In re Chambers' Estate

• Decision Date: 25 May 1929
• Citation: 18 S.W.2d 30,322 Mo. 1086
• Parties: In Matter of Estate of James H. Chambers, Deceased: Arthur T. Chambers, Man E. Chambers, Leslie T. Chambers and Ethel S. Ingels v. John Ralph Chambers, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

18 S.W.2d 30

322 Mo. 1086

In Matter of Estate of James H. Chambers, Deceased: Arthur T. Chambers, Man E. Chambers, Leslie T. Chambers and Ethel S. Ingels v. John Ralph Chambers, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 25, 1929

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Franklin Miller, Judge.

Affirmed.

Charles G. Revelle, George O. Durham, J. Revelle Burcham and Emil E Brill for appellant.

(1) The public policy of this State prescribes that estates of deceased persons shall descend and be distributed in a certain manner. Art. 14, Chap. 1, R. S. 1919. (2) This method and manner of descent and distribution is made subject only to certain prescribed conditions and these conditions are limited to a certain class of people and people in a certain situation. Art. 20, R. S. 1919. (3) It is entirely contrary to public policy of any state to deny access to the courts for redress or remedy for any wrong or the protection of any right. Mallet v. Smith, 60 Am. Dec. 107; Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall, 445; Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 42 U.S. S.Ct. 188; White v. Delano, 270 Mo. 16; 12 Schooler on Wills (6 Ed.) 1490, note; 5 C. J 20; Mo. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 10; Mo. Constitution Art II, sec. 30; Mo. Constitution, Art, VI, sec. 1; U.S. Constitution, Art. XIV, sec. 1; Rouse v. Branch, 91 S.C. 111, 74 S.E. 133; South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. Johns, 92 Conn. 168. (4) The Constitution of this State guarantees access to the courts of the country for redress of all wrongs and remedy for all rights, and the courts stultify themselves when they deny these remedies to the public. South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. Johns, 101 A. 961; Wright v. Cummins, 196 P. 247; In re Keenan's Will, 205 N.W. 1001; Sec. 10, Art. II, Constitution of Missouri; Cement Co. v. Gas Co., 255 Mo. 1. (5) The non-contest clause in this will violates the provision of the Constitutions of Missouri and of the United States. In re Wall, 136 N.Y.S. 452, 76 Misc. 106; In re Kathan's Will, 141 N.Y.S. 705; In re Vom Saal's Will, 145 N.Y.S. 307, 82 Misc. 531; Fifield v. Van Wyck's Excs., 27 S.E. 446, 94 Va. 557; In re Keenan's Will (Wis.), 205 N.W. 1001. (6) Wholly independent of constitutional provisions the non-contest laws violate sound principles of public policy as recognized by the courts of this State. (7) Assuming the clause to be constitutional and valid under ordinary conditions, no court should enforce this clause when there is reasonable grounds and probable cause for the contest. Tate v. Camp (Tenn.), 245 S.W. 839: Rouse v. Branch, 74 S.E. 133, 91 S.C. 111; Appeal of Chew's, 45 Pa. St. 228; Jackson v. Westerfield (N. Y.), 61 How. Prac. 399; In re Friend's Estate, 58 A. 853, 209 Pa. 442; South Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John, 101 A. 961, 92 Conn. 168; In re Baker's Estate, 168 P. 882; Sherwood v. McLaurin (S. C.), 88 S.E. 363; Lewis' Estate, 19 Pa. Dist. 695; Wright v. Cummins (Kan.), 196 P. 247; In re Lynn, 31 Pittsburgh Leg. J. N. S. (Pa.) 258; In re Owens, 32 Pittsburgh Leg. J. N. S. (Pa.) 257; Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398; Lee v. Calton, 5 T. B. Mon. 246; Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N.J.Eq. 338, 7 A. 856; Powell v. Morgan, 2 Vern. 90; Morris v. Burroughs, 1 Ark. 399; Brown v. O'Barn, 199 N.Y.S. 824; In re Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 165 N.Y.S. 71; In re Wall, 136 N.Y.S. 452; In re Vom Saal's Will, 145 N.Y.S. 307, 68 L. R. A. 451; Whitehurst v. Gotwalt (N. C.), 127 S.E. 582; 2 Schooler on Wills (6 Ed.) 1489 to 1496; In re Keenan, 205 N.W. 1001; In re Bergland, 180 Cal. 629 (in principle). (8) To deny this right of contest when probable cause and reasonable grounds existed would be calculated to work and promote fraud on the testator, legatees, the public and the court. 1 Schooler on Wills (5 Ed.) sec. 605; In re Friend's Estate, 58 A. 854; Tate v. Camp, 245 S.W. 839.

Watts & Gentry for respondents.

(1) The clause excluding plaintiff from all participation in the will of the testator because of instituting a contest of the will violates none of plaintiff's rights under the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of Missouri, or the statutes of said State, but is valid and should be enforced. There is no reason why this clause should constitute an exception to the general rule as to the right of a testator to attach conditions as he may see fit to legacies and devises; which is that a testator has an absolute right to attach any condition he may choose, so long as it is not against good morals or public policy. Gibson v. Gibson, 219 S.W. 565. While the precise clause in question has never been ruled upon by any appellate court in Missouri, the rule for which we contend is recognized by abundant authority. Donegan v. Wade, 70 Ala. 501; In re Miller, 156 Cal. 119, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 868; In re Garcilon, 104 Cal. 570, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 953; In re Bergland's Estate, 180 Cal. 629, 182 P. 277; Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 461, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 898; Hoit v. Hoit, 42 N.J.Eq. 388; Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546; In re Kitcher, 220 P. 301; Smithsonian Inst. v. Meech, 169 U.S. 399; Beall v. Schley, 2 Gill. 181, 200; Fifield v. Van Wyck, 94 Va. 557; Breitsupt v. Vansatt, 1 Rich. Eq. 465; Cochran v. Cochran, 127 Pa. 486; In re O'Neil, 19 S.C. 170; In re Kirkholder's Est., 149 N.Y. 87. (2) Appellant had no probable cause for instituting the contest of the will, and acted in bad faith in so doing. In re Kitcher, 220 P. 301; Lanciscus v. Louisville Tr. Co., 256 S.W. 424.

Lindsay, C. Seddon and Ellison, CC., concur.

OPINION

John J.

Ralph Chambers, is a son of Jame H. Chambers, deceased, by the latter's first marriage. The respondents are the widow and children of the deceased by his second marriage.

This proceeding originated in the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis, in the final distribution of the estate, under the will of the deceased. The probate court upheld the validity of a "nocontest" clause contained in the will.

Appellant, said John Ralph Chambers, had contested the will of his father, and the probate court, upon the application of respondents, adjudged that he had thereby forfeited the legacy given by the will, and ordered the share given him to be divided equally among the respondents, the other residuary legatees. One-fifth of the residue of the estate was devised to a trustee for the sole use of John Ralph Chambers during his lifetime, and at his death, to go to the other beneficiaries under the will.

The fifth clause of the will is as follows:

"Fifth. If any devisee, legatee or beneficiary under this, my will, shall contest the validity or object to the probate of this instrument or attempt to vacate the same or to alter or change any of the provisions hereof such person shall be thereby deprived of all beneficial interest thereunder and of any share in my estate, and the share of such person shall become a part of my residuary estate, and such person shall be excluded from taking any part of such residuary estate, and the same shall be divided among the other persons entitled to take such residuary estate."

The issues and the result of the suit to contest the will of James H. Chambers, may be seen in Chambers v. Chambers, 297 Mo. 512, 249 S.W. 415. In the instant proceeding, the circuit court affirmed the judgment and order of distribution made by the probate court, and this appeal was taken. Jurisdiction of the appeal is shown by the record, in that appellant's share of accrued income, had he participated in the distribution, was in excess of $ 20,000.

Counsel for appellant contend that the foregoing clause of the will is invalid, in that it is violative of public policy, and violative of certain provisions of the Constitution of this State and of the Constitution of the United States; and farther, that the suit to contest the will was prosecuted in good faith, and based upon probable cause, and that the contestant, this appellant, was justified in instituting and prosecuting that suit; and, on that account, appellant is excepted from the forfeiture provision of the will.

The question presented is one of first impression in the appellate courts of this State. However, the validity of a provision of this character has been before the appellate courts of many of the states, and not infrequently has been considered by the courts of England; and decisions are numerous not only on the question of whether such a provision is valid, but also, whether an exception to the provision for forfeiture shall be made upon the ground that the contest was one instituted upon probable cause and in good faith. The conflicting decisions reached, and the contradictory grounds upon which they proceed, and the importance and interesting character of the subject, explain perhaps, the frequency with which such cases have been the subject of annotation. In many of the earlier decisions and especially in England, the allowance of an exception to the operation of the condition of forfeiture turned upon the question whether the gift was of land or personal property, and if the latter upon the fact that there was in the will no gift over of the legacy bequeathed to the contestant. In such cases where there was no gift over, the provision for forfeiture was held to be one merely in terrorem. Recognition of this rule and reference thereto was made by Marshall, C. J., in Pray v. Belt, 26 U.S. (1 Peters) l. c. 670: "Clauses of this description have always received such judicial construction, as would comport with the reasonable intention of the testator. Even when the forfeiture of the legacy has been declared to be the penalty of not conforming to the injunction of the will, courts have considered it, if the legacy be not given over, rather as an effort to effect a desired object by intimidation, than as concluding the rights of the parties." This...