In re Carlstad
| Citation | 150 Wash.2d 583,80 P.3d 587 |
| Decision Date | 04 December 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 73775-4., No. 73565-4 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of Monti CARLSTAD, Petitioner. State of Washington, Respondent, v. Brian McLean, Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Washington Appellate Project, Thomas Kummerow, Maureen Cyr, Seattle, for Petitioner.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Daniel Clark, Deputy County Prosecutor. David McEachran, Whatcom County Prosecutor, MacDuffie Setter, Laura Hayes, Kimberly A. Thulin, Deputy County Prosecutors, for Respondent.
Mark Wilner, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae (Aclu of Washington).
David Zuckerman, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae (Aclu of Washington).
Washington Court Rules mandate that a collateral attack on a judgment and sentence (judgment) in a criminal case must be made within one year after the judgment becomes final. Both Monti Carlstad and Brian McLean were in prison and acting pro se when they filed separate collateral attacks on their judgments. Carlstad filed a personal restraint petition (PRP), and McLean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Each deposited the necessary pleadings with prison officials prior to the expiration date for their collateral attacks. In both cases, however, the pleadings were not received by the respective courts until after the expiration of the one-year time limit. As a result, both the PRP and motion were dismissed as untimely. The issue presented is whether this court should adopt, through case law, the mailbox rule for pro se prisoners and consider the pleadings filed upon delivery to prison officials. We decline to adopt the mailbox rule through case law.
Monti Carlstad accepted a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to numerous burglary charges. He was sentenced to 136 months' confinement. The judgment was filed on April 17, 2000. Carlstad received notice pursuant to RCW 10.73.110 that he had one year from April 17, 2000, in which to file a collateral attack on the judgment, subject to the limitations of RCW 10.73.090 and 10.73.100.
On Thursday, April 12, 2001, at 5:36 p.m., Carlstad handed his PRP to prison officials for mailing. The PRP arrived at the Court of Appeals on Wednesday, April 18, 2001 — one day after expiration of the statutory deadline. The Court of Appeals dismissed his PRP because it was not timely filed. In re Pers. Restraint of Carlstad, 114 Wash. App. 447, 458, 58 P.3d 301 (2002). Carlstad appealed to this court and we granted discretionary review. In re Pers. Restraint of Carlstad, 149 Wash.2d 1008, 67 P.3d 1097 (2003).
Brian McLean pleaded guilty to charges of first degree assault, first degree robbery, and other charges. At sentencing, McLean moved to merge the first degree assault and first degree robbery convictions, contending that they encompassed the same criminal conduct. The trial court denied his motion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, State v. Mc-Lean, noted at 96 Wash.App. 1011 (1999), and this court denied review. State v. McLean, 139 Wash.2d 1018, 994 P.2d 846 (2000). His judgment was entered on January 21, 2000.
On the evening of Thursday, January 18, 2001, McLean placed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea under the door of the prison law librarian's office. The librarian logged the motion into the prison log book on Friday, January 19, 2001. The motion was postmarked Monday, January 22, 2001, and received at the Whatcom County Superior Court on Wednesday, January 24, 2001. The superior court dismissed the motion because it was not filed within one year of the judgment becoming final, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. McLean, noted at 115 Wash.App. 1030 (2003). McLean appealed to this court and we granted discretionary review. State v. McLean, 149 Wash.2d 1008, 67 P.3d 1097 (2003).
Should this court adopt, through case law, the mailbox rule for pro se prisoners and consider their collateral attacks on a judgment and sentence timely filed if delivered to prison officials on or before the one-year collateral attack time limit?
Carlstad and McLean ask us to adopt a mailbox rule similar to that created by the United States Supreme Court in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). In Houston, after the federal district court dismissed a pro se prisoner's writ for habeas corpus, the prisoner delivered a notice of appeal for mailing to the district court to prison officials prior to the statutory deadline for such appeals. Id. at 268, 108 S.Ct. 2379. However, the district court stamped the notice "filed" one day after the statutory deadline and dismissed his appeal as untimely. Id. at 268-69, 108 S.Ct. 2379. The United States Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and determined that a notice of appeal would be considered filed at the moment a pro se prisoner delivers it to prison officials. Id. at 268, 108 S.Ct. 2379. The Court determined that the applicable statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2107,1 did not define when a notice of appeal had been "filed," nor did it indicate with whom it must be filed. Houston, 487 U.S. at 272,108 S.Ct. 2379. The Court then turned to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which required "filing" with the clerk of the court within 30 days.2 The Court noted that while it was undisputed that the notice had to be delivered to the clerk of the district court, the question remained as to how to determine at what moment a "filing" had occurred. Houston, 487 U.S. at 272-73,108 S.Ct. 2379.
The Court, while acknowledging the general rule that the court clerk's receipt of the pleadings was usually considered the moment of filing, found that the general rule should not apply to pro se prisoners. Id. at 275, 108 S.Ct. 2379. Whereas a civil litigant may choose to risk tardiness by mailing a notice of appeal, a pro se prisoner's only option for filing papers with a court is by handing them over to prison officials to mail. Id. The Court noted that a pro se prisoner "has no choice but to entrust the forwarding of his notice of appeal to prison authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and who may have every incentive to delay." Id. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 2379. The Court recognized that, although the mailbox rule had been rejected in other contexts because it would increase disputes and uncertainty over when a filing occurred, pro se prisoners could avoid such disputes because prison officials had welldeveloped procedures for recording the date and time at which they received papers for mailing. Id. at 275, 108 S.Ct. 2379. In Houston, the Court adopted the mailbox rule for pro se prisoners.3
After Houston, and before the appeals in these cases, two Court of Appeals divisions reached different conclusions regarding adoption of the mailbox rule.
In State v. Robinson, Division One of the Court of Appeals rejected the mailbox rule. State v. Robinson, 104 Wash.App. 657, 17 P.3d 653 (2001). In Robinson, the defendant argued that her motion to withdraw guilty plea was timely filed because it was mailed three days before the one-year deadline. Id. at 660, 17 P.3d 653. The Robinson court turned to CrR 8.4, which states: "CR 5 shall govern service and filing of written motions (except those heard ex parte) in criminal causes." Id. at 665, 17 P.3d 653. CR 5 is entitled: "Sendee and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers." The court then noted that while CR 5(b)(2)(A) provides that "service shall be deemed complete upon the third day following the day upon which they are placed in the mail ...," CR 5(e) contains no such provision for "filing" with the court. Id. Instead, it simply states:
The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court....
CR 5(e). The court rejected the mailbox rule, impliedly reasoning that filing occurs upon receipt of the papers by the clerk of the court. Id.
Several months later, Division Three of the Court of Appeals, citing Houston v. Lack, approved the mailbox rule for a pro se prisoner who delivered a motion to withdraw guilty plea to prison officials for mailing before the one-year deadline, but it was received by the court after the deadline. State v. Hurt, 107 Wash.App. 816, 27 P.3d 1276 (2001). The Hurt court, believing there was no Washington case directly on point (and not mentioning Robinson), turned to analogous federal collateral attack time limitation law for guidance, finding it to be highly persuasive. Id. at 822-23, 27 P.3d 1276. The court reiterated that prisoners have no choice but to deposit their appeals in the hands of prison officials, who may not mail them in a timely fashion. Id. at 823, 27 P.3d 1276. The court acknowledged that there is a strong public interest in finality of judgment, but that it was difficult to see how those interests would be affected by adding a few days to the timeliness of only a handful of cases. Id. at 826-27, 27 P.3d 1276. The court also noted that concern for a pro se prisoner's equal protection rights also compelled its decision. Id. at 827, 27 P.3d 1276.
Carlstad and McLean filed different types of collateral attacks on their judgments. Carlstad filed a PRP, while McLean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A PRP is filed in the Court of Appeals, and a motion to withdraw guilty plea is filed in superior court.
1. Carlstad PRP. PRPs are special proceedings over which the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction (concurrent with the Supreme Court) and are governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. RAP 1.1(e), 16.3(c), 16.17.
A PRP attacking a judgment must be filed within one year of the petitioner's judgment becoming final. RCW 10.73.090(1). Carlstad's judgment was final on April 17, 2000. Therefore, the one-year...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ongom v. Dept. of Health
...to deflect substantive attention from a wrongly decided case. See RAP 1.2(a); see also, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Carlstad, 150 Wash.2d 583, 597, 80 P.3d 587 (2003) (Sanders, J., dissenting) ("Together RAP 1.2(a), RAP 1.2(c), and RAP 18.8(a) make clear that an appellate court should li......
-
In re Fero
...of our court rules, those concerns should be addressed "through the normal rule-making process." In re Pers. Restraint of Carlstad , 150 Wash.2d 583, 592 n.4, 80 P.3d 587 (2003). However, "[f]oisting [an unfounded interpretation of the court rules] upon courts and parties by judicial fiat c......
-
State v. Parvin
...P.3d 589 (2013) (citing State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007)). ¶ 40 The State cites In re Pers. Restraint of Carlstad, 150 Wash.2d 583, 80 P.3d 587 (2003), in support of its argument. In Carlstad and the companion case, State v. McLean, the Supreme Court refused to......
-
State v. Burns, 95528-0
...to bypass normal rule making procedure, as that deprives us of the benefit of valuable perspectives. In re Pers. Restraint of Carlstad, 150 Wash.2d 583, 592 n.4, 80 P.3d 587 (2003) (even if nonexistent rule is desirable, "the rule should be adopted through the normal rule-making process[, w......