In re Centerpoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC

Decision Date30 June 2021
Docket NumberNo. 19-0777,19-0777
Citation629 S.W.3d 149
Parties IN RE CENTERPOINT ENERGY HOUSTON ELECTRIC, LLC, Relator
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Marnie A. McCormick, Duggins Wren Mann & Romero, LLP, Austin, for Amici Curiae Entergy Texas, Inc., AEP Texas Inc., El Paso Electric Company, Electric Transmission Texas, LLC, Southwestern Electric Power Company.

Kyle D. Hawkins, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, Ari Cuenin, Office of the Solicitor General, Bill Davis, Office of the Attorney General, Assistant Solicitor General, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Texas Attorney General's Office, First Asst. Attorney General, Ryan Lee Bangert, Texas Attorney General, W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Attorney General of Texas, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, for Amicus Curiae State of Texas.

Kyle D. Hawkins, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, Bill Davis, Office of the Attorney General, Assistant Solicitor General, Austin, for Other interested party Solicitor General.

James Christopher Dean, Dean Law Firm, Trisha Danielle Ross, J. Christopher Dean Law Firm PLLC, Houston, for Real Parties in Interest Maxwell Higgins, Megan Higgins, Tommy Higgins, Karen Y. Higgins, Individually and as the Independent Administrator of the Estate of Glenn Wood Higgins, Deceased.

Macey Reasoner Stokes, Benjamin E. Gonsoulin, Ioannis Vasilios Anaipakos, Meghan D. McElvy, Baker Botts, L.L.P., Houston, for Relator.

Justice Busby announced the Court's disposition and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, and Justice Bland joined.

Three cases we decide this term address whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas Public Utility Commission (PUC) over an electric utility's rates, operations, and services extends to certain issues raised in common-law tort suits against utilities.1 In this case, a good Samaritan was electrocuted while attempting to help the victims of a wreck that downed a CenterPoint power line, and his estate and family sued CenterPoint for negligence. CenterPoint's plea to the jurisdiction presents the following question: does the PUC have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate issues of duty and breach that underlie these plaintiffs' claims?

We hold that the PUC does not have exclusive jurisdiction because the plaintiffs and their decedent are not "affected persons" statutorily authorized to bring a complaint in the PUC. In addition, whether a regulatory scheme has displaced the common-law duty of reasonable care is a matter for courts—not agencies—to decide, and CenterPoint correctly argued in the trial court that the common-law standard applies. It is for a trier of fact to determine whether the utility breached that standard, as the PUC itself has long acknowledged. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying CenterPoint's plea to the jurisdiction, and we deny its petition for writ of mandamus.

BACKGROUND

Two vehicles were involved in a collision in southern Harris County after the driver of one vehicle ran a red light. The vehicle that ran the light hit a wooden utility pole, causing the pole and the power line attached to it—owned and maintained by CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC—to fall to the ground. Glenn Wood Higgins was driving near the wreck and stopped to render aid. While walking toward the vehicle, plaintiffs allege that Higgins came into contact with electricity radiating through the ground from the downed power line. The contact knocked his body onto the line, shocking him and catching his clothes on fire. Higgins suffered severe burns and passed away three weeks later.

Higgins's family members2 and estate (collectively, plaintiffs) brought wrongful-death and survival claims against CenterPoint in Harris County Probate Court. Plaintiffs asserted causes of action for common-law negligence and gross negligence.3 They alleged that CenterPoint has a duty to design, construct, operate, and maintain its electricity distribution system to de-energize portions of the distribution lines promptly when they experience faults. Plaintiffs asserted that CenterPoint's line protection scheme was not prudently designed, and that CenterPoint chose and installed an inappropriately sized fuse. Fuses are placed on power lines to stop the flow of electricity and de-energize the line in the event of a fault. Plaintiffs contended that an appropriate fuse would have de-energized the downed power line in five seconds or less—before Higgins had even exited his truck.

CenterPoint filed a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that the PUC's exclusive jurisdiction over an electric utility's rates, operations, and services extends to adjudicating whether CenterPoint's line-protection measures complied with the law and industry standards. In CenterPoint's view, plaintiffs' complaints regarding fuse size implicate fundamental policy questions about how electric utilities must design, install, operate, and maintain their electric distribution systems. In response, plaintiffs asserted that (1) the Texas Estates Code gave the probate court exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the case, (2) the Utilities Code provisions conferring jurisdiction on the PUC did not apply because plaintiffs were not customers of the utility, and (3) the electrical operations and services at issue did not fall within the PUC's exclusive jurisdiction because it has not regulated line protection systems but rather leaves it up to utilities to comply with the industry standard of care.

The probate court denied CenterPoint's plea to the jurisdiction but stayed further proceedings while CenterPoint sought mandamus relief. CenterPoint filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, which denied relief without a substantive opinion.

ANALYSIS

CenterPoint asserts that the Public Utility Regulatory Act (PURA) gives the PUC exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the standard of care applicable to plaintiffs' tort suit and whether it violated that standard. Under the Texas Constitution, district court jurisdiction "consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where [such] jurisdiction may be conferred ... on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. As courts of general jurisdiction, district courts are presumed to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute absent a showing to the contrary. In re Entergy Corp. , 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2004). The Legislature may "bestow exclusive jurisdiction on administrative bodies," Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk , 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006), but those bodies may exercise only powers conferred in clear and express statutory language. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc. , 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex. 2002). They do not share the jurisdictional presumption of district courts. In re Entergy Corp. , 142 S.W.3d at 322.4

When the Legislature has granted an agency exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate a disputed issue, the agency has the sole authority to make an initial determination regarding that issue, and a trial court lacks jurisdiction until a party has exhausted administrative remedies. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC , 546 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. 2018). Whether the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction over an issue is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Id. If the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction, mandamus is an appropriate remedy to correct a trial court's denial of a plea to the jurisdiction. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P. , 235 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2007).

I. The probate court does not have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs' wrongful-death and survival claims.

We first address plaintiffs' contention that because the Estates Code grants the probate court original and exclusive jurisdiction over this case, jurisdiction cannot be exercised by the PUC. Plaintiffs point out that Article V Section 8 of the Texas Constitution does not mention probate courts, which have original and exclusive jurisdiction under the Estates Code to adjudicate wrongful-death and survival actions. CenterPoint counters that the statutory probate court has concurrent—not exclusive—jurisdiction over plaintiffs' case, and that probate courts—like district courts—must defer to exclusive agency jurisdiction when applicable. We agree with CenterPoint.

A statutory probate court has jurisdiction only as provided by statute. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 ("The Legislature may establish such other courts as it may deem necessary and prescribe the jurisdiction and organization thereof, and may conform the jurisdiction of the district and other inferior courts thereto."); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores , 128 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ("A statutory probate court may exercise only that jurisdiction accorded it by statute."). Plaintiffs point to several Estates Code provisions that confer exclusive original jurisdiction on probate courts. For example, "[a]ll probate proceedings must be filed and heard in a court exercising original probate jurisdiction," TEX. EST. CODE § 32.001(a), and "[i]n a county in which there is a statutory probate court, the statutory probate court has exclusive jurisdiction of all probate proceedings." Id. § 32.005(a). Plaintiffs assert that once a statutory probate court exercises original jurisdiction over a probate proceeding, that court maintains exclusive jurisdiction over any related causes of action.5

Yet the Estates Code also provides that a probate court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court over certain enumerated claims, which include those for survival or wrongful death. Id. § 32.007 ("A statutory probate court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in: (1) a personal injury, survival, or wrongful death action...."). Nothing in the text of this statute indicates that the Legislature intended to place...

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