In re Cedric K., A115680 (Cal. App. 7/25/2007)

• Decision Date: 25 July 2007
• Docket Number: A115680
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re CEDRIC K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CEDRIC K., Defendant and Appellant.

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In re CEDRIC K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CEDRIC K., Defendant and Appellant.

A115680

Court of Appeals of California, First Appellate District, Division Five

July 25, 2007

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from the Contra Costa County, Super. Ct. No. J0600698.

GEMELLO, J.

Defendant Cedric K. appeals after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging that he committed second degree robbery. Defendant challenges admission of his confession and the juvenile court disposition. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

An April 2006 petition under section 602 alleged that defendant, born in February 1989, committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211/212.5, subd. (c)). The juvenile court sustained the petition after a contested jurisdictional hearing, adjudged defendant a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602¹, and committed him to a county institution (the Boys Ranch) for a period not to exceed nine months.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

At Richmond High School at around 12:50 p.m. on March 21, 2006, Elias P. was sitting on a bench with two other students eating lunch. Two males walked up behind him and said, "Give me your iPod." Elias thought it was a joke and did not respond. The males then grabbed him by the shoulders and slammed him to the ground. The assailants grabbed his headphones, which were not connected to the iPod, and demanded the iPod. Elias said he did not have it, and the assailants searched him and one grabbed the iPod from Elias' pants pocket. Before they left, one of the assailants punched Elias on the left cheek twice.

Elias stood up five to seven seconds after the robbery and from about 10 to 12 feet away saw the defendant leaving. Elias knew the defendant from elementary school. Elias testified that he was sure defendant was one of the assailants. Elias did not see the other assailant.

The only other eyewitness, one of the students sitting with Elias, immediately fled and was unable to identify the defendant.

In March 2006, Richmond police officer Eddie Russell was assigned as a school resource officer. Following the robbery of Elias, Russell arrested defendant at a store in Richmond. Russell knew defendant from a school program called Stop Drop, and the officer spoke with him at least two or three times a week. Russell read defendant his Miranda² rights from a card, and defendant agreed to talk.

Defendant initially denied that he was present at the scene of the robbery, but he eventually admitted his involvement in the crime. He said that someone he knew as "Creole" called him over and said that a youth sitting on a lunch bench had "it" somewhere in his pockets. Defendant grabbed the victim and threw him to the ground. They snatched the victim's headphones and Creole punched the victim in the face. Defendant found the iPod in the victim's pocket and gave it to Creole, who later sold it and gave defendant $50.

DISCUSSION

I. Validity of the Miranda Waiver

Defendant contends that the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to suppress the confession he gave for lack of evidence that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary.

"A minor has a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which precludes admission of a minor's confession obtained without the minor's voluntary, intelligent, and knowledgeable waiver of his or her constitutional rights." (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 383-384.) "First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the `totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421.)

On appeal, "we accept the [juvenile] court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. We independently determine from the undisputed facts and the facts properly found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained." (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 992.)

Officer Russell's testimony, which the trial court clearly credited, supports the court's finding that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Officer Russell testified that he read defendant his rights and asked defendant if he understood each of the rights, to which defendant answered "yep." Russell then asked, "Having those rights in mind do you wish to talk to me now?" Defendant responded, "We can talk. I ain't tripping." Russell also testified that defendant appeared to understand the questions throughout the interrogation. Defendant was 17 years old at the time.

Defendant contends that his mental disabilities precluded him from making a knowing and voluntary waiver. Defendant's aunt, Angie Clark, testified that he has "multiple mental illnesses" due to a near-fatal drowning accident when he was a child. Defendant is on SSI for his mental disability, he has motor skill and speech problems, he "gets confused, things mixed up," he is "easily influenced" by other people, and he is in a special education program. His disability affects his judgment and understanding of basic instructions. For example, when sent to the store to buy certain items, he will come back with different items; he gives away his property; and on one occasion Clark saw him step out into the street in front of an oncoming truck. On cross-examination, Clark admitted that defendant was in the general student body at Richmond High School through his sophomore year.

Defendant's cognitive difficulties are not so extreme as to preclude a finding of valid waiver. " ` "Neither a low I.Q. nor any particular age of minority is a proper basis to assume lack of understanding, incompetency, or other inability to voluntarily waive the right to remain silent under some presumption that the Miranda explanation was not understood." ' " (People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 384.) In Lewis, the defendant was less than 14 years old and a paranoid schizophrenic. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, because the defendant actively participated in the interrogation and expressed no confusion either before or during the interview, the Court rejected the suggestion that his age and mental illness undermined the finding that he validly waived his rights. (Ibid.) The same is true here. Further, there is no evidence that Russell engaged in deception, intimidation, or coercion preceding defendant's waiver. The trial court did not err in finding that defendant validly waived his Miranda rights.

II. Voluntariness of Confession

Defendant contends that his counsel below was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his confession on the ground that it was obtained through coercion. Defendant's counsel did argue that the waiver was invalid, but counsel did not argue that the confession itself was involuntary. Counsel was not ineffective, because a motion to suppress on the ground of voluntariness would have lacked merit.

A confession is considered voluntary " `if the accused's decision to speak is entirely "self-motivated" [citation], i.e., if he freely and voluntarily chooses to speak without "any form of compulsion or promise of reward . . . ." ' " (People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 238.) A confession is involuntary where "a person in authority makes an express or clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage for the accused which is a motivating cause of the decision to confess." (Ibid.) Coercive police activity (such as implied promises and threats) is a necessary predicate to a finding of involuntariness. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1041.) The question of voluntariness is viewed "in light of the record in its entirety, including `all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.' " (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 779.) Defendant argues that his confession was the product of deception and implied promises and threats. " `It is settled that admonitions to tell the truth do not amount to coercion'; nor do `assertions that one is better off telling the truth' constitute false promises of leniency." (People v. Seaton (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 67, 74; see also In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200, 210-212 [summarizing cases].) As our Supreme Court has explained, "When the benefit pointed out by the police to a suspect is merely that which flows naturally from a truthful and honest course of conduct, we can perceive nothing improper in such police activity. On the other hand, if in addition to the foregoing benefit, or in the place thereof, the defendant is given to understand that he might reasonably expect benefits in the nature of more lenient treatment at the hands of the police, prosecution or court in consideration of making a statement, even a truthful one, such motivation is deemed to render the statement involuntary and inadmissible." (People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 549.)

The critical distinction is whether the interrogating officers made only general statements that cooperation would be advantageous or whether they made specific promises of leniency, whether express or implied. (See People v. Vasila (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 865, 874 [defendant was promised that federal prosecution would not be instituted and that he would be released on own recognizance]; In re Shawn D., supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 214-216 [defendant was promised that his honesty and cooperation would be noted in the police report and that the officer would speak to the...