In re Carey

• Decision Date: 29 August 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 219592.
• Citation: 241 Mich. App. 222,615 N.W.2d 742
• Parties: In the Matter of David Anthony CAREY, Minor. People of the State of Michigan, Petitioner-Appellee, v. David Anthony Carey, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

615 N.W.2d 742

241 Mich. App. 222

In the Matter of David Anthony CAREY, Minor.

People of the State of Michigan, Petitioner-Appellee, v. David Anthony Carey, Respondent-Appellant.

Docket No. 219592.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 14, 2000, at Lansing.

Decided May 19, 2000, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication August 29, 2000.

Dennis P. Grenkowicz, Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert A. Reuther, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, for the petitioner.

Silver & Elder (by David S. Elder), Alpena, for the respondent.

Before BANDSTRA, C.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH and ZAHRA, JJ.

BANDSTRA, C.J.

In this appeal we consider whether a court must determine the competency of a juvenile accused of an offense when a claim is raised that the juvenile is incompetent to stand trial in the adjudicative phase of a delinquency proceeding. We hold that the Due Process Clause requires this determination. We further hold that, in making this determination, the provisions of the Mental Health Code applicable to determinations of adult competency for criminal trials should be employed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

A petition was filed in the Alpena County Probate Court, Juvenile Division, now part of the Family Division of the Alpena Circuit Court, alleging that respondent had committed second-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. § 750.520c; MSA 28.788(3). Shortly after the petition was filed, the prosecutor moved that respondent be evaluated concerning both his competency to stand trial and his criminal responsibility. The trial court granted this motion. Respondent was examined by Jason Stentoumis, a psychologist at Northeast Michigan Community Health.¹ After this examination was performed, counsel for respondent moved for a competency hearing, claiming that respondent had a due process right to a hearing and requesting that the practice for determining competency in adult criminal cases be followed.

The court held a competency hearing on January 17, 1997. Cary Bautel, who was employed as a psychologist by the Alpena-Montmorency-Alcona Educational Service District, testified that he had performed a psychological evaluation on respondent. The tests had indicated that respondent had a full scale IQ of 52. Bautel had classified respondent as being in the lower range of the classification "educable mentally impaired." Bautel's last dealings with respondent had been in 1994. The trial court did not allow Bautel to give testimony regarding respondent's competency to stand trial. However, it allowed Bautel to testify regarding respondent's ability to function within the legal system. Bautel testified that in his opinion, respondent would understand very little of the proceedings.

Just as with Bautel, the trial court did not allow Stentoumis to testify directly about respondent's competency to stand trial. However, it allowed Stentoumis to testify about respondent's current level of functioning. According to Stentoumis, respondent's full scale IQ was 65, which placed him in the lowest one percentile of people his age. Respondent could understand simple language, but abstract matters were difficult for him to comprehend. In addition, he had short-term memory problems. However, respondent was capable of carrying on a conversation that was goal-oriented. Stentoumis believed that respondent was aware he had done something wrong because, as Stentoumis put it, "[h]is mother was angry with him and [respondent] stated he wouldn't do it again because his Mom was upset with him." Stentoumis was not sure whether respondent would be able to assist counsel.

After the close of testimony, the trial court offered its doubts about whether competency determinations were appropriate for the juvenile court. Nonetheless, on May 15, 1998, the court concluded that respondent was not competent to stand trial because he could not understand the nature and object of the proceedings. However, on December 31, 1998, the court issued an opinion in which it ruled that the issue of competency was not relevant to the adjudicative phase of a juvenile proceeding.² It is from this ruling that respondent appeals.

Respondent contends that he has a due process right not to be subjected to the adjudicative phase of a delinquency proceeding while incompetent to stand trial and a right to have his competency determined. A claim of incompetency to stand trial, and the right to a competency determination, implicates constitutional due process protections. People v. Newton, (After Remand), 179 Mich.App. 484, 487, 446 N.W.2d 487 (1989). Issues of constitutional law are reviewed de novo. People v. Sierb, 456 Mich. 519, 522, 581 N.W.2d 219 (1998); People v. Walker, 234 Mich.App. 299, 302, 593 N.W.2d 673 (1999).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

No cases in Michigan have addressed the due process right of a juvenile to be determined competent as a prerequisite to the adjudicative phase of a delinquency proceeding. Further, Michigan has no statutory procedures expressly dealing with competency in the context of juvenile proceedings. While there are Mental Health Code procedures for determining the competency of adult criminal defendants, see M.C.L. § 330.2020 et seq.; MSA 14.800(1020) et seq., proceedings held in the family division of the circuit court, which include delinquency proceedings, are not considered to be criminal proceedings. MCL 712A.1(2); MSA 27.3178(598.(1)(2). Thus, the questions before this Court are (1) whether due process demands that a competency determination be made before a questionably competent juvenile is subjected to the adjudicative phase of a delinquency proceeding, and (2) if such a right exists, whether the provisions of the Mental Health Code for competency determinations apply to juvenile competency proceedings. We conclude that (1) juveniles have a due process right not to be subjected to the adjudicative phase of juvenile proceedings while incompetent, and (2) although the Mental Health Code provisions for competency determinations by their terms apply only to defendants in criminal proceedings, they can serve as a guide for juvenile competency determinations.

GENERAL LEGAL BACKGROUND

Although juvenile proceedings are not considered adversarial in nature, they are closely analogous to the adversary criminal process. In re Wilson, 113 Mich.App. 113, 121, 317 N.W.2d 309 (1982). Proceedings in a juvenile court need not conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial; however, essential requirements of due process and fair treatment must be met. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); In re Belcher, 143 Mich.App. 68, 71, 371 N.W.2d 474 (1985). Among the essential requirements of due process and fair treatment are the requirement that the allegations in a delinquency petition be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), the right to notice of the charges, Gault, supra at 34, 87 S.Ct. 1428, the right to counsel, id. at 41, 87 S.Ct. 1428, the right to confrontation and cross-examination, id. at 57, 87 S.Ct. 1428, the privilege against self-incrimination, id. at 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, and the right not to be placed in jeopardy twice, see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-531, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). However, not all due process rights conferred on adults accused of a crime are applied to juveniles in delinquency proceedings, primarily because of the special nature of the proceedings. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). (Due process does not require a trial by jury in juvenile cases.).

The conviction of an individual when legally incompetent violates due process of law. Newton, supra at 487, 446 N.W.2d 487; U.S. Const. Ams. V, XIV; Const. 1963 art. 1, § 17. The protection afforded by the Due Process Clause requires that a court sua sponte hold a hearing regarding competency when any evidence raises a bona fide doubt about the competency of the defendant. People v. Ray, 431 Mich. 260, 270, n. 5, 430 N.W.2d 626 (1988).

Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so. [ Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-140, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring)

, citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-172, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975).]

DUE PROCESS AND JUVENILE COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS

Although this state has not addressed the issue of competency determinations in juvenile proceedings, a number of other jurisdictions have concluded that competency, if properly raised, must be determined by the court. In James H. v. Superior Court of Riverside Co., 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 174, 143 Cal.Rptr. 398 (1978), the California Court of Appeals held that juveniles had a due process right to be afforded a hearing when a question arose with respect to competency. The court reasoned that an incompetent juvenile would be unable to cooperate with counsel, thus denying the juvenile the effective assistance of counsel. Id. The court also held that the trial court had the inherent power to conduct a competency hearing; thus, it reasoned, the lack of statutory procedures did not preclude holding a hearing. Id. at 175, 143 Cal.Rptr. 398. The Supreme Court of Louisiana concluded that the right of an incompetent juvenile not to be subjected to juvenile proceedings was "fundamental" and "essential," and analogized this right to the right not to be tried in absentia. In re Causey, 363 So.2d 472, 476 (La., 1978). In In re Two Minor Children, 95 Nev. 225, 230-231, 592 P.2d 166 (1979), the Nevada Supreme Court similarly found a due process right to a competency hearing. Its holding...