCIS, and LANG.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice LANG.

This is an appeal from the trial court's order modifying an existing agreed visitation order between Marshall M. Jackson and his former parents-in-law Ronnie and Cheryl Adams, the appellees. The agreement allowed the Adamses scheduled visitation of their grandchildren, C.P.J. and S.B.J., Jackson's two minor children. In two issues, Jackson argues (1) the trial court's order amending the previous visitation schedule infringes on his fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of his children; and (2) he is entitled to request termination of the previous order, even though he agreed to it, because a recent United States Supreme Court decision constitutes a "change in circumstances." For reasons that follow, we resolve appellant's issues against him and affirm the trial court's order allowing the Adamses' visitation.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jackson married Stephanie Adams in May 1989. The couple had two daughters: S.B.J. in 1989 and C.P.J. in 1993. Stephanie died of leukemia in October 1994. After her death, the Adamses, Stephanie's mother and father, babysat and cared for the children during the daytime hours so Jackson could continue to work. Sometime in May 1997, Jackson enrolled the children in an after-school daycare program. The children no longer visited the Adamses on a daily basis. In the summer of 1997, Jackson announced that he would marry his girlfriend, Kathy, in December of that year. Kathy had two daughters of her own. One was over the age of eighteen and lived outside the home, while the other was a minor who would live with Jackson, Kathy, C.P.J., and S.B.J.

The Adamses filed a petition for grandparent access on July 31, 1997. After mediation, Jackson and the Adamses agreed on a schedule allowing the Adamses regular visits with the children that included some weekends, holidays, and birthdays. The trial court entered an order approving the parties' agreement on February 10, 1999.

On October 30, 2000, Jackson filed a "motion to modify" the Adamses' visitation order, in which he asked the trial court to terminate the Adamses' visitation due to "changed circumstances" in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).1 Alternatively, Jackson requested that the Adamses' visitation of the children be "significantly reduced." The trial court held hearings on June 6 and June 18, 2001. On September 16, 2002, the trial court denied Jackson's request to terminate visitation. However, the court modified the visitation schedule to omit Sundays and otherwise reduce the amount of time C.P.J. and S.B.J. were to spend with the Adamses. Jackson then brought this appeal, asking this Court to set aside the visitation order altogether because the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him.

GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS

In the trial court and on appeal, Jackson states specifically that the "Texas grandparent visitation statute"2 is unconstitutional as it applies to him. However, at the trial court, in the briefs before us, and at oral argument, Jackson's argument articulates a challenge that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. Regardless of this inconsistency, his claim is obviously premised on the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville.

Specifically, Jackson relies on Troxel for the proposition that fit parents hold a special interest "in the care, custody, and control of their children ... [which] is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Further, Jackson cites Troxel for its holding that when a court decides non-parental visitation rights, it must accord material weight to a fit parent's decision of how to raise his child. See id. Jackson argues that because there is neither an allegation by the Adamses nor a finding by the trial court that he was or is unfit, the trial court's decision to continue visitation by the grandparents necessarily infringes upon his parental liberty interest. This "Troxel argument" is the substance of Jackson's first issue. Jackson's second issue varies slightly from the first in that he claims he is entitled to request termination of the 1999 order, despite his agreement to it, because Troxel itself constitutes a "change in circumstances."

A. Standard of Review

As a general rule, we give wide latitude to a trial court's decision on custody, control, possession, and visitation matters. Jacobs v. Dobrei, 991 S.W.2d 462, 463 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.). Generally the trial court's decision will be reversed only if it appears from the record as a whole that the trial court abused its discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.1982). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). When a party does not request findings of fact, we infer that the trial court made all the necessary findings to support its judgment. Id.; see also Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989); Jacobs, 991 S.W.2d at 463.

However, where the application of a statute to the facts of a given case is claimed to be unconstitutional or where the statute is claimed to be facially unconstitutional, we are not confronted with factual or legal sufficiency issues or even abuse of discretion issues. Instead, we must ascertain the fundamental issue of whether an appellant's constitutional rights were violated. Because the constitutionality of a statute raises a question of law, we review this particular issue de novo. See Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 629 (Tex.1996).

Although we use the Supreme Court's holding in Troxel as our template for analysis, we are mindful that the analysis begins with the presumption that the legislative enactment is constitutional. See Gen. Servs. Comm'n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 (Tex. 2001) (citing Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 629); see also Glazer's Wholesale Distribs., Inc. v. Heineken USA, Inc., 95 S.W.3d 286, 298 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.). Furthermore, the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of demonstrating that the enactment fails to meet constitutional requirements. See Little-Tex, 39 S.W.3d at 598; Glazer's Wholesale, 95 S.W.3d at 298 (citing Tex. Pub. Bldg. Auth. v. Mattox, 686 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. 1985)).

B. Authorities Respecting the Constitutionality of Family Code Section 153.433

We note at the outset of our analysis that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Troxel is clearly limited to the application of the Washington statute to the facts of that case. Accordingly, we cannot apply Troxel as a sweeping indictment of all non-parental visitation statutes in general or as to the Texas statute in particular. Further, the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to define the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054. There the Court said, "Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of [the Washington statute] and the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case ... [w]e do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context." Id. The Court continued: "Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter." Id.

It is clear that a parent does hold a special liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of the parent's children. That liberty interest of parents includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." Id. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)). Children are not "mere creature[s] of the State." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535, 45 S.Ct. 571). The decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to this parental right reflect "Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children." Bates v. Tesar, 81 S.W.3d 411, 436 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) ("[W]e held that the `liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to `establish a home and bring up children' and `to control the education of their own.'")). Accordingly, when a court is injected into a situation wherein it is asked to make decisions respecting the competing wishes of a fit parent and the child's grandparents, the court "must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70, 120 S.Ct. 2054.

Several Texas courts have addressed the grandparent visitation statute since the Troxel decision was delivered. However, no decision has directly held that the statute is unconstitutional. In Lilley v. Lilley, 43 S.W.3d 703 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, no pet.), the court held specifically that section 153.433 is "not unconstitutional on its face or in the district court's application to the facts at hand." Id. at 713. Differing somewhat with the Lilley holding, the El Paso court of appeals, in Roby...

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