In re Childers, S15Y1540.

• Decision Date: 05 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. S15Y1540.,S15Y1540.
• Citation: 297 Ga. 788,778 S.E.2d 216
• Parties: In the Matter of Dennis S. CHILDERS.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

297 Ga. 788

778 S.E.2d 216

In the Matter of Dennis S. CHILDERS.

No. S15Y1540.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 5, 2015.

Jenny K. Mittelman, Paula J. Frederick, Gen. Counsel, State Bar of Georgia, for appellant

Dennis S. Childers, Atlanta, for appellee.

Herman Maddox Kilgore, Maddox Kilgore, P.C., Marietta, Anthony B. Askew Chair, Review Panel, Atlanta, for other party

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of the special master, Herman Maddox Kilgore, who recommends that Dennis S. Childers (State Bar No. 124408) be disbarred following the entry of his guilty plea in the State Court of Cherokee County to one count of theft by receiving stolen property, OCGA § 16–8–7. Childers was sentenced under the First Offender Act, OCGA § 42–8–60, to 12 months probation. The State Bar initiated this proceeding under Bar Rule 4–106.

In a conference call with the special master, the State Bar and Childers agreed to a hearing at 9:30 a.m. on May 12, 2015. On the morning of May 11, Childers sent an email to the special master requesting a continuance. The special master replied in an email shortly thereafter denying the request and reiterating that the hearing would commence at 9:30 the next morning. Childers called the special master's office at 4:07 p.m. on May 11 asking for an update on his continuance request. At the special master's request, a staff member called Childers at the number he provided and left a message that his request had been denied and that he was directed to appear the next morning. Childers did not appear, however, and after waiting over 20 minutes, the special master commenced the hearing, at which the State Bar alleged that Childers violated Rule 8.4(a)(3) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, see Bar Rule 4–102(d). According to the Accusation to which Childers pled guilty, he received a vehicle tag that he knew was stolen and he received it without the intention of restoring it to its owner.

In determining whether Childers' conviction constituted a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, the special master looked to Comment 3 to Rule 8.4(a)(3), which provides in part that lawyers are “professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate a lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category.” The special master found that Childers' criminal offense specifically involved an act of dishonesty and, although he did not commit it in the context of his law practice, his conduct nevertheless demonstrated an indifference to legal obligations and implicated his trustworthiness, thus relating to his fitness to practice law, see In the Matter of Levin,289 Ga. 170, 709 S.E.2d 808 (2011), as the only conceivable purpose for possessing and retaining a stolen vehicle tag is to mislead law enforcement and/or the tax commissioner. Finding that Childers violated Rule 8.4(a)(3), the maximum sanction for which is disbarment, the special master considered the following factors in aggravation of discipline: Childers' prior disciplinary history, which includes a six-month suspension, see In The Matter of Childers,273 Ga. 337, 540...