In re Care and Treatment of Coffman

• Decision Date: 12 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. SC 87803.,SC 87803.
• Parties: In the Matter of the CARE AND TREATMENT OF Larry L. COFFMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

225 S.W.3d 439

In the Matter of the CARE AND TREATMENT OF Larry L. COFFMAN, Appellant.

No. SC 87803.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

June 12, 2007.

Emmett D. Queener, Office of the Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Charles Birmingham, Alana Barragan-Scott, Asst. Atty. Generals, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Chief Justice.

Introduction

In January 2004, a St. Louis jury found that Larry Coffman suffered from pedophilia and a personality disorder and determined that he was a sexually violent predator. Based on this finding, Coffman was committed to a secure Missouri Department of Mental Health facility.

Coffman petitioned for release based on his assertion that he was no longer a sexually violent predator because he was not more likely than not to commit a sexually violent offense if released. The circuit court, probate division, denied his petition without a hearing.

Coffman challenges the denial of his petition and also challenges the constitutionality of the 2004 amendment to section 632.498, which sets forth the procedure for determining whether a sexually violent predator is entitled to release.

The statute is constitutional as written. The two-part hearing procedure does not violate due process or the equal protection clause. Coffman's petition was not frivolous, and the trial court erred in denying it without a hearing. The judgment is reversed. The case is remanded. On remand, the court shall provide Coffman a hearing pursuant to section 632.498.

Facts and Procedural History

Missouri law provides that Coffman is to remain in the custody of the department of mental health until such time as his "mental abnormality has so changed that [he] is safe to be at large." Section 632.495.2.¹ The law allows Coffman to petition for release upon his own motion. Section 632.498. Coffman petitioned for release in March 2006. The trial court denied his petition without a hearing.

In support of his petition for release, Coffman presented the reports of evaluations by three experts. Dr. Stephen Peterson, a psychiatrist, performed an initial examination and noted that Coffman's medical status had "changed considerably" since his last assessment. Dr. Peterson believed that Coffman suffered from cardiovascular and pulmonary disorders and recommended that Coffman be evaluated by specialists in those two areas.

Dr. Allen Soffer performed the cardiovascular examination. Dr. Soffer did not find any heart disease and suspected that Coffman suffered from pulmonary problems.

Dr. Mark Briete performed a pulmonary examination. Dr. Briete found that Coffman had restricted lung functioning and pulmonary lung disease. Dr. Briete noted that Coffman suffered from shortness of breath upon exertion and required a wheelchair and supplemental oxygen.

All three doctors recommended that Coffman stop smoking and lose weight through diet and exercise. Neither Dr. Soffer nor Dr. Briete gave an opinion as to whether and to what extent Coffman's physical condition would affect his ability to commit future sexually violent offenses.

After receiving the reports of Dr. Soffer and Dr. Briete, Dr. Peterson completed his evaluation, concluding that Coffman is "severely physically debilitated by his lung disease," that he "is becoming more medically fragile and therefore less dangerous," that the damage "cannot be reversed," that he would eventually suffer congestive heart failure, and that he would require the constant use of supplemental oxygen and a wheelchair. Dr. Peterson believed that Coffman's condition would require him to live in a nursing home or similar care facility. Dr. Peterson determined that, "[t]aken together, the clinical information strongly indicates that Mr. Larry Coffman no longer presents as more likely than not to commit predatory acts of sexual violence because he is too physically debilitated. Certainly, his thinking about his offense has not changed much, but he will be unable to alter his physical state very much. Therefore, any victim out of his immediate reach is safe. He certainly cannot chase anyone down and cannot exert himself without quickly feeling exhausted."

The circuit court denied Coffman's petition without a hearing, finding that the petition was frivolous because Coffman did not allege facts demonstrating that his mental condition had changed or that his mental abnormality no longer existed.

Coffman appeals the trial court's order to this Court, alleging that he is entitled to a hearing and that the 2004 amendment to section 632.498, which increases his initial burden from probable cause to preponderance of the evidence, is unconstitutional.

Standard of Review

The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law and is therefore reviewed de novo. Barker v. Barker, 98 S.W.3d 532, 534 (Mo. banc 2003). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and this Court will read the statute in a manner consistent with the constitution whenever possible. Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 102 (Mo. banc 2007); Asbury v. Lombardi, 846 S.W.2d 196, 199 (Mo. banc 1993).

Section 632.504 allows the circuit court to dismiss a petition without hearing if it is "frivolous," and the circuit court did so here. The state argues that Coffman cannot challenge the constitutionality of section 632.498 because he was denied a hearing under that statute by the circuit court's determination that his petition was frivolous. Since this Court concludes that Coffman's petition was not frivolous and he should have received a hearing, it is proper to address the procedures that should apply at that hearing.

Discussion

1. The two-trial discharge procedure of section 632.498 does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the committed person and is not unduly burdensome

The states are allowed to enact sexually violent predator statutes that provide for the involuntary civil commitment of certain individuals who are determined to be dangerous to society "if the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards." Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997).

Missouri has provided procedures and evidentiary standards for the designation — and involuntary civil commitment — of sexually violent predators in sections 632.480 to 632.513. Once a person has been designated a sexually violent predator and committed to a mental health facility, the department of mental health is required to evaluate his mental condition annually. Section 632.498. There are two methods by which a sexually violent predator can obtain release after he has been committed. First, if the director of the department of mental health determines "that the person's mental abnormality has so changed that the person is not likely to commit acts of sexual violence if released," then the director must authorize the person to petition the court for release. Section 632.501. The circuit court then holds a hearing where the state has the burden to show that the petitioner should not be released. Id.

Second, if the department of mental health does not conclude that the sexually violent predator should be released, he is nevertheless free to petition for his release at any time. Section 632.498. Coffman attempted to secure release under this provision. Under the 2000 version of the statute, the circuit court was required to set a hearing on the petition unless the petition is frivolous, and, if the court determined that there was probable cause to believe that the person should be released, then a trial was to be held. At this trial, which may be by jury, the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person should not be released. Thus, the 2000 statute provided a two-part test: first, the committed person must show probable cause why he should be released; second, the state must show beyond a reasonable doubt why he should not.

Section 632.498 was amended in 2004. The amendment raises the initial showing that must be made by the sexually violent predator from "probable cause" to a "preponderance of the evidence." Coffman argues that this raised burden is unduly burdensome because it shifts the ultimate burden to the sexually violent predator to show that he should be released, rather than requiring the state to demonstrate why he should not be released. Although his release petition was filed after the 2004 amendment took effect, Coffman sought release under the provisions of the 2000 statute, claiming that the 2004 amendment was unconstitutional.

This Court considered a similar due process argument in In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Wilbur Schottel, 159 S.W.3d 836 (Mo. banc 2005). That case determined that the 2000 version of section 632.498 was constitutional, despite requiring the sexually violent predator to make the initial showing. Schottel received a hearing before the trial judge on his petition, but the judge determined at that hearing that Schottel did not provide probable cause to believe that he would not reoffend and, therefore, denied Schottel a second jury trial. Id. at 840. Schottel argued that the statute required him to prove that he "would not" reoffend and that this was a higher burden on him than was required by the state to obtain his initial commitment. Id. at 841. Schottel argued that the statute therefore violated due process. Id. This Court rejected Schottel's "hyper-technical" reading of the statute's term to require him to prove absolutely that he "will not" reoffend. Id. at 841-42. Rather, this Court held that the statute, when "read in context," provides that, "at the initial hearing, the legislature merely intends the judge to act in a gatekeeper role. He or she is not asked to reach a final decision as to the person's danger to the community or whether the person is still [a sexually violent predator], but to determine whether `probable cause exists to believe'"...