Tate v. Camp

Decision Date19 December 1922
Citation245 S.W. 839,147 Tenn. 137
PartiesTATE ET AL. v. CAMP ET AL.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Appeal from Chancery Court, Knox County; Charles Hays Brown Chancellor.

Bill by Hugh M. Tate and others against George M. Camp and others. From decree of the Court of Civil Appeals on appeal from the decree of the chancellor, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. Decree of Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.

Cates Smith, Tate & Long, of Knoxville, for Hugh M. Tate and others.

Lindsay Young & Young, of Knoxville, for George M. Camp and others.

McKINNEY J.

This bill in this cause was filed on June 28, 1921, by Hugh M Tate and Eugene C. Fretz, executors of the will of E. C. Camp, against George M. Camp, Jewel C. Fretz, Eugene C. Fretz, as an individual, and Lois Alene Camp and E. C. Camp, minors, for the purpose of having the court construe a certain provision in the will of E. C. Camp, deceased, and to have the court determine whether or not the defendant George M. Camp, a beneficiary under said will, had forfeited his interest under said will.

The clause in said will, which it is sought to have construed, and under which it is claimed the forfeiture applied, reads as follows:

"I have not overlooked any one to whom, under all the circumstances, I think I should have made a bequest, and if any person or persons to whom I have herein made bequests shall enter any contest of this will, upon any ground whatsoever, such person or persons shall forfeit and lose the provision made for them, and what they would have taken shall fall back to my estate and pass under the residuary clause of this will."

The bill was answered by the adult defendants, and James M. Meek was regularly appointed guardian ad litem for the minor defendants and answered for them. Said guardian ad litem, on behalf of his wards, is contesting the right of their father, G. M. Camp, to take under said will upon the ground that he has forfeited his right thereto by having entered a contest for the purpose of determining the validity of said will.

It appears from the pleadings and decrees, exhibited with the bill, that, when the will in question was offered in the county court of Knox county for probate, the defendant G. M. Camp filed a petition of contest, and had the record certified to the circuit court of Knox county for a hearing upon the issue of devisavit vel non. He also filed a bill in the chancery court of Knox county for the purpose of having a receiver appointed, and one was appointed, pursuant thereto, for the purpose of taking charge of and managing the estate of E. C. Camp pending a hearing as to the validity of his will.

While the case was thus pending in the circuit court, but before the issues had been formulated, the matters involved were compromised, the contest proceedings dismissed, and the will was then probated in solemn form.

The cause was heard on the pleadings, the exhibits thereto, and the following agreed statement of facts, to wit:

"Statement of Facts.

Filed May 5, 1922.

In the above-styled cause, the following facts are hereby stipulated and agreed upon in order to save cost and facilitate the preparation and hearing of the cause, to wit:

I. That the allegations of complainants' bill are true in so far as it undertakes to set forth the facts, and the exhibits to said bill are true copies of the documents and records of which they purport to be copies.

II. That E. C. Camp died at his home in Knoxville, Tenn., on the 21st day of November, 1920, at the age of 81 years; that he had been in feeble health for several months before his death.

III. That on the 23d day of April, 1920, the said E. C. Camp executed a will, copy of which is filed as an exhibit to the bill in this cause, and that said will was found among his valuable papers after his death.

IV. That Jewel C. Fretz was a niece of E. C. Camp, and that she and her son, Eugene C. Fretz, were living in the home of the said E. C. Camp at the time of his death, and had been making their home with him for seven years, and that they are two of the beneficiaries mentioned in said will of April 23, 1920.

V. That the defendant George M. Camp is a son of the said E. C. Camp, and was at the time of the death of his father his only heir.

VI. The defendant George M. Camp had been working for the Coal Creek Coal Company at its mines, located in Anderson county, Tenn., 30 years, since 1890; that during the first 10 years he worked at everything from a common laborer up to weighmaster and shipping clerk, and his wages ranged from $1 a day up to $40 a month; that in the year 1900 he was made general manager of said mines and held this position for 17 years, or up until 1917; that his duties as such general manager gave him general supervision over all of the work at the mines, especially the getting out and shipping of coal; that his salary for the first 4 or 5 years was at the rate of $1,000 per annum, and for the next 4 years it was at the rate of $1,200 per annum, and from 1910 to 1917 at the rate of $1,800 per annum; that in 1917 the Coal Creek Leasing Company was formed, which leased all of the mines of the Coal Creek Coal Company and operated them under a contract to load the coal on the cars at a stipulated price; and the said George M. Camp became president of said leasing company, and at the same time he was made general sales manager of the coal for said Coal Creek Coal Company, at a salary of $600 per annum, which position he held up to the time of the death of his father, E. C. Camp; that the capital stock of said Coal Creek Coal Company, organized prior to 1870, was $200,000; that E. C. Camp owned more than one-half of said capital stock; that said company each year, with the exception of the years 1903 and 1904, paid dividends, never less than 8 per cent. and ranged from that to a little more than 25 per cent. per annum and averaged more than 12 per cent. per annum; that the said E. C. Camp, as president of said company, drew a salary as such ranging from $3,000 to $5,000 per annum: that the duties he performed as president of said company during the last 10 years of his life were merely nominal.

VII. That the business and social relations between E. C. Camp and the son, the defendant George M. Camp, were always of the most cordial and friendly nature.

VIII. That the said G. M. Camp never had for the last 25 years sufficient income, aside from his salary and income from the Coal Creek Company, to pay the taxes and upkeep on his other property.

IX. That the said E. C. Camp, on the 22d day of June, 1918, two years and five months before his death, made a will, and in said will E. C. Camp gave to his only son and heir, George M. Camp, all of his property of every kind and description, but directed that his executors pay over to Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz the sum of $15,000 and to the said Eugene C. Fretz the sum of $10,000, and to charity for the period of five years $1,000 per annum (a true copy of which, made from the stenographer's office carbon copy thereof, is filed herewith as Exhibit A to this agreement).

X. That under the will, dated April 23, 1920, the estate of the said E. C. Camp was disposed of in value as follows:

To his son, the defendant George M. Camp, $26,800; to the children of defendant George M. Camp, Lois A. and E. C. Camp, $64,400; total devised to his son, George M. Camp, and children, $91,280. To Mrs. C. C. Gamble, widow of his deceased son Ed Camp, $13,000. To William and Mary Camp, children of his brother Henry N. Camp, $11,000. To Edna and Gene Camp, daughters of his brother Fred Camp, $16,000. To his brother James H. Camp and his daughter Edna, $17,350. To John Mallory Camp and Horace Camp, children of Mallory Camp and grandchildren of James H. Camp, $16,000. To Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz, daughter of James H. Camp, and her son Eugene C. Fretz, $221,435; total amount bequeathed to Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz, her son Eugene C. Fretz, her father James H. Camp, and her sister Edna, and to John Mallory and Horace Camp, sons of her brother Mallory Camp, $264,785.

XI. That when said will was offered for probate the defendant George M. Camp objected to said will being probated with a view to contesting the same, on the alleged grounds: First, that at the date of the making of said will his father, E. C. Camp, was not mentally capable of disposing of his property. Second, because the said Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz and Eugene C. Fretz, by the exercise of undue influence procured him to make said will. And, third, because in consideration of his working for the Coal Creek Coal Company for the last 20 years for a nominal salary he was, by agreement to heir, at his father's death the whole of his property.

XII. That before any pleadings were made, upon looking into a contest of said will, the said George M. Camp and said Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz and Eugene C. Fretz entered into an agreement by the terms of which all bequests in said will, except those to George M. Camp and Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz and Eugene C. Fretz, were left undisturbed, and they divided the property which had been devised to them so that George M. Camp took property of the value of $164,715, and Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz and her son, Eugene C. Fretz, took property valued at $83,600.

XIII. That under said will as offered for probate the defendant George M. Camp and his two children would have taken property of the value of $91,280; that under the settlement made between George M. Camp and the said Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz and Eugene C. Fretz, the value of the property taken by George M Camp and his two children combined amounted to $229,115; that in said adjustment Mrs. Jewel C. Fretz and Eugene C. Fretz, who had jointly been given $221,435 by said will, accepted property valued at $83,600 and gave up to ...

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  • Rossi v. Davis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • 22 November 1939
    ... ... the exception, in addition to the South Norwalk Trust Co ... case and In re Friend's Estate referred to above see: ... Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.W. 839, 26 A. L ... R. 755; Re Keenan (Wis.), 205 N.W. 1001, 42 A. L. R. 836 ...          It ... seems ... ...
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    ...ordinary conditions, no court should enforce this clause when there is reasonable grounds and probable cause for the contest. Tate v. Camp (Tenn.), 245 S.W. 839: Rouse Branch, 74 S.E. 133, 91 S.C. 111; Appeal of Chew's, 45 Pa. St. 228; Jackson v. Westerfield (N. Y.), 61 How. Prac. 399; In r......
  • Duncan v. Rawls, A17A2052
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    ...sometimes not only work manifest injustice, but accomplish results that no rational [settlor] would ever contemplate." Tate v. Camp , 147 Tenn. 137, 151–152, 245 S.W. 839 (1922).As one of our sister states that has adopted the majority rule that I would follow in this case has observed,[I]f......
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